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CANADIAN AND INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIES FOR RAPID RESPONSE TO CRISES

This chapter builds on a United Nations Association in Canada public dialogue event to mark the 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping from October 19 to 20, 2006 in Kingston, Ontario, which included a public forum and a closed experts' roundtable. Participants of the closed experts' roundtable and panelists at the linked public dialogue event discussed the debate surrounding international and Canadian strategies for rapid response to crises. Participants explored UN rapid response capabilities, as well as Canada's role in preventing and assisting in crises, and its contribution to global security. The discussion provided a comprehensive overview of the system's current strengths and weaknesses and specific insights as to the barriers preventing the realization of concrete outcomes from previous discussions about rapid response to global crises. The opinions expressed in this chapter and the recommendations are derived from UNA-Canada's consultation process and are not necessarily the views of the organization.

Participants at both events included **Stephen Kinloch-Pichat**, Strategic Planning Officer, UNDP, Haiti; **Col. Michael Hanrahan**, Director of Peacekeeping Policy, National Defence; **Peter Langille**, Department of Political Science, University of Western Ontario; **Brig.-Gen. Greg Mitchell** (Retd), Former Force Commander of SHIRBRIG in Sudan, Canadian Forces; and **Lt. Col. Michael Voith**, Former Commanding Officer, Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), Canadian Forces. Please refer to Appendix 1 for a complete list of participants.

BACKGROUND: RAPID RESPONSE AND UN PEACEKEEPING ¹

A key requirement for peace operations and of peacekeeping in particular, is the ability to respond rapidly and effectively to developing crises. Indeed, the timing with which a mission is approved and deployed is a major component of that mission's capacity to respond to crises or avoid a relapse into conflict. While the UN has acquired much expertise in conducting traditional peacekeeping operations, it still lacks the capacity to rapidly undertake more complex operations and to effectively sustain them. In general, the days and weeks immediately following a cease-fire or peace accord constitute a critical period for

¹ In this chapter, the term 'peacekeeping' refers to operations authorized by the United Nations (under Chapters 6, 7 and 8) to monitor cease-fires and/or support the implementation of peace agreements, and to initiate peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities.

² Baramki, Gabi, Gerard Toulouse, and Peter Langille. 2003. "Report on Working Group 3 International Cooperation and Human Security." 53rd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Nova Scotia, 17-21 July. <http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac53/wg3.htm>.

stabilizing the situation and for establishing the grounds for peace; beyond this point, the credibility and effectiveness of the force deployed are seriously affected. Traditionally, it took on average four to six months for a peacekeeping operation to be deployed following a Security Council approval.² Ironically, it took only six weeks for the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide to kill an estimated 800,000 innocent victims. While response times have improved — they are now defined as 30 days for a traditional peacekeeping mission and 90 days for a more robust mission — they remain difficult to achieve.

The mid-1990s, and more specifically in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, numerous studies set out to tackle the issue of rapid response to global crises. In 1995, Canada presented a report to the General Assembly, based on widespread participation by Canadian organizations and agencies, as well as officials from around the world.³ The proposal, entitled *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*, sought to improve the UN's ability to deploy peacekeeping operations rapidly during situations of crisis. Among its conclusions, the report stated that "As long as sovereign states retain the right to decide on the deployment of their national units, there will never be complete assurance that a UN force can meet an urgent situation on time."⁴ While this remains true today, several efforts have been made to address the challenge and to improve the UN's rapid response capacity.

In 2000, the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (Brahimi report) identified several key conditions to increase the success of future complex operations including the need for political support, rapid deployment and credible force.⁵ As the Panel explains "all [actors] agree on the need for the United Nations to significantly strengthen capacity to deploy new field operations rapidly and effectively." Indeed, the logic follows that to respond to the challenges of the 21st century, forces need to be mobile, flexible, effective, and sustainable in the field. In response to the report, important changes were made to the way the UN manages peacekeeping operations. Even with such changes, however, future attempts by the UN to undertake complex peace operations on its own, are largely inhibited by the resistance of Member States "to establish the building blocks for the UN to acquire the operational ability to deploy rapidly and effectively."⁶ In light of these constraints, other response mechanisms have been gaining acceptance and are increasingly being called upon to respond to crises where the UN cannot.

