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BUILDING LOCAL CAPACITY: INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE STRATEGIES FOR UN PEACEKEEPING

This chapter derives from a United Nations Association in Canada (UNA-Canada) public dialogue, held on October 24th, 2006 in Edmonton, to mark the 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping. The event included a public forum and a closed experts' roundtable. Participants of the closed experts' roundtable and panelists at the linked public dialogue event discussed issues related to local capacity building and sustainable strategies in UN peacekeeping. Participants explored the concept of sustainability and capacity building and examined the role of the international community in promoting capacity building. Participants also looked at ways to ensure the success of local capacity building in UN peacekeeping missions in the future. The opinions expressed in this chapter and the recommendations are derived from UNA-Canada's consultation process and are not necessarily the views of the organization.

The closed roundtable featured **Tonia Anselmo**, Rapporteur and Youth Representative-Edmonton, UNA-Canada; **Sandra Bibby**, Coordinator What Kind of World Program, UNAC-Edmonton Branch; **Donald Bourne**, Logistics Delegate, ICRC Operations Manager for Disaster Response, Red Cross Canada; **Kristine Ennis**, Policy Officer, D Air SP 2-7 Directorate of Air Strategic Plans, 11 NT, Department of National Defence; **Karen Foss**, Peacekeeping and Peace Operations Group, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada; **Dr. Joy Fraser**, Edmonton Branch, UNA-Canada; **Patricia Hartnagel**, Peace activist, Formerly Project Ploughshares—Edmonton; **Tom Keating**, Professor, University of Alberta; **Emily Schroeder**, Project Officer, UNA-Canada; **Kristine St-Pierre**, Consultant for UNA-Canada, Superintendent **John White**, Director, International Peacekeeping Branch, Royal Canadian Mounted Police; and **LCdr Albert Wong**, Public Affairs Officer, DND and former member of the Strategic Advisory Team in Afghanistan. **Robert O'Brien**, Project Manager, UNA-Canada was the event's moderator.

BACKGROUND: SUSTAINABLE APPROACHES AND UN PEACEKEEPING

One of the key challenges to UN peacekeeping operations is the question of how to measure the success of a mission. Linked to this question are the concepts of sustainability and capacity building; sustainable capacity building strategies are increasingly being recognized as necessary components of successful peace operations.

Throughout the 1990s, some countries hosting peacekeeping operations fell back into conflict once the mission ended. The relapse was attributed to a gap between peacekeeping efforts to increase security and stabilization, and efforts generally more

associated with peacebuilding, such as governance and development. Haiti and Liberia, for example, are two situations where the UN had to launch new peacekeeping missions with wider mandates. More recently in the spring of 2006, violence broke out again in Timor-Leste, one year after the UN peacekeeping mission concluded what seemed to be a successful mandate. The return to violence raises questions as to whether withdrawal was undertaken too early, and whether a follow-on strategy was adequately devised to ensure continuity and sustainability in peace operations.¹

A peacekeeping mission is deemed 'successful' if it fulfills the mandate given to it by the UN Security Council. However, participants at the roundtable noted that the true success of a mission is the ability of a country to resolve its conflicts peacefully, and to work collectively with the international community towards the creation of a stable environment and the promotion of good governance. UN peacekeeping operations, as integrated missions, focus on restoring post-conflict states by helping to reform the security sector, uphold the rule of law, generate respect for human rights, and conduct democratic elections. In fact, these elements have become integral aspects of successful peacekeeping missions.

To prevent relapse of political or ethnic tensions and the reoccurrence of violent conflict, participants discussed the necessity to create conditions that will secure peace, minimize the gap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and ensure a successful withdrawal and sustainable exit from a post-conflict state. Effective and sustainable capacity building in UN peacekeeping operations is one way of creating these conditions. 'Capacity building,' however, remains fairly undefined in theory and in practice. In an attempt to refine the concept, participants addressed a number of questions, including: how does capacity building contribute to the sustainability of a peace operation; when should capacity building begin; who should 'build capacity'; and how long should it last. Participants first examined the concept of 'capacity building' as part of a sustainable approach to peacekeeping.

WHAT DO WE MEAN BY 'CAPACITY BUILDING'?

As mentioned above, local capacity building is increasingly being recognized as an important component of a peacekeeping mission, especially considering the integrated and complex nature of contemporary missions. Currently, however, there are no standard operating procedures for capacity building. Broadly defined, effective and sustainable capacity building implies the removal of conflict from society. It also refers to the tools required for a society to resolve conflicts peacefully and to prevent the reoccurrence of conflict once a mission has fulfilled its mandate. Still, there are no institutionalized definitions of what capacity building means in practice and no clear ways of approaching capacity building.

¹ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO). Available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp>.

