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SECURITY AND RULE OF LAW: UN PEACEKEEPING IN HAITI

This chapter derives from a United Nations Association in Canada (UNA-Canada) public dialogue, held on November 7th, 2006 in Quebec City, to mark the 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping. The event included a public forum and a closed experts' roundtable. Participants in the closed experts' roundtable and panelists at the linked public event discussed the elements of security and rule of law, particularly in the context of the UN peacekeeping mission Haiti (MINUSTAH). The participants explored the strengths and weaknesses of the mission, and examined possible future scenarios. In general, the dialogue underlined the lack of security in Haiti and the weakness of judicial institutions as principal factors preventing the mission from advancing its goals. The opinions expressed in this chapter and the recommendations are derived from UNA-Canada's consultation process and are not necessarily the views of the organization.

The closed roundtable featured **Daniel Atangana**, UNA-Canada Quebec City Branch; Chief Superintendent **Dave Beer**, Director General, International Policing, Royal Canadian Mounted Police; **Sgt. Gilles Brunet**, International Peacekeeping Operations, Royal Canadian Mounted Police; **Karen Foss**, Foreign Affairs and International Trade; **Vincent Sosthène Fouda**, Sociology Department, Université Laval; **Marlye Gélín-Adams**, Regional Advocacy Advisor for Latin America and the Caribbean, CARE USA; **Major Laurent Giroux**, Canadian Forces; **Dr. Canisius Kamanzi**, Université Laval; **Edouard Onguene**, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law, Université Laval; **Diego Osorio**, Foreign Affairs and International Trade; **Major Roger Otis**, Operations Officer, Defence engineering Valcartier, DRDC Valcartier; **Marc Perron**, President, UNA-Canada Quebec City Branch; **Emily Schroeder**, Project Officer for UNA-Canada; **Kristine St-Pierre**, Consultant for UNA-Canada; **Camille Tremblay**, Consultant, World Bank and UNMIK in Kosovo; and **Dr. Gérard Verna**, Université Laval. **Julie Gagné**, Teaching Coordinator, Institut québécois des hautes études internationales (HEI), Université Laval, was the event's moderator.

BACKGROUND ON UN PEACEKEEPING IN HAITI

Reflection on the past role of the UN in Haiti helps to clarify the current discussion on Haiti and MINUSTAH. Haiti is one of few countries where the UN has repeatedly been called upon. In total, four peacekeeping missions were established between 1993 and 2000.¹

¹ United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH): <http://www.minustah.org/>.

- United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) (1993-1996; fully functional by March 1995)
- United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) (1996-1997)
- United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) (1997)
- United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) (1997-2000)

This period was characterized by positive achievements, most notably in the development of a democratic culture and of a multifaceted civil society. However, because of the continuing political crisis and the lack of stability, serious reforms to the judicial and police sectors were never undertaken. Currently, the situation is worse than it was ten years ago, exemplifying the need for the international community to define and commit to long-term objectives in Haiti.

Following the ousting of Haitian president Jean-Bertrand Aristide in February 2004, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1529 authorizing the deployment of a Multinational Interim Force (MIF). Resolution 1542 was subsequently adopted on 30 April 2004, which established the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and requested that authority be transferred from the MIF to the UN peacekeeping mission on 1 June 2004. Since then, the country has been governed by an interim government backed by a peacekeeping force under MINUSTAH.

In February 2006, Haiti held its first elections since Aristide's departure in 2004. While elections had previously been scheduled for 2005, these were postponed four times due to security concerns and logistical difficulties. Many observers viewed the elections as an important step toward a democratic and prosperous Haiti. However, much work remains to be done. Most recently, SC Resolution 1702 (15 August 2006) stated that "security, rule of law and institutional reform, national reconciliation, and sustainable economic and social development remain key to the stability of Haiti."