The international community has come a long way since the mid-1990s in pushing for greater rapidity and effectiveness in responding to crises. Despite these efforts, however, the lack of progress on the issue of rapid response to global crises is particularly apparent when considering the ongoing atrocities in Darfur. While the need for a rapid response in Darfur has long passed, it is imperative that issues of rapid deployment be further explored if future responses to crises are to occur in a timely manner.

³ Government of Canada. September 1995. *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*. The report was prepared by an International Consultative Group co-chaired by Sir Brian Urquhart of the Ford Foundation and Dr. John C. Polanyi, Nobel Laureate of the University of Toronto.

⁴ *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*, 63.

⁵ United Nations. 2000. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (Brahimi Panel) http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/. The report mentions a viable peace-building strategy as a fourth factor.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A RAPID RESPONSE?

The primary objective of a rapid response is to respond rapidly to imminent tensions that, if left unattended, could degenerate into war. More specifically, a rapid response is deployed to an area to stabilize and secure the environment as soon as possible, so as to allow for a larger UN peacekeeping force. While the objective of a rapid response may be obvious in theory, its deployment in practice is much more challenging.

First, many participants identified the notion of a rapid response as misleading. *Rapid* can mean anything from hours, days, months, or years, and as such, the rapidity of a force does not matter. What is important, however, is its timing. The timing of an intervention is central to any deployment strategy, especially when attempting to quell an emerging crisis or prevent the resurgence of conflict.⁷ For example, the 6 to 12 week time-frame immediately following a ceasefire or peace agreement is often viewed as the most critical period for establishing the foundations for a stable peace.

In conjunction with timing are the credibility and political momentum of a response. These are important elements in the success of an operation; once lost, these factors are difficult to regain.⁸ As mentioned by Brig.-Gen. Mitchell, rapid response forces must be credible, properly equipped to achieve desired outcomes, and be capable of successfully communicating intended political messages. It is also essential that political expectations with respect to military capabilities be realistic. In other words, a rapid deployment should be accompanied by the rapid employment of forces on the ground. This involves preparations prior to a force's deployment, as well as plans for its employment and its departure based on identified measures of success.

Participants also recognized the fact that military solutions alone will not resolve conflicts, and that civilians are increasingly viewed as crucial for the success of a mission and for its rapid deployment. The rapid deployment of both military and civilian personnel is essential for communicating political messages to relevant actors in a crisis. The content of political messages, in turn, determines the type of response that is deployed, ranging from military observers to combat units. Finally, flexibility and effectiveness are also necessary components of a rapid response, since decision-making processes can range from hours to months, and must address short-term needs while at the same time establishing the building blocks for future efforts.⁹

The most significant obstacles facing the deployment of a rapid response are delays in decision-making and those caused by the UN's own internal oversight mechanisms. The single greatest factor causing these delays is political. As identified by the participants, responses are driven by a multitude of political factors including national interests,

⁶ See St-Pierre, Kristine. 2006. "Empty Rhetoric or Genuine Effort, Evaluating the Potential Effectiveness of Rapid Reaction Forces in Preventing Conflict." *Paterson Review* 7, no. 3, 8.

⁷ See St-Pierre.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Peter Langille. 2002. *Bridging the Commitment-Capacity Gap: Existing Arrangements and Options for Enhancing UN Rapid Deployment*. Geneva: Center for UN Reform Education.

domestic media, domestic and international public opinion, and what some referred to as standing resolution ‘tripwires.’ As one professor argues,

...failing to act in an escalating violent situation is the difference between a situation that can be contained and a humanitarian disaster that can spiral beyond control and result in thousand of people being displaced or killed. A failure to act quickly, early and decisively not only leads to conflict escalation but incriminates the Western powers directly in the ensuing violence and severely damages the legitimacy of international norms.¹⁰

In recent years, conflicts have increasingly demonstrated the need for rapid integrated responses — involving military, civilian, and humanitarian personnel. The recent crises in Lebanon and Darfur are the most recent examples of crises where a rapid and integrated response was required. Both cases also highlight different limitations to UN rapid response capacity, as identified above. The case of Lebanon demonstrated the difficulty of getting Member States to commit troops and to uphold their commitments, as well as the delays involved in requiring parliament approval. In the case of Darfur, the crisis illustrates the difficulties that questions of sovereignty and national interest pose for rapid response operations. While calls for the deployment of a UN rapid response force to Darfur have been made incessantly over the past three years, lack of cooperation from the Sudanese Government remains a major factor restricting the UN’s ability to intervene. The case of Darfur also demonstrates the contribution of regional organizations to peacekeeping and the need for greater creativity and flexibility in the design of peacekeeping forces.