As discussed by the participants to the roundtable, the creation or strengthening of local capacity building as part of UN peacekeeping missions requires the establishment of appropriate mandates and timelines to ensure initiatives are adequate and long-term. The creation or strengthening of local capacity building also requires the development of an operational strategy to assess the needs on the ground and identify local capacities and partnerships. In doing so, participants identified a number of specific approaches to capacity building including strategies for improving coordination among all actors engaged in capacity building, and strategies for reinforcing local partnerships to help in the gradual transfer of knowledge and responsibility from the international community to local structures. More specifically, local capacity building also often incorporates initiatives that promote security and good governance, as well as integrated police and justice systems. With this in mind, participants recognized the importance of local capacity building as multifaceted and context specific.

Participants acknowledged that building peace in a country devastated by war is a long-term process that requires the cooperation between the international community and local institutions. While local capacity structures may already exist on which to build, these often have low capacity, and in many cases, have been completely destroyed by conflict. As a result, participants agreed that building local capacity constitutes an integral component of a sustainable approach to peace operations and that it should concentrate on a gradual transfer of responsibilities to local authorities. In their view, long-term stability will only be achieved once local institutions are able to take on the responsibility for building governance, promoting the rule of law, and strengthening economic and social development.

With the above in mind, participants moved on to examine strategies for improving sustainability in UN peacekeeping, as well as efficacy and sustainability of capacity building initiatives. While these strategies are often similar in post-conflict countries, their exact characteristics are context specific and depend greatly on the conditions and needs on the ground.

STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING SUSTAINABILITY IN UN PEACEKEEPING

Participants examined three strategies for improving sustainability in UN peacekeeping: more inclusive mandates, longer timeframes, and transition planning from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.

MORE INCLUSIVE PEACEKEEPING MANDATES

Participants first discussed the question of mandates and argued that sustainable approaches to capacity building should be based on well-defined mission objectives. This means that when the Security Council accepts to deploy a peacekeeping mission, the mandate should be clear and achievable, and should reflect the situation on the ground.

Participants noted that past missions have tended to view an election or a new government as a benchmark for ending an operation. Most practitioners now recognize that establishing sustainable peace takes longer and that other criteria for evaluating the success of a mission

are required. These criteria are reflected in the increasingly complexity of peacekeeping mandates, which include provisions for police training, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform, as well as capacity building in governance, the rule of law, human rights, and economic and social development.

According to participants, the problem is that peacekeeping mandates are often constrained by arbitrary timelines and require that they be revised once the mission has started. Participants, however, cited the difficulty of altering a mission's mandate mid-operation and called on wider operational mandates as a means to preempt the need to revisit mandates at mid-course. As they observed, nine out of fifteen Security Council members must vote in favour of a change to a mission's mandate before that change can be authorized; in the event that a permanent member votes against the proposal, the mandate cannot be changed.

One participant also mentioned that mandates should be devised in a systematic way, using an organizational approach describing the role of respective players such as the UN, the host government, civil society, NGOs, etc. in capacity development.

LONGER TIMEFRAMES FOR MISSIONS ON THE GROUND

Second, participants discussed the need for longer timeframes in UN peacekeeping missions. In general, the UN Security Council authorizes a peacekeeping mission for a timeframe of six months to one year. While these timeframes may make sense both politically and financially, they are limited in their ability to ensure the sustainability of capacity building strategies in the long-term. While overall missions may typically cover five-year spans, according to Sup. John White, these are still not adequate to absolve problematic issues that are endemic, yet accepted, throughout a particular community or culture (e.g., domestic violence). In his view, the problem comes from the insufficient level of planning within missions, and the fact that withdrawal from a mission is most often determined by the expiration of funds, rather than the conditions on the ground.

In order to achieve stability in post-conflict states, and ensure the long-term effectiveness of capacity building strategies, participants concluded that peacekeeping operations should be mandated for longer periods. Participants agreed that longer timeframes are necessary if initiatives are to make a difference and not fall apart once the international community leaves. Still, participants were also fully aware that the UN seldom has an appetite, or the financial means, to undertake thirty-year missions.