OVERVIEW OF PRESENT MISSION

As of 30 September 2006, the force numbers 6,642 troops and 1,700 police officers. Operating under Chapter VII of the Charter, the force is mandated to:

1. Ensure a secure and stable environment by supporting the Transitional Government and the reform of the Haitian National Police (HNP), by assisting in the implementation of DDR programmes and restoration of the rule of law, and by protecting civilians **from** imminent physical harm;
2. Support the political process by fostering democratic governance, institutional development, and national reconciliation, as well as supporting efforts at carrying out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections; and
3. Promote the protection of human rights, and monitor and report human rights violations.²

BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

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More recently, the latest report by the UN Secretary General on Haiti (document S/2006/592) argues that the country's needs remain extensive and the challenges are immense. According to the report,

The security situation continues to be worrying and destabilizing, in particular the crime situation in the capital, as the sources of instability still exist and the national security capacity to address them remains inadequate. (...) The institutions of State, including the Haitian National Police, the judicial system and the institutions of Government, require extensive assistance in order to function appropriately at all levels.³

As part of the report, the SC recommends that MINUSTAH's mandate be extended for at least another 12 months, and required that the Mission's current military strength be augmented by 54 individual police officers for institutional support and 16 seconded corrections officers. In the Secretary General's opinion, 12 months is "the minimum time needed to establish a solid basis for rule-of-law reform and achieve some initial results and progress towards democratic governance."⁴ Such time frame would provide further proof to the Haitian people of the international community's continuing commitment. Despite this recommendation, the SC extended the UN mission in Haiti until 15 February 2007 only, though with the intention of renewing the mission for further periods.

In short, it was noted that within the UN mission, the forces lack experience, communication with the local population and understanding of the local culture. There seems to be a gap

² International Crisis Group (ICG), "Haiti: Security and the Reintegration of the State," *Crisis Group Latin America/Caribbean Briefing N°12*, 30 October 2006.

³ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1702 (SC/8811).
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8811.doc.htm>.

⁴ *Ibid.*

between the international community and the local population. This gap is reflected in the local population's perception of the UN forces as "tourists". Armed groups continue to dominate the poor sectors surrounding the capital, and constitute a threat to peace. Violence and insecurity have proven to be harmful to development projects and risky for the Blue Helmets. The efforts towards disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration have so far not produced the expected results, nor have they reached the majority of rural and urban armed groups. Ultimately, the strengthening of the Haitian State is a long-term proposition, requiring a long term commitment by the international community.

FOCUS ON SECURITY AND RULE OF LAW IN HAITI

To begin, participants broached the subject of security in Haiti. Security represents the greatest challenge facing the Haitian government and MINUSTAH.⁵ It should be noted that the term "security" covers several different aspects, which should be dealt with separately. Participants identified several factors of insecurity which not only mire the country in political and institutional insecurity, but help to perpetuate the climate of precariousness. Some of these insecurity factors are listed below:

- criminality that increases daily
- the unrestricted movement of civilian and military weapons
- street gangs and urban guerrillas
- impunity and lack of judicial structures
- numerous prison escapes after the departure of M. Jean-Bertrand Aristide
- the deportation to Haiti by the United States of criminals of Haitian origin
- the silence of political leaders
- the extreme poverty of the population, illiteracy and ignorance
- the scarcity of business activities
- the high level of unemployment
- the HIV pandemic
- the Catholic Church's refusal to play a mediating role in restructuring civil society
- the devastated natural environment and the limited natural resources

According to Ms Marlye Gélin-Adams, one of the main threats in Haiti is the insecurity created by the criminal gangs that operate in defined areas or "hot zones" of the capital, Port-au-Prince. These armed groups of criminal origin are concentrated mainly in the

⁵ International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 October 2006.

shanty-towns where they compete amongst themselves for control of the areas and sow terror and desolation in the hearts of the people, notably through many cases of extortion, including kidnappings for ransom. In fact, it has been pointed out that no one is safe from kidnapping. We must also recognize that insecurity in Haiti is caused by various groups operating separately.