The next section explores the various mechanisms that exist for rapid response.

MECHANISMS FOR RAPID RESPONSE

According to Mr. Kinloch-Pichat, the evolution of the international order, due to more recent concerns with international security and humanitarian considerations, has resulted in a wider range of objectives for the UN. As a consequence, there are concerns that by taking a narrow focus on improving the UN’s rapid response capacities, these improvements may come at the expense of meeting other objectives. Although he believes improvements to rapid reaction times are critical to speeding up deployment, he senses that these may be insufficient to improve the UN’s overall effectiveness.

In light of these acknowledgements, the participants agreed that there is a clear advantage to having a wide range of political choices when dealing with global crises. As Col. Hanrahan mentioned, more choices means that Member states are not compelled to rely only on the UN as a response mechanism, and allows for greater flexibility as different mechanisms may be more suitable for different situations. Accordingly, the participants

¹⁰ Carment, David. 2005. “Effective Defence Policy for Responding to Failed and Failing States.” *Research Paper Series*. Ottawa, Canada: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 21.

identified a number of mechanisms for timely response, each of which exhibit unique advantages and challenges. These mechanisms are presented in Table 1 below with corresponding examples.

TABLE 1. TYPES OF RESPONSE MECHANISMS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Response Mechanisms	Examples of Peacekeeping Operations
UN Missions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIH), 1995–2002 · UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), 1996–1997 · UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), 1997–1999
Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), July 2000–present · UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), March 2005 to present
Coalition of the Willing and Regional Organizations or Arrangements (UN-Authorized)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · NATO-led force in Bosnia (IFOR), 1995–1996 · NATO-led international force in Kosovo (KFOR), 1999–present · International Force East Timor (INTERFET), 1999–2000 · British forces' joint rapid reaction force to Sierra Leone, 2000 · ECOWAS deployment in Liberia (ECOMIL), 2003 · EU Rapid Reaction Force (using NATO assets) in Macedonia, 2003 · African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), 2003–2004 · African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) force in Darfur, 2004–present

While traditional UN missions, as well as military arrangements under standby agreements such as SHIRBRIG, are preferable owing to their legitimacy and impartiality, they both encounter difficulties in obtaining consent from the national governments of participating countries, often resulting in their ineffectiveness. The UN does not have a standing force, and does not have the ability to recruit forces without the authorization from the Security Council and cooperation of donor countries. In addition, although both types of deployments are initially mandated to deploy for six months, they face the possibility of being extended indefinitely, causing potential troop-contributing countries to back down. The UN's ability to respond rapidly to imminent crises is also impeded by the lack of political will to undertake more robust interventions with Chapter VII provisions. As a result, Chapter VII missions have increasingly been relegated to coalitions of the willing or regional organizations, following authorization by the Security Council.

Coalitions of the willing and regional organizations often portray a more limited legitimacy, due in part to concerns about impartiality. At times, however, specific organizations have enjoyed greater legitimacy than even UN missions, as seen with the AU force in Darfur. Interventions by coalition of the willing or regional organizations

are often restricted in their scope and duration because of limited capacities. While they have the possibility to stay in theatre for an extended period of time, they are mostly considered as short-term solutions, providing the necessary capacity before a UN peacekeeping force can be deployed. Although all ad hoc peacekeeping operations are often faced with deployment and mandate delays, coalitions and regional organizations can often portray greater flexibility in deploying more robust operations more rapidly. In fact, while the ad hoc basis of peacekeeping operations may, in most cases, be viewed as a source of inefficiency, Mr. Itani suggested that the flexibility of such an approach may allow for more creative and context-specific solutions, as well as prevent institutional rigidity in responding to crises.

The next section looks at the strengths and weaknesses of two types of mechanisms in terms of rapid response, SHIRBRIG and regional organizations.

MULTINATIONAL STAND-BY HIGH READINESS BRIGADE (SHIRBRIG)

The Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), an initiative of the Danish and the Canadian Governments, became operational in January 2000. It is a rapidly deployable peacekeeping force available to the UN, with a projected response time of 15 to 30 days, and a brigade which comprises 4000 to 5000 troops when fully deployed. The intent of the force is to buy time to generate forces; it can remain in the field for up to 6 months. The force allows participating Member States to maintain their national sovereignty, and provides complete transparency with regards to the commitments required, as it does not commit Member States to remain in the field for more than six months.