If this is the case, one option could be to create partnerships between UN peacekeeping missions on the ground, NGOs, and third parties (such as government agencies) to ensure that capacity building programmes enjoy some level of continuity. For example, in 2002, the United Kingdom government presented Sierra Leone with a ten year commitment to

² The agreement also incorporates a long-term guarantee by the UK Government to intervene within 48-72 hours if major tensions were to erupt. Nick Grono, "Improving the International Response to Conflicts in Africa," Speech given at the *World Bank Conference on Strategic Agendas for Development*, Washington D.C., 14 March 2006. Available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4043&1=1>. See also United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Sierra Leone: Making a Difference." Available at: <http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Servlet?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1063633917725>.

security sector and governance reforms. The agreement commits the Government of Sierra Leone to reach agreed upon performance benchmarks in exchange for UK support.²

In addition to longer timeframes, Sup. White asserted that exit strategies should be determined by the readiness of the host nation to govern independently and uphold the rule of law. Sup. White recalled instances in Haiti and East Timor where “we left too soon”, where the job was not complete, and where the “honeymoon with the international community wore off.” Karen Foss also remembered the unfortunate occurrence in East Timor when several humanitarian institutions decided to “close up shop.” Foss argued that in order for capacity building strategies to be sustainable, the international community, including UN peacekeeping missions and agencies on the ground, should not withdraw suddenly nor should they withdraw fully. Participants agreed that withdrawal from an international mission when the objectives of the mission — and reasons for entering in the first place — have not been met, may cause speculation about the competency of the international community and the UN to deliver sustainable results. It may also prove more financially costly if the UN is called to return.

TRANSITION PLANNING FROM PEACEKEEPING TO PEACEBUILDING

Participants also discussed the need to plan for a smooth transition between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and at the same time, strengthen the UN’s capacity to develop peacebuilding strategies. As reported by the Brahimi Report, only an environment in which peace is self-sustaining “offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces,” making peacekeepers and peace-builders “inseparable partners.”³ In other words, while peacekeeping leads the way for a peacebuilding mission, a peacekeeping operation has no exit without an adequate peacebuilding strategy, making the inclusion of a sustainable peacebuilding strategy a necessary component of transition planning and management. In Sierra Leone, for example, the peacekeeping operation, which is now completed, contained peacebuilding strategies that are currently under implementation.⁴ These strategies allowed for continuity between the peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, and contributed to a smooth transition between the two. In this regard, the newly created Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office intends to help fill the void between war and peace by creating institutional and systematic links between peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. While promising, it is still not clear what role it will play and how it will go about doing so.

The transition between peacekeeping and peacebuilding also depends on “a collaborative and inclusive UN system and the effectiveness of other international actors.”⁵ Indeed, these actors, including UN agencies, the World Bank, and various humanitarian and developmental agencies (both governmental and non-governmental), must continue to

³ United Nations “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” (Brahimi Report), 2000. Available at: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/.

⁴ UN DPKO

⁵ Report of the Secretary-General, “No exit without strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations,” 2001, para. 21.

work long after a peacekeeping operation has been withdrawn. As a result, the cooperation and coordination between peacekeeping and peacebuilding is extremely important, and must commence during the initial planning and deployment of a peacekeeping mission. The sooner the various actors make efforts to cooperate and work together, the greater the chances are that the peacebuilding process will be carried forward. A carefully planned out transition strategy is also important to ensure that the gains made during a peacekeeping mission are sustained well after the mission has been completed.

Flexibility in a UN peacekeeping mission was also identified as a crucial aspect of a transition plan. Participants discussed various forms of flexibility: flexibility in terms of timing and allowing for long timeframes; flexibility with respect to changing priorities; and flexibility with regards to funding. According to Bob O'Brien, greater flexibility in UN peacekeeping missions is necessary to allow local capacities to develop at their own pace. This will help to avoid sudden increases in insecurity and improve the likeliness that results will be sustainable in the long-term. While agreeing with O'Brien, LCdr Wong commented that a mission's flexibility often depends on its leadership, and as a result, greater flexibility, whether in terms of timing, priorities or funding, does not always constitute a priority.

STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING EFFICACY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF CAPACITY BUILDING INITIATIVES

Sustaining local capacity both during a peacekeeping mission and following its withdrawal requires coordination and cooperation between the post-conflict state, the UN peacekeeping mission on the ground and UN agencies, as well as international, regional and local actors (NGOS, civil society, local communities, etc.). Strategies for improving efficacy and sustainability of capacity building initiatives in UN peacekeeping include greater cooperation between all actors engaged in capacity building and enhanced coordination of their mandates and initiatives, as well as the creation of local partnerships.

COOPERATION AND COORDINATION AMONG INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND LOCAL ACTORS

Many participants viewed coordination among different agencies as vital to sustainable capacity building. According to Donald Bourne, NGOs are key players in UN peacekeeping missions, as they strive to prevent and resolve conflict. Without coordination, however, NGOs working on similar projects often compete with each other. One participant gave the example of groups who enter a conflict zone, without experience working in the area, with money and proposals formulated by their implementing partners. As there are no obligations for these groups to coordinate with each other, each group imposes

⁶ Institute of Public Affairs, "The Trouble with NGOs in Afghanistan." *IPA in the News*, 8 February 2005. Available at: http://www.ipa.org.au/files/news_905.html.

its project on the community and leaves once their restricted timeframe has expired. NGOs also have no obligation to coordinate with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). For example, in Afghanistan, more than 1500 local NGOs are working towards strengthening local capacity building. While these NGOs may at first sight be a sign of increased local capacity, the sheer number of NGOs raises questions of coordination, duplication, funding priorities, and corruption.⁶

Bourne also recalled numerous occasions when UN peacekeepers would enter a conflict site with well-designed projects, but would not stay the course, causing more chaos and confusion than if they had done nothing at all. Bourne gave the specific example of the UN entering a conflict zone with the auspices of running a hospital, at which point the Red Cross would pull out. As the funding dropped, the UN withdrew, leaving the Red Cross to once again “mend the disarray.”