In addition to the gang-related insecurity is the insecurity linked to poverty, to the lack of economic and social opportunities and to the degradation of the natural environment. In Haiti, the state of decay of the institutions that should govern every state and nation is just as evident in the small everyday things like food and drinking water, as it is in the State's exercise of its governing functions, which are: keeping the peace, the security of people and property, the functioning of the justice system, the police, schools and hospitals. The absence of institutions inevitably entails erosion of the standard of living, and above all puts the country in a state of insecurity where the law is made and enforced by street gangs. Unemployment seems to be the most worrying thing for Haiti, as the country has never developed a production economy that generates and creates jobs. So the jobless population finds for its sole occupation only violence and everything that comes with it.

Participants also stressed the impact of this insecurity on international perceptions. Rumours are an enormous problem in Haiti, as each incident is magnified at the political level, creating greater insecurity than what really exists.

Four different themes under the supervision of MINUSTAH are explored below. For each, we describe the progress to date, as well as the ongoing challenges they face in restoring the rule of law.

GANGS AND LOCAL CRIMINALITY

Despite political progress following February 2006's election, armed gangs continue to dominate impoverished areas surrounding the capital city, and pose a threat to peace. Cité du Soleil, Haiti's largest slum, is home to a number of criminal gangs, which largely denounce the UN presence and continue to impede disarmament plans.⁶ According to one source, "The HNP has no permanent presence inside the neighborhoods and only mounts sporadic raids, leaving people feeling trapped in their homes."⁷ The high level of violence and insecurity has proven detrimental for development projects and risky for peacekeepers. In July 2006, three peacekeepers were wounded while on duty, and both sides exchanged fire in a neighboring suburb.⁸

⁶ Delva, Joseph Guylor. 2006. "Haitian gang leaders shelve disarmament plan." *Reuters*, 21 August. <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N21173088.htm>.

⁷ Gantz, Peter H. and Sarah Martin. 2005. "Haiti: UN Civilian Police Require Executive Authority." *Refugees International*. <http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/5383>.

⁸ UN News Centre. 2006. "Three UN Peacekeepers Wounded in Haiti; Mission Beefs Up Street Presence." 14 July. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=19204&Cr=haiti&Cr1=.el>

POLICE TRAINING

The UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL) mandate is to assist in the restoration and maintenance of law and order in Haiti. Acting as police technical advisors and as liaison between the Haitian national police and the UN force, CIVPOL provides support to the Haitian National Police in their day-to-day duties, and helps to develop its capacity, train its personnel, and reform the institution itself.⁹

However, rebuilding the police force is proving to be more difficult than had been imagined. In this context, Dr. Gérard Verna mentioned the urgency of ensuring the simultaneous emergence of both the justice system and the police, in order for human rights to be respected. This will also prevent the police from feeling obliged to do the work of the justice system, and above all will help the population find again the calm and the serenity necessary to build a lasting peace.

In addition, the participants from the RCMP and the Canadian Forces stressed the lack of cooperation and of real political will on the part of the Haitian authorities, who in particular prevent accounting for the number of police recruited by the Haitian government whose salaries should be drawn from the budget line. According to one participant, numerous phantoms continue to draw salaries in the public service, which is entirely financed by the international community. More precisely, Superintendent Dave Beer and Sergeant Gilles Brunet state that progress made during the '90s was lost under the regime of President Aristide. They say the current mission is much more complex, and its mandate much more difficult to accomplish than ten years ago. The police corps is corrupt and badly organized, and the reorganization of the police constitutes one of the greatest challenges. Despite a certain amount of progress made in identifying individuals in the HNP (Haitian National Police) who are corrupt, Haiti remains a country where impunity is the rule, and where patronage and the personal enrichment of people in high places are common.

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION IN HAITI

Since being elected in February 2006, President Preval has repeatedly demanded that armed gangs surrender their weapons. While the level of violence dropped sharply following Preval's win, kidnappings and political bloodshed have once again intensified.

Participants wondered if the failure to disarm the ex-criminals at the beginning of MINUSTAH's mandate is in part responsible for the increase in violence by the armed groups. They also wondered if the deterioration in the country's security might have been partially avoided if the disarmament projects had been put in place earlier on.

⁹ Government of Canada. "Video Interview: Graham Muir, Chief Superintendent in the RCMP and Police commissioner for MINUSTAH." <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/muir-haiti-en.asp>.