According to Brigadier General Mitchell, former brigade commander for the SHIRBRIG force in Sudan, SHIRBRIG is an important element of peacekeeping operations and has proven an effective and efficient contributor to UN operations.¹¹ Since it was declared operational in January 2000, SHIRBRIG has undertaken four missions (UNMEE, UNMIL, UNAMIS, and UNMIS) and has provided planning assistance to both ECOWAS (as part of UNOCI) and the DPKO in Darfur. However, the force faces several challenges when it comes to strengthening its rapid response capacity.

- Participation in SHIRBRIG missions is based on conditional commitments from Member States, whom decide on a case-by-case basis, based on national interest considerations, whether their forces and equipment can be used. In recent years, Member States' participation in other missions (including the NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan and the US-led coalition in Iraq) has resulted in increasing pressure on the ability of the brigade to deploy at full capacity.

¹¹ Mitchell, Gregory B. 2006. "Briefing to the Danish Institute of International Studies." http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Events/2006/SHIRBRIG/mitchell_briefing_diis.pdf.

¹² Armstrong-Whitworth, Peter. 2006. "SHIRBRIG: The Future of Canada's Contribution to UN Peace Support Operations?"

- The Brigade was originally established to undertake peacekeeping operations with Chapter VI provisions. However, every mission to date has had a Chapter VII component (SHIRBRIG's deployment to Sudan is under Chapter VII provisions). While the SHIRBRIG Steering Committee has agreed to consider deployments to more robust missions on a case-by-case basis, to date, no formal amendment has been made to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which established the Brigade.¹² As peacekeeping operations requiring a Chapter VII mandate are increasingly the norm, it is important that SHIRBRIG takes part in these missions if it is to remain credible and relevant to the United Nations.¹³
- SHIRBRIG is sustainable in the field for a period of six months, reducing the force's flexibility in responding to crises.
- SHIRBRIG is composed of military personnel only; no police or civilians are included in the force.

SHIRBRIG's experience has demonstrated that cohesion between all military and civilian components is necessary for mission success. As a result, Member States can improve SHIRBRIG by including expertise in civil affairs, human rights, and the rule of law into its operations. The additions would make SHIRBRIG more effective in its rapid response operations, as well as enhance its credibility as an organization. As SHIRBRIG was designed to provide the UN with a rapid reaction capability, it can be argued that "[its] relevance to the UN is dependent on its capacity to fulfill the UN's requirements for rapid reaction."¹⁴

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS

In the 2005 report of the Secretary-General *In Larger Freedom*, Secretary General Kofi Annan acknowledged that the need for rapid action cannot be achieved solely through the mechanisms of the United Nations. As a result, he urged Member States to improve the UN's deployment options by "creating strategic reserves that can be deployed rapidly, within the framework of the United Nations arrangements."¹⁵ The report also called on the establishment of "an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the United Nations to work with relevant regional organizations in predictable and reliable partnerships."¹⁶ Accordingly, other organizations have already undertaken to reorganize their military capability to ensure greater rapidity and effectiveness in future deployments, notably the EU, NATO, and the AU. In fact, the report applauds the European Union and the African Union for their decision to create high-readiness standby brigades that could reinforce United Nations missions, and calls on other nations to develop similar capacities and asks that these be placed at the disposal of the United Nations.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ United Nations. March 2005. *In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*. Report of the Secretary General, A/59/2005, 31. <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/>.

¹⁶ *In Larger Freedom*, 31.

Recent examples of rapid deployments include the British forces' joint rapid reaction force to Sierra Leone in 2000, the EU Rapid Reaction Force (using NATO assets) in Macedonia under Operation Concordia in March 2003, and the EU Interim Multinational Emergency Force and French-led Operation Artemis to Bunia, DRC in June 2003.¹⁷ As these interventions have proven successful and have in certain cases facilitated the deployment of UN peacekeepers, regional organizations, with their increasing rapid response capacity, could in fact act as a complementary mechanism to UN deployments. The increasing role of regional organizations in peace operations, however, also raises the question of whether these regional forces are adequate and sufficiently credible for a mission to succeed, as seen with the deployment of African Union forces in Darfur.