At the opposite end of the spectrum, the UN and the Red Cross became in some situations so closely associated, that rebel groups no longer recognized Red Cross neutrality and purposely limited the distribution of food and other humanitarian aid. Based on his extensive peacekeeping experience, Bourne asserted that coordination is necessary both at higher levels (between UN DPKO and other UN agencies) and on the ground (among NGOs, and between NGOs and the UN peacekeeping mission). Foss also called for mandatory coordination between NGOs and local leaders to prevent well-intentioned groups from addressing what they believe to be the needs of a specific community, without first consulting with that community. In this regard, consultation processes were mentioned as necessary mechanisms for formalizing coordination efforts.

Coordination is also crucial to avoid duplicating efforts and to make the most of the resources available. In many countries, organizations like the Red Cross are conducting capacity building without the presence of UN peacekeeping forces. As a result, it is important that UN DPKO and other UN agencies coordinate with humanitarian organizations in the field in order to take advantage of the expertise and knowledge of these organizations and to ensure that UN peacekeeping missions complement rather than duplicate their work.

CREATION OF LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS

The need for community involvement and the creation of local partnerships in peacekeeping missions is a crucial component of sustainable capacity building approaches. By creating or strengthening local partnerships, international actors contribute to the gradual transfer of knowledge and responsibility from the international community to local establishments. Empowering the local population to self-govern, under the rule of law, is fundamental to sustain capacity over the long-term.

According to LCdr Wong, the role of the international community is to find a means of channeling this capacity in a way that reflects perspectives and needs of the local community and population. On this subject, Sup. White discussed the need to respect indigenous cultures and the notion that western values should not be imposed on these cultures. He noted that many post-conflict states are verbal societies, and suggested working with them on their terms and in their capacity. Following on this argument, Foss mentioned that

where existing structures are not strong, local partnerships should be strengthened with what already exists and functions. In East Timor, for example, local capacity is present, but there are no rewards for using this capacity to its full advantage. In this situation, Foss suggested creating local buy-in and encouraging genuine consultation or dialogue with the local public in order to create an understanding and foster trust. Still, LCdr Wong pointed out that corruption and poverty are usually embedded in post-conflict societies, and as a result, the international community should be careful not to build on existing corruption. Sup. White further recommended that the international community and the UN not assess missions based on western expectations or standards, but instead redirect the focus on the missions' environment and capacity building needs on the ground.

Participants also mentioned the importance for capacity building initiatives to involve all levels of civil society, including grassroots organizations. In doing so, international players must be careful not to diminish grassroots capacity on the ground, but rather support, promote and complement this capacity. As Patricia Hartnagel observed, there is a fine balance between the work of international players and that of grassroots organizations and much needs to be done to ensure the sustainability of grassroots capacity. One example of successful support of grassroots organizations can be seen in Kinshasa, DRC where local NGOs are promoting an inter-cultural model of living together and facilitating the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. This is carried out through a project that consists of neighboring groups called 'Cellules pour la paix' (Peace Cells) formed of people trained to mediate and resolve conflicts. Another example is the UN sponsored "food-for-work" project aimed at building local capacity among local communities in Afghanistan. Since the cultivation of produce is a long-term effort, locals can either be involved in tree farming, planting, or maintaining orchards in exchange for food rations, which often consist of a bag of rice, lentils, cooking oil, and salt.

International NGOs (INGOs) play a crucial role in the development of local capacity building and in strengthening grassroots capacity. INGOs are key actors in the creation of local partnerships, helping to empower community-level establishments and engaging in the transfer of knowledge and training. Their capacity and willingness to remain in the field well after a UN peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission has left also renders their presence essential to achieving sustainable peace. For example, the USAID program entitled 'Localizing Institutional Capacity in Southern Sudan,' granted Mercy Corps a three-year \$9.6 million grant to prevent and resolve conflict by fostering a healthy and vibrant civil society. The program works to strengthen the organizational capacity of 56 local non-governmental organizations that address the plight of marginalized populations. Half of these organizations are led by women.⁷

⁷ MercyCorps, "Program Details: South Sudan," 2006. Available at: <http://www.mercycorps.org/countries/sudan/632>.