¹⁰ Human Rights Watch. 2006. "Haiti: Secure and Credible Elections Crucial for Stability." *Human Rights News*, 6 February. <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/02/06/haiti12611.htm>.

The setting up of conventional programs of disarmament, demobilization and re-integration (DDR), even if undertaken at the start of the mission, could not have given more than partial results because those programs are not well enough adapted to the local conditions found in Haiti. For example, Mr. Vincent Sosthène Fouda noted that the DDR program in Haiti differs from other programs undertaken in Africa. Whereas in Africa one finds above all former combatants, the majority of the men and women targeted by the program in Haiti are criminals. As noted by the UN Security Council, the necessary conditions for setting up conventional DDR programs are not currently present in Haiti. Indeed, the DDR program does not seem to be generating the hoped-for results. For one thing, efforts related to the DDR have so far been unsuccessful in reaching a large number of the armed groups, both rural and urban.¹⁰ The DDR program does not appear to be adapted to the reality on the ground, and is thus not prepared to take in hand the urban and rural guerrillas.

The SC has recognized that the conditions for conventional DDR do not currently exist in Haiti. As a matter of fact, DDR efforts have so far, not generated the anticipated results and have failed to reach the majority of rural and urban armed groups.¹¹ Consequently, the Council has called for the development of alternative programmes that would focus greater attention on local conditions and further the goal of DDR.¹² In September 2006, the UN announced the launch of a major campaign to persuade armed groups to disarm. In turn, the UN promises them money, food, and job training. Using the media, the UN will air radio and television ads to inform the public about the campaign and to convince groups to willingly give up their weapons.¹³

On this subject, the participants stated that it is necessary to identify the number of military weapons in circulation, to prohibit the civilian population from carrying military weapons, and to regulate and reduce the issuance of the right to carry small-caliber weapons. Participants also said it might be helpful if the negotiations with the gang leaders were less publicized in the media, so as to prevent the propagation of rumours unfavourable to the setting up of the program. Chief Superintendent Beer also underlined the need to link disarmament and development in order to give the Haitian population reasons to hope.

BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS

Participants then approached the theme of creating links among the different actors present in Haiti, and discussed ways of strengthening these partnerships. The Secretary-General has proposed that nation-building in Haiti is a long-term proposition.¹⁴ It takes time, it is hard, it is difficult and it requires everyone to play his or her part. He discussed

¹¹ HRW, 2006

¹² United Nations Security Council Resolution 1702 (SC/8811).

¹³ The Associated Press. 2006. "New plan in works to disarm rebel forces in Haiti, UN envoy says." 4 September. <http://www.cbc.ca/story/world/national/2006/09/04/haiti-un.html>.

¹⁴ Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 3 August 2006 - Remarks by the Secretary-General at a joint press conference with President Rene Preval of the Republic of Haiti, <http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=913>

the need to work in partnership: the government, the private sector, the civil society. He stated “The law enforcement officers alone cannot do [it]. The most effective police that I have come across around the world have had the support of the population and the civil society. Support your police. Support MINUSTAH.”¹⁵ Yet mechanisms for this partnership remain fragile and under development.

Ms Marlye Gélín-Adams underlined that one of the greatest difficulties in Haiti is the absence of a “contract” between the State and the Nation, between existing institutions and the population. Even though the people have the will to get out of their situation, there is a lack of political will and above all, a lack of responsibility towards the population. Instead of talking about the selfishness of the Haitian people, as Canada’s Governor General, herself originally from Haiti, noted on her last trip to the island, Ms Gélín-Adams invoked the notion of “institutional selfishness”, that is, a country where there is no social contract to govern the establishment of a sustainable link between the institutions and the population, a contract that ultimately builds a nation-state. Moreover, the relationship between the UN forces and the local population is defined by defiance. As Dr. Verna indicated, MINUSTAH remains a foreign and provisional force, and consequently it is up to the international community to understand the Haitian culture and not to impose a foreign culture.