OBSTACLES TO GREATER RAPID RESPONSE CAPACITY

Apart from the challenges facing the response mechanisms identified above, the participants considered a number of other obstacles to greater rapid response capacity. They are political will, civil-military cooperation, and the responsibility to protect.

POLITICAL WILL

The lack of political will amongst Member States to reform UN peacekeeping and to strengthen rapid response operations is a major impediment to the UN's capacity to respond rapidly to crises. While addressing political will is one option, it may be more beneficial to build skills and capacities outside the government that would take action when global crises arise, and as such, compensate for delays in political action. In fact, EU studies regarding capacity building in civilian organizations have demonstrated that civilian capabilities are essential where military capabilities are insufficient. Indeed, one way to circumvent a lack of political will is to develop more tools and a greater capacity outside of government. As more tools are created, the lesser governments will be able to stall developments for rapid response.

The UN and EU are the only international organizations with an established mechanism that allows for the mobilization and deployment of a significant operational civilian capability. UN police missions are made up of individual civilian police officers and formed police units contributed by Member states. Their deployment can take between six to nine months following a mission's authorization by the Security Council. The problem with such a timeframe is that it leaves a critical gap at the onset of an operation, when forces are needed to stabilize the situation and maintain security. One way to address this gap is for Member states to develop greater capacity to deploy qualified police personnel, something which several nations, including Canada, have attempted to do.¹⁸ The UN also faces a problem with respect to the quality of its personnel.¹⁹ Selected candidates, most of which are from

¹⁷ United Nations. 2004. "UN Peace Operations 2003: Year in Review."
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/year_review03/Issues_related.htm.

¹⁸ Perito, Robert, Michael Dziedzic, and Beth DeGrasse. 2004. "Building Civilian Capacity for U.S. Stability Operations: The Rule of Law Component." *United States Institute of Peace, Special Report No. 118*.
<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr118.html>.

¹⁹ Ibid.

developing countries, often portray limited training and experience which significantly limit their effectiveness.

The EU Police Unit has an available force for international service of 5,000 civilian police (1,400 of which are part of a rapid reaction force which can deploy on a 30-day notice), as well as 200 judges, lawyers, and corrections officers (60 of which can deploy on a 30-day notice). The rapid reaction forces are composed of formed (constabulary) units contributed by police organizations of Member states. The Italian Carabinieri is one example.²⁰

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

The increasing focus on humanitarian concerns means that traditional military-based organizations must also work towards achieving humanitarian objectives in peacekeeping missions. Such objectives may in certain respects complicate the international community's ability to appropriately respond to crises, as the integration of humanitarian and civilian considerations into UN peacekeeping missions requires a wide range of skill sets, as well as reliable information through a UN intelligence unit. Yet, it should be recognized that military-civilian integration in field missions and in the sharing of information is already a common feature of UN peacekeeping missions. For example, the military has specific liaisons sitting in civilian units, and intelligence units are present in the field (e.g. the Unified Mission Analysis Centre (UMAC) in Sudan). While civil-military cooperation is already a common feature of many missions, the problem becomes one of insufficient monetary resources. Resistance from certain countries within the UN against the creation of an intelligence unit also continues to hinder progress in that direction.

The increasing focus on humanitarian concerns also requires greater cooperation and coordination between NGOs and governments, as the involvement of NGOs in conflict can lead to complications when their efforts are not sufficiently integrated with government initiatives. Military forces are also working closely with NGOs to create a stable environment in which to assist them in their efforts, and to mitigate casualties amongst local NGOs involved in conflicts. While many efforts exist to strengthen cooperation—in fact, NGOs and peacekeeping missions meet regularly in thematic working groups to discuss how to coordinate better—the concern is that NGOs often resist being physically integrated into UN operations. The integration of humanitarian assistance within military efforts challenges fundamental humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence, which NGOs want to maintain. Still, many participants were confident of the possibility for further cooperation between NGO and government approaches to conflicts, as well as the possibility for further philosophical integration

²⁰ Ibid.

between two. NGOs also have the ability to offer creative solutions outside of more conventional mechanisms.