CANADA'S EXPERTISE IN LOCAL CAPACITY BUILDING

In discussing Canada's expertise in capacity building, participants referred to the Government of Canada's 'whole of government' approach. Within the context of peacekeeping missions, this approach refers to a multilateral endeavour, amalgamating the efforts of military, police, and civilian institutions to achieve capacity building strategies that meet requirements of defence, diplomacy, and development (also known as '3D' approach). Specifically, the approach requires greater collaboration between the Canadian Forces and other government departments and agencies (including Foreign Affairs Canada, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Department of Justice Canada, and Elections Canada among others) to further develop Canada's integrated approach to conflict and post-conflict situations. While the approach is advantageous in that it presents different, yet coordinated capacity building strategies, it sometimes excludes actors that work outside the government like NGOs and civil society groups.

With the above in mind, Foss affirmed that Canada must continue to work towards bettering its approach to peacekeeping and peace operations, including responding to the need for quick-impact peace dividends, developing strategies for long-term sustainable capacity, and increasing its adaptability to local environments and situations.

LESSONS LEARNED: CANADA'S ROLE IN LOCAL CAPACITY BUILDING INITIATIVES

Participants discussed different local capacity building initiatives undertaken by various departments within the Canadian government including the RCMP, DND, and DFAIT. While CIDA representatives were not able to attend the roundtable, CIDA's contribution to capacity building in post-conflict countries is also part of Canada's 'whole of government' approach and should therefore be acknowledged. All initiatives are linked either explicitly or implicitly to UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations.

INTERNATIONAL POLICING⁸

Canadian police officers on international missions contribute to capacity building through a number of initiatives. These initiatives, coordinated by the RCMP, include training local police, reforming, professionalizing and democratizing police organizations, strengthening security and reinforcing local authority, and promoting civil-military relations. Canada is the largest contributor of police in Darfur, and also provides the area with logistical support, transportation/jeeps, as well as military and civilian personnel.

⁸ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "International Peacekeeping," 2006. Available at: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/peacekeeping/index_e.htm.

As stated by Sup. White, the police does not work in isolation, but rather in collaboration with other international institutions for an integrated and coordinated approach to conflict resolution. Traditionally, intervention in failed or post-conflict states has largely been militaristic. Although some NGOs may already be present in an area of conflict, such as the Red Cross, the UN has customarily been the designated authority, responsible for securing a particular environment before other actors are able to enter. A secure environment is vital to the performance of the RCMP's International Peacekeeping Branch, since police require freedom of movement in order to undertake their tasks and responsibilities.

One of the first tasks that international police would normally initiate on a mission is to establish and operate training academies in order to ensure an international standard of uniformity amongst all police. Where the international community has authorization to manage institutions and governance of the respective country, there exists opportunity for knowledge sharing, as well as increased commitment to the mission and tenants of the resolution agreement. Complications arise, however, when the country of origin retains primacy over all establishments; cooperation from existing forces is then not guaranteed. In this case, the international team, while still mandated to police, concentrate their efforts on other necessary tasks including coaching, mentoring, and advising. Sup. White insisted that in order to improve local capacity, there must be cooperation between all levels of police. In his view, the best way of promoting daily communication and a habitual transfer of knowledge between international officers and indigenous officers is to co-locate them at all levels and ranks. Sup. White also affirmed that many of the international police that are deployed as part of a UN peacekeeping mission are in need of 're-education' when it comes to the use of firearms, especially in the attainment and maintenance of public order and crowd control. As a result, he stressed the need for greater accountability in the use of guns and called on targeted training of international police forces to help them adhere to international standards for the use of guns and other methods of force.⁹

Sup. White observed that, in the past, measuring the success of a mission was relatively simple, especially where previous policing organizations had not yet been established. Under these circumstances, his team would open training academies, train police, and calculate their effectiveness. Measuring the success of a mission has since become much more complex. In fact, he noted that normal things expected in a democratic society become much more difficult in a failed or post-conflict state. To measure the success of a mission, he asked himself "are we moving ahead?"... "are they still violating human rights?"... "are they arresting people without any evidence?"

⁹ These standards include the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the UN Basic Principles for the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. See Amnesty International Canada, "Preventing police from misusing their guns," *New Release*, 24 February 2004. Available at: http://www.amnesty.ca/resource_centre/news/view.php?c=Resource%20Centre%20News.

One indicator of mission success is less corruption within police and government institutions. He recounted that in many post-conflict countries, the police are often illiterate and they operate without a concept of, or mandate to, conduct proper investigations before arresting individuals. The idea of an investigation is often beyond their grasp and, at times, unfair arrests are executed on the command of the government. In order to determine whether or not a local officer should remain an officer, international police forces conduct investigations — known as the process of ‘vetting’ — on the conduct and background of the officer in question. According to Sup. White, however, it is often difficult to determine whether or not an officer committed a crime, predominantly since most records were destroyed during the conflict.