Participants agreed on the fact that it is necessary to have a true partnership that is real and sustainable between the Haitian government and the population. They said it is urgent to establish greater collaboration among the different institutions, the Haitian government and the UN, in order to ensure greater transparency in the management of areas such as justice, police and civil society. These areas are even more important considering that a justice system is practically absent, that the strength of the police force is undefined and that civil society is non-existent. Local and international NGOs also have an important role to play in mediating, creating links and building trust. It is the Haitian people who must learn to persuade their own government and make it responsible, and NGOs have much to contribute to this objective.

Participants also discussed the place of religious institutions in the reconstruction of Haiti. Despite their importance at the level of sensitizing the people - indeed these institutions have proven to be very important, if one considers that 75% of the population is illiterate - there exists a resistance in the Catholic church to becoming openly involved with the UN. Taking into account their importance within Haitian culture, Mr. Fouda said it would be good to explore other possibilities of partnership between MINUSTAH and the Catholic church and the other local and international NGOs.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Gantz and Martin, 2005.

MINUSTAH'S LIMITED CAPACITY AND REPUTATION

Finally, participants discussed MINUSTAH's capabilities and the way the mission is perceived by Haitians. According to the participants, there is a crisis of trust between MINUSTAH and the Haitian people. The allegations concerning the bad behaviour of officers of the Haitian national police (and of foreign troops) in Haiti, have given rise to serious questions about the legitimacy and credibility of the mission in the eyes of the Haitian population. Specifically, the bad behaviour of officers of the National Police compromises MINUSTAH's links with the local people, and damages the reputation of the UN's peacekeeping forces.¹⁶

Added to this crisis of trust is a problem of image and understanding caused in part by a gap at the level of language. Actually, very few MINUSTAH soldiers can express themselves in French and in English. Moreover, Creole, the language spoken by 99% of Haitians, is almost non-existent among the members of the peacekeeping forces, thus creating an enormous distance between the international community and the local population. Governance-linked strategies also influence the progress of the mission on the ground. The place of Brazil at the head of the command is an example of this. Despite their efforts, the Brazilian force has little experience in peacekeeping. Their lack of expertise and of depth in decision-making is evident in the field, reducing their credibility with the Haitian people and making their tasks more difficult.

According to the participants, it is essential to develop mixed patrols, combining foreign troops with those of Haitian origin, in order to recreate some trust between MINUSTAH forces and local populations. To do this, it seems necessary that the international forces deployed in Haiti learn French or Creole so as to be able to communicate more easily with the people. The presence of three translators for a force of 500 police is in all likelihood not enough. For example, Canada, which has many reserve soldiers of Haitian origin in its ranks, chose in their last deployments to create mixed patrols. These have produced many positive results, as local people recognize themselves in the uniforms that people like them are wearing, and thus quickly start to feel trust. Participants also suggested that the Blue Helmets should receive cultural training before being deployed, to enable them to better understand their new environment and the people they will be mixing with.

It would also be advantageous to have UN troops from countries with more experience in peacekeeping, like Canada, side by side with troops with less experience, so as to promote similar or even complementary rules of engagement, with the aim of reinforcing the credibility and capacities of the Blue Helmets in general.

THE CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION IN HAITI

Canada and Haiti are linked not only geographically but also historically and culturally. Mr. Diego Osorio also stressed the presence of a special relationship between Canada and Haiti, which assumes a direct impact between the situation in Haiti and life in Canada. In other words, if insecurity persists in Haiti, there will be a direct impact on the insecurity in large Canadian cities like Montreal, Quebec and Toronto.

Canada's ongoing role in Haiti is multidimensional and reflects a 'whole of government' approach. Canada is playing an important role as part of international efforts to restore security and stability, and to support long-term reform and reconstruction in Haiti. Canada's contribution to MINUSTAH included 550 Canadian troops in the UN mandated MIF that facilitated the transition to MINUSTAH. Canada is contributing to Haiti's reconstruction efforts by working in close cooperation with the Haitian Government, MINUSTAH, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the international community in Haiti. At present, Haiti is the leading beneficiary of Canada's development assistance in the Americas. The Government disbursed more than \$180 million between 2004 and 2006, and recently announced another \$15 million to help strengthen democratic institutions.