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

A rapid response capacity, as its name suggest, is designed to *respond* rapidly to crises, and to provide a stabilization force immediately after a cease-fire or peace accord. However, as posited in the Responsibility to Protect, possible future roles for a UN rapid response force could include the prevention and halting of genocide, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity. According to R2P, this role is part of the responsibility to prevent. A major obstacle to such deployment is the UN's lack of mechanisms and capacity to predict or anticipate crises before they occur.²¹

In addition, the participants expressed concerns with regards to the impact of structural and institutional limitations on the realization of humanitarian goals, such as R2P. More specifically, Col. Hanrahan pointed out that R2P principles have limited impact during crises, since there are no existing processes or structures to incorporate these principles into rapid response systems and decision-making processes. The consequence is that recent resolutions referring to R2P continue to have little real impact on rapid response operations. R2P also requires countries to further develop their rapid reaction capabilities so that they have the capacity to deploy forces when necessary. As the re-establishment of rapid reaction forces on an ad hoc basis is costly, and military budgets are on the decline, the development of such forces is limited.

In light of these limitations, the further development of rapid reaction forces, such as SHIRBRIG, may be useful for speeding up deployment. Still, the availability of forces does not necessarily translate into action if political will does not exist. Thus, the development of political will to respond to crisis situations is at least as important as developing military capabilities.

CANADIAN STRATEGIES FOR RAPID RESPONSE TO CRISES

Canada's experiences in recent peace operations have highlighted the need for, and demonstrated the added value of taking a "whole of government" approach to international missions, in which military and civilian resources work together in a focused and coherent manner. The approach is being used as part of the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and Canada's support for the Africa Union troops in Darfur, Sudan. The approach was also implemented as part of the Canadian support for the elections in Haiti in February 2006. Specifically, the approach requires greater collaboration between the Canadian Forces and other government departments and

²¹ Rice, Susan. "Collective Response to Crisis: Strengthening UN Peace Operations Capacity." http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/Rice_paper_collective_response.pdf.

agencies (including Foreign Affairs Canada, the Canadian International Development Agency, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) to further develop Canada's integrated "3D" approach (defence, diplomacy and development) to conflict and post-conflict situations.

STANDING CONTINGENCY FORCE

Recent developments as part of Canada's desire to better meet the need of responding quickly to international crises include the creation of a Standing Contingency Force, which consists of approximately 1000 soldiers deployable within 7 to 10 days notice. The task force would provide an initial presence on the ground in order to stabilize the situation and/or facilitate the deployment of a larger, follow-on force. However, as one author suggests, it may take one to two years before the task force is available for operations and it is unlikely to stay in the field for up to six months.²² Nevertheless, efforts are being made to test and further develop the idea of a rapid response force. One such effort was undertaken jointly with the U.S. in the fall of 2006. The effort consisted of a seaborne invasion exercise off the coast of the U.S. in order to test the feasibility of the plan to create a rapid response team.²³

DISASTER ASSISTANCE RESPONSE TEAM (DART)

Created in 1996 as part of Canada's response to the genocide in Rwanda, the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) is another unprecedented initiative of the Government of Canada to respond rapidly to natural disaster crises. As former commander of two DART missions, Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Voith described DART's role in providing medical care and potable water, as well as some engineering capabilities, in emergency areas until domestic and humanitarian aid capabilities can be mobilized. Although DART does not operate in nuclear, biological or chemical disasters, does not possess trauma or surgical capabilities, and is limited to a 40 day mandate, Lt.-Col. Voith emphasized that DART is notable amongst rapid response organizations for its mobilization capacity to be first on the scene and provide assistance without overlapping on work by other bodies. DART was deployed twice in the last two years, to Sri Lanka in the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami, and in Pakistan, following the 2005 earthquake. In both operations, DART members provided effective assistance in the form of potable drinking water (producing between 150,000 to 200,000 litres of water per day) and medical treatments until aid organizations had established their capabilities. Both deployments were deemed successful and highlighting the importance of diplomatic relations and the 3D approach in the operations' success.

²² Armstrong-Whitworth.

²³ Pugliese, David. 2006. "Canadian forces will take part in amphibious exercise off U.S. coast" *The Daily News*. 10 October. <http://www.hfxnews.ca/index.cfm?sid=8684&sc=2>.

GLOBAL PEACE AND SECURITY FUND (GPSF)

The Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) is a new mechanism which further enables rapid response by mobilizing funds more quickly than in the past. It is dedicated to providing security assistance to failed and fragile states, post-conflict stabilization and recovery, and capacity building for peace operations primarily in Africa. The GPSF has received \$500 million over five years which it will allocate between the Stability and Reconstruction Taskforce (START), an inter-departmental advisory board and secretariat situated within Foreign Affairs that will oversee the design of 3D (diplomacy, development, defence) integrated approaches to “failed and fragile states,” and two smaller programs, the details of which are still unclear.