The progression of a community’s respect for authority is another indicator of mission success. This is especially important in countries where the indigenous population has suffered gross violations of human rights committed by the state’s former police force. Regaining trust requires time and consistent demonstration by the police that they have changed. Another indicator of mission success is the effective establishment of a fair and just judicial system. However, developing new criminal and judicial codes is a lengthy and challenging process to achieve within the UN’s diminutive timeframes.

STRATEGIC ADVISORY TEAM IN AFGHANISTAN (SAT)¹⁰

The Strategic Advisory Team (SAT) consists of 14 DND personnel (both military and civilian) and one CIDA officer. Under Afghan leadership, team members are embedded in their partner Afghan government ministries and agencies to support the development of the Government’s human capacity through their expertise, training, education, and military strategic planning skills.

As described by LCdr Wong, in 2002, the international community devised the Bonn Process to support Afghanistan in the attainment of a system of governance. An interim government was appointed through a nation-wide consultation, which then progressed to a transitional government. The Bonn Process concluded in 2005 with the election of an inclusive Afghan parliament. The subsequent launch of the Afghanistan Compact in January 2006 signifies the mutual commitment between the UN, the international community, and the Government of Afghanistan. Within this framework, SAT and the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) work in unison to move Afghanistan from a failed to a competent state through three fundamental pillars: the security sector; governance, the rule of law, and human rights; and economic and social development. The development of Afghanistan’s security sector is vital to their longevity as a functioning state. In an effort to acquire an honourable police force and judicial system,

¹⁰ Department of National Defence, “Backgrounder: Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan,” 2006. Available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1703#argus.

with legislation that upholds the rule of law, NATO will provide the majority of security provisions to Afghanistan over the next five years. Enhancing the Afghan National Army is also of primary importance, where it was mentioned that Canada played a crucial role in ensuring cohesion and uniformity among all ranks by recommending re-integrative training of troops from all countries involved.

Nevertheless, increased threats of insurgency and corruption, and the scarce availability of basic health and medical care impede the successful implementation of capacity building strategies in Afghanistan. LCdr Wong commented on the fact that the income brought into Kabul from the international community creates a false economy. For example, he recalled his driver being paid \$600 per month, while civil servants and teachers earned a mere \$50 per month and doctors, \$100. The lack of income security causes professionals to seek higher paying 'taxi' jobs, and increases the possibility of corruption.

In Afghanistan, Canada has also contributed a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to bequeath further security and capacity building throughout the province of Kandahar.¹¹ The PRT assists the Afghan government in extending their services and authority throughout the country, and provides a secure environment for capacity building efforts, such as combating insurgency, addressing poverty and promoting good governance in the areas of democracy and human rights. Canada's contribution to security reform in Afghanistan is the third largest in the world, with the primary directive to professionalize the police and military. In order to "realize a progressive expansion of Afghan civilian capacity, allowing for gradual transfer of roles and responsibility from the PRT to the Afghan government," the Canadian integrated mission in Kandahar must be long-term. The ultimate objective of the PRT is to contribute to a solid foundation of local capacity building, where Afghans are able to civilly "govern themselves and we [the international community] are able to withdraw successfully."

STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION TASK FORCE (START)¹²

The Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), assesses the extent of crises around the world, and, drawing on expertise from across government and in collaboration with task forces from partner countries, it promotes faster and more coordinated responses from the Government in support of stabilization and reconstruction efforts. As discussed by Foss, START aids local clientele in recovering from a particular conflict, and prevents its recurrence by nurturing the development of local capacity. The task force addresses the underlying factors that contribute to a particular conflict, and advances requests for coordinated government assistance. The task force is also effective in providing support to the UN and other international organizations when responding to crises.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Government of Canada, "International Policy Statement: Diplomacy," 2005. Available at: <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-diplomacy6-en.asp>.

Within the START framework, participants discussed the Canada's engagement to build and strengthen local capacity in Sudan, Haiti, and Afghanistan. In Sudan, Foss reported that following the signing of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005, 14 million dollars have been allocated to START in an effort to ease Sudan's compounding political calamity. This contribution is intended to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, assist Sudan with poverty-reduction, and provide for a plethora of peacebuilding initiatives in the areas of security, governance, and justice, such as community organizations for conflict resolution, programs to tackle violence against women, and training for security forces.

Foss also explained that in Haiti, Canada is working with the Haitian government to continue efforts toward obtaining the right to education, health, and security, and also in ending the perpetual violence. As challenges persist in the acquisition of a just society, START is committed to justice and security system reform, reform of the Haitian National Police, and social reconciliation, which endeavours to build a foundation for human rights recognition and dialogue amongst the Haitian population.