In particular:

- Canada contributed to the electoral process and international observation efforts. Elections Canada was chair of a group of seven countries that monitored the election and helped build the electoral apparatus every step of the way.
- Canadian police personnel (including 100 civilian police and 25 experts on police services) are contributing their training and expertise to reforming the Haitian National Police.
- Other efforts seek to ensure economic recovery — through electric power, rapid job creation, environmental protection — and access to basic services including water and sanitation, health and nutrition, and education.

The RCMP and Canadian Forces participants noted that the UN troops have a different style of operating from Canadians. For example, the troops currently deployed use tactics like checkpoints. This tactic results in creating distance between the UN force and the population, and reinforces the distrust towards the Blue Helmets and the HNP on the one hand and the local people on the other. Major Roger Otis stressed that Canadian troops reach out to the people, talk with them and establish links of trust. In fact, the Canadian Forces, which, as noted above, include many soldiers who speak French and a number of others of Haitian origin, are one of the only forces able to communicate with the Haitian population. In the opinion of the participants, the Canadian government has the responsibility to do more in Haiti and to get significantly involved at different levels (for example, through the Blue Helmets, with the diaspora, with specific projects centred on various themes such as corruption, etc.) All in all, the participants concluded that Canada must be more active in Haiti.

CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE

MINUSTAH currently finds itself challenged by various factors. As mentioned above, armed groups continue to spread terror and to threaten peace efforts, the police system is limited in its capacity to carry out its daily duties, and concrete DDR efforts have yet to materialize.

Three additional needs were identified:

1. **Job creation:** It is necessary to promote and develop long-term job creation programs. As Dr. Verna noted, job creation will not only allow a revival of hope among the population, but will also contribute to the DDR programmes by giving the ex-criminals the possibility of working. Job creation is necessary to ensure that ex-criminals as well as youth do not turn towards weapons, banditry and violence.
2. **Involvement of the diaspora.** It is necessary to invite the Haitian diaspora to really get involved in the reconstruction of the country. As Camille Tremblay noted, the money that Haitians send home from abroad only serves at the level of managing daily needs, hence the necessity of a real involvement in sustainable development projects.
3. **Media participation.** The media should play a greater role in raising the awareness of the population. According to Mr. Tremblay, the media experiment worked to call the people to participate in the elections. This experience is worth renewing through the planning and creation of radio programs broadcast at peak listening hours.

Participants also pointed the finger at the difficulty of holding to a long-term calendar of operations and of accomplishing anything concrete in the period of time allotted to the troops in the field, that is, six months. The reality of six-month mandates ends up contradicting the statements of the Secretary-General who said in August 2006 that “the reconstruction of Haiti must be done on a long-term basis.”¹⁷

“Long-term”, however, is not synonymous with an accumulation of short-term missions. This dysfunctionality affects the achievement of the objectives set by the UN, and weakens the mandate that it has given MINUSTAH. The reconstruction of Haiti takes time; it is difficult and everyone must play a role. The capacity of the UN to follow through with its mission in Haiti will thus depend on the long-term commitment of the donors to fulfill their promises.

In regard to the upcoming municipal and local elections, Major Otis stated that they are extremely important, for they will enable Haiti to build a basis for future elections and to balance power between the central government and the regions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As noted at the start of this chapter, Haiti is one of the few countries where UN forces have been called in several times. Indeed, Haiti is perpetually in a state of starting over. There is no national vision for Haiti’s development. The institutions that exist are phantom institutions. The security issues are complex, and as several participants emphasized, security also involves development projects and the struggle against poverty. However,

¹⁷ Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 3 August 2006 - Remarks by the Secretary-General at a joint press conference with President Rene Preval of the Republic of Haiti, <http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=913>

it must be recognized to what degree development in Haiti depends on security. All in all, strengthening the Haitian State is a long-term proposition that requires the sustained commitment of the UN and of the international community.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MINUSTAH, IN COLLABORATION WITH THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT AND DONORS:

MINUSTAH, in collaboration with the international community and donors, must ensure that short-term projects are linked to longer-term ones. In order to do this, the UN's Peacekeeping Operations Department as well as the Security Council should consider giving MINUSTAH a longer mandate that goes farther than the current six months. It is also recommended that the international community and donor countries make commitments for a period of at least ten years.¹⁸

MINUSTAH, in collaboration with the Haitian government and donors, should:

1. Pursue programs of reform of the HNP and of the judicial system in order to ensure the proper parallel functioning of the judicial and police systems.
2. Strengthen the cooperation between MINUSTAH forces and the members of the HNP, with the help of promotional campaigns to recruit troops of Haitian origin and individuals who speak French or Creole. It would also be advantageous to invite greater participation on the part of countries with a large Haitian diaspora, notably Canada and the United States.
3. Reinforce the capacities of radio and television stations to broadcast messages, with the goal of laying the basis for national dialogue. This can be done with funding help, and in collaboration with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society.
4. Seek to promote the people's economic and social well-being so as to allow them to regain trust in their government and its institutions. In order to do this, MINUSTAH should invite the commitment of local and international NGOs so as to facilitate community dialogue and build trust. MINUSTAH should also involve more members of the diaspora in the creation of development strategies for Haiti.
5. Promote an anti-violence component in government projects. This component should:
 - a. Aim to identify the number of military weapons in circulation.
 - b. Prohibit the carrying of military weapons by the civilian population.
 - c. Regulate and reduce the issuance of the right to carry small caliber weapons.

¹⁸ See ICG 2006.

6. Ensure linkages between disarmament and development programs. It is imperative that the problem of security receive particular attention if the situation is to improve. On the other hand, this attention must not be given to the detriment of other development sectors. Programs aimed at DDR should be implemented at the same time as the fight against poverty.
7. In regard to security programs, MINUSTAH, the HNP and the Haitian government should make sure that the negotiations with gang chiefs are less publicized in the media, in order to avoid the propagation of rumours that prejudice the setting up of DDR programs. MINUSTAH and the HNP should also target the “hot zones” of Port-au-Prince and work to penetrate them.
8. In regard to development programs, MINUSTAH, in collaboration with the Haitian government and donors, should:¹⁹
 - a. Put in place long-term job creation programs.
 - b. Strengthen local institutions, recognizing their autonomy and their cultural specificities.
 - c. Promote and fund a system of universal primary and secondary education as well as development of rural regions and urban infrastructure.
 - d. Put in place education and economic opportunity programs addressed particularly to women and girls.
 - e. Put in place projects aimed at environmental rehabilitation and encouraging reforestation.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA:

Canada’s determination to commit itself to stay in Haiti for a prolonged period, and to try to convince other countries of what it is trying to accomplish in collaboration with others, will take time and cost a lot.²⁰ Nonetheless, it is important for Canada to stay and to maintain these efforts in Haiti in order to ensure that the achievements are sustainable.

The Canadian government should:

1. Seek to re-establish investor trust and encourage investments in Haiti.
2. Work with the Haitian government to develop and put into effect anti-corruption projects.

¹⁹ Ibid., 15.

²⁰ Government of Canada. Video Interview: Jean-Louis Roy, President of Rights and Democracy. <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/roy-hait-en.asp>.

3. Consider a greater commitment in Haiti. For example:
 - a. Canada could provide more Blue Helmets and/or police personnel.
 - b. Canada could promote the involvement of the diaspora at various levels (in development projects, in the police, within the Canadian armed forces, through funding of certain specific projects, etc.)
 - c. Canada could invite the commitment of NGOs to developing specific projects centered on different themes such as women, education, the justice system, health, environment, etc.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY AND LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL NGOS:

1. NGOs and civil society should promote good governance and aim at strengthening local capacities. They also have a role to play in regard to the promotion of the national dialogue, that is, the “buy-in” and participation of the population in the national decision-making process.
2. NGOs and civil society should intensify the information campaign for reducing violence. To do this, they should promote the anti-weapons campaign and the abolition of the right to carry arms. NGOs and civil society should also strongly consider playing a mediator role between the local population and the Haitian government.