With regards to Afghanistan, START's commitment is directly linked to Canada's involvement in the PRT in Kandahar (see previous section).

CANADA CORPS¹³

CIDA's Canada Corps initiative mobilizes Canadians to participate in governance initiatives in developing countries. Governance programmes are built around five main areas: democratization; human rights; rule of law; public sector institution and capacity building; and conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and security-sector reform. CIDA's focus on good governance is based on the recognition that improving governance structures is essential for long-term sustainable development. For example, under the Canada Corps Fund, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (based in Montréal, Québec) in cooperation with the Faculty of Law from McGill University and the Centre for International Studies at the Université de Montréal is engaged in implementing a project aimed at strengthening good governance through African mechanisms of human rights protection, namely, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Building local capacity is a long-term process. Peace operations — whether peacekeeping or peacebuilding — should not be considered as an end in themselves, but as a part of a long-term process toward conflict resolution. To ensure the success of local capacity building in the future, it may be advantageous to explore the benefits of combining both

¹³ Government of Canada, "International Policy Statement: Development," 2005. Available at: <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/ips-development#62c>. See also Canadian International Development Agency, "Office for Democratic Governance," 2006. Available at: <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/NIC-54102116-JUN>.

a short-term and long-term agenda, i.e., combining deadline oriented progress with longer-term objectives. Greater attention should also focus on defining further, and systematizing the integrated nature of peace operations, as well as the transition from peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

Many recommendations for ensuring sustainable approaches in UN peacekeeping emerged from the October 24th event. These are presented below.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL:

1. The UNSC should consider the authorization of more inclusive peacekeeping mandates that incorporate capacity building initiatives at the onset of a peacekeeping mission. Ideally, these mandates should be clear, achievable, and reflect the situation on the ground (i.e., the nature of the fighting, the level of insecurity and impunity, the level of threat to individual civilians, etc.).
2. To facilitate the repartition of objectives among peacekeeping actors, mandates could incorporate a set of overall objectives, as well as more specific objectives for the various actors on the ground (including military, police, and civilian).
3. To the extent possible, the UNSC should consider the authorization of longer timeframes for UN peacekeeping missions. Longer timeframes could help strengthen capacity building initiatives by establishing stronger bonds between various actors and by increasing the credibility and engagement of UN peacekeepers. Appropriate timeframes should be determined on a case-by-case basis, based on a set of predetermined criteria, including the long-term mission objectives, the capacity building requirements for achieving these objectives, the financial resources and troops available, and the potential partnerships.
4. Where longer timeframes are not feasible, the possibility for partnerships between the UN, NGOs and third parties (i.e., governments or government agencies) should be explored. These partnerships could ensure project continuity and would strengthen accountability of local actors in the implementation of projects.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO OCHA:

As the lead agency overseeing humanitarian coordination, OCHA's mandate is to improve coordination among UN agencies, donors and NGOs (international and local). However, due to the extensive number of actors in the field, coordination is often extremely difficult. As a result, OCHA's role is highly important in fostering cooperation and promoting coordination between the various humanitarian actors present in the field. With respect to capacity building, greater cooperation and coordination between humanitarian actors would reduce the risk of duplication among NGOs and would ensure that projects reflect the actual needs of the community or region in which the project will be implemented.

1. OCHA should continue to work towards improving coordination and cooperation between international NGOs and local NGOs working in the field by:
 - a. Encouraging more information collection and exchange by international NGOs.
 - b. Promoting greater dialogue through weekly meetings and discussion groups, and by circulating meeting minutes among the NGO and UN community.
 - c. Informing on NGO activities and location of these activities through monthly reports.
 - d. Conducting inter-agency assessments to develop more coordinated and multi-sectoral responses.
 - e. Support the creation of maps identifying the location of NGO activities.
2. Continue to promote cooperation and coordination between NGOs, UN agencies and local governments through the development of Humanitarian Information Centers where NGOs can register, and where they can indicate, along with UN agencies and other organizations, the location (or planned location) of their activities.
3. OCHA, together with DPKO, should promote greater coordination between NGOs wanting to conduct projects in a post-conflict setting and local communities, leaders, and government by:
 - a. Organizing meetings and promoting greater dialogue between international NGOs and the local government and local communities.
 - b. Encouraging the sharing of good practices and lessons learned among these actors.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS ON THE GROUND:

1. Work towards systematizing the concept of capacity building within peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions and ensure that capacity building is a major component of peacekeeping mandates.
2. UN Peacekeeping missions and other UN agencies involved in UN peacekeeping (e.g., UNHCR) should strengthen coordination with OCHA and with humanitarian organizations and other NGOs engaged in capacity building in post-conflict areas. Greater coordination would help the UN take advantage of the expertise and knowledge of humanitarian organizations and would ensure that UN peacekeeping missions complement rather than duplicate the work of these organizations.
3. In order to determine the capacity building needs of a mission, UN Peacekeeping missions should assess the existing capacity on the ground and identify the gaps. This assessment should be conducted in collaboration with the local

government, local NGOs, and civil society. Only once the gaps are identified, can an appropriate capacity building strategy be elaborated.

4. To ensure the smooth transition between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and to strengthen the UN's capacity to develop peacebuilding strategies, UN Peacekeeping missions should carefully design a transition plan. This plan should:
 - a. Support greater cooperation and coordination between peacekeeping and peacebuilding during the initial planning and deployment of a peacekeeping mission.
 - b. Promote efforts on the part of various actors engaged in capacity building to cooperate and work together.
 - c. Incorporate local capacity building initiatives at the onset of a peacekeeping operation.
5. Work towards increasing the flexibility of missions in terms of timing, priorities and funding. Such flexibility implies balancing the need for timely action and the need to proceed slowly in developing local capacity and in fostering local ownership to ensure results are sustainable. Flexibility also refers to a mission's ability to adapt quickly to changing needs on the ground by shifting its priorities and funding requirements to better reflect the new challenges.
6. UN Peacekeeping missions, in collaboration with the Peacebuilding Commission, should coordinate transition plans from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. The Peacebuilding Commission could be involved from the beginning of a peacekeeping mission by sending an observer to consult and investigate how best to design transition and to ensure that the capacity building initiatives undertaken during a peacekeeping mission are continued as part of the peacebuilding operation.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (INGOS):

1. INGOs engaged in capacity building should make sure to involve all levels of civil society, including grassroots organizations. At the same time, however, international NGOs should be careful not to diminish grassroots capacity on the ground, but to support, promote and complement this capacity.
2. Coordinate with local actors and government in order to ensure that projects undertaken reflect the actual need on the ground and that the work done is not duplicated. This can be accomplished through the elaboration of joint work-plans and regular meetings.
3. Strengthen its relationship with OCHA and other UN agencies in order to develop common approaches to building local capacity.
4. Promote greater disclosure regarding both funding received and planned expenditures.

5. Further increase transparency in their work by providing OCHA with continuous updates and reports.
6. Foster local ownership of local communities by creating or strengthening local partnerships with peacekeeping missions that contribute to the gradual transfer of knowledge and responsibility from the international community to local establishments.
7. When creating local partnerships where existing structures are not strong, NGOs should build on the existing capacity, and help to identify capacity needs, as well as strategies to build the required skills and capacity.
8. Where possible, a local NGO could take the lead in facilitating the coordination process between INGOs and local communities. This could help INGOs maintain and strengthen their relationship with local NGOs.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS:

1. Work towards improving its approach to peacekeeping and peace operations. In doing so, the various departments of the Government of Canada involved in peacekeeping missions (i.e. DFAIT, CIDA, DND, RCMP, Department of Justice, Elections Canada) could:
 - a. Further develop strategies for long-term sustainable capacity building by conducting pilot case studies and documenting lessons learned.
 - b. Build on the lessons learned from the various actors working in the field such as what works, what does not, and why.
 - c. Increase the adaptability of Canadian (and international) troops, police and civilian workers to the local environment and situation through cultural awareness training, as well as human rights and gender training, and by acquiring tools for problem-solving in rapidly changing environments.
 2. The Government of Canada should strengthen cooperation and coordination among Canadian actors deployed in peacekeeping missions, including troops, police, humanitarian workers, NGOs, civilian experts, etc., in order for all actors to know where others are working, as well as the projects and activities each are undertaking. In doing so, the Government could:
 - a. Organize meetings where Canadian actors can share information about their activities and timeframes.
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- b. Commit Canadian actors to report on their activities and progress, and to circulate to other actors their findings and recommendations for further actions.
 - c. Build on existing initiatives such as CIDA's development of a database of Canadian organizations — including non-governmental organization, institution, or private sector firm registered or incorporated in Canada — that are working in democratic governance and development, by expanding its functions to include a section on lessons learned and recommendations for future action, and by making the database more accessible to the public.
 - d. Create a complementary database for government actors, describing government initiatives and location in the field that would also be accessible to the public.
 - e. Encourage other countries to develop similar databases detailing the work and location of their national NGOs and governmental agencies.
3. Collaborate with other countries involved in capacity building, like the European Union, to further foster an exchange of knowledge and expertise. One possible avenue for greater cooperation includes the training of peacekeepers and civilian police in cultural awareness, gender issues and human rights protection.