CANADIAN CIVIL SOCIETY AND INITIATIVES

Civilian expertise is also available through organizations such as CANADEM, which has created a catalogue of civilian experts ready to deploy on short-notice. For example, CANPOL is a national roster of 5000 Canadians with expertise in human rights, peace building, democratization, rule of law, admin-logistics, security, and reconstruction. The roster also comprises 500 police and security sector reform experts that have experience in over 60 countries. Another example is CANADEM’s national Roster of Election Observers for Canada, which identifies candidates for deployment to observer missions. Based on these experiences, participants agreed that more Canadian centers of excellence should be created that have the capacity to provide solutions in responding to crises.

MULTILATERAL COMMITMENTS

The Government has also pledged its continued partnership with both NATO and the UN. This commitment reflects Canada’s longstanding engagement in both organizations as a means to defend its national interests. As part of this engagement, Canada is pursuing a strong leadership role in Afghanistan under the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission.

Canada has also played a central role in the creation and the establishment of SHIRBRIG. As part of this initiative, Canada assumed the Presidency of SHIRBRIG in 2003 and a Canadian, Brigadier General Gregory Mitchell, took on the position of brigade commander from January 2004 until summer 2006. Owing to its current involvement in NATO and Afghanistan, however, participants did not feel that Canada currently has a vested interest in SHIRBRIG. Participants also mentioned that a general shift away from SHIRBRIG as a rapid reaction tool can be observed by other nations as well, namely the EU, as they focus on other issues. Still, Canada is continuing to support the African Union and ECOWAS in their development of a capacity to prevent, resolve and manage crises, and in particular, efforts towards an AU rapid reaction force.

Participants agreed that Canada should consider paying greater attention to SHIRBRIG so that it remains a valuable tool in dealing with future crises and that Canada should promote military and civilian integration in UN peacekeeping operations. In spite of above developments, however, participants remained unclear as to what the Canadian military’s

plan to have a rapid response force capable of intervening in failed or failing states around the world will look like, and how it would fit into other multi-national rapid reaction forces.

OTHER STRATEGIES FOR RAPID RESPONSE TO CRISES: UNEPS

Throughout both public dialogue events, Dr. Langille called for a more serious commitment to collective human security. In doing so, he proposed the establishment of a permanent United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS), an idea which participants discussed at length. UNEPS it would ensure readily deployable military capacities to handle crises and would be immediately deployable in situations involving armed conflict, genocide, ethnic cleansing and other crises. The body would overcome the tensions between notions of state sovereignty, and the principles of R2P and the right to intervene. An emergency service would also appeal to a broader audience than the idea of a UN standing army, and would expand upon legitimate and reliable emergency services. Furthermore, it would be reliable, cost effective and adaptable to the circumstances of specific emergency situations. As part of this proposition, Dr. Langille also called for greater engagement of civil society to build domestic and global constituencies, and to gradually approach supportive states in order to establish a body at the UN that can effectively respond to crises.

Nevertheless, several participants mentioned that bureaucratic unwillingness on the part of Member states could stymie rapid response efforts even if UNEPS was established. Some participants also questioned how and when relevant parties would agree to use such a force, though others suggested public pressure could provide the impetus for deploying UNEPS when needed. Others mentioned that Member states could support such a body and see it as supplementing their own forces, but only after reaching a critical mass of public pressure for its creation. In this regard, active support from civil society organizations and global cooperation between NGOs are key factors in furthering the cause, in particular through more elaborate research on the structure and functions of the emergency service, and through the dissemination of information and greater public awareness.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: POSSIBILITIES FOR STRENGTHENING RAPID RESPONSE CAPACITY

The 1990s and the 21st century have presented a stark need for greater rapid response to crises. While many challenges remain to enhancing the UN's capacity for rapid response, participants agreed that there are clear possibilities for the development of greater rapid response capacity. Before addressing these possibilities, however it is important to remember, as Mr. Kinloch-Pichat advised the panelists, that humanity has progressed in its response to global crises and will continue to do so. As a result, the international community should consider solutions that can actually work in the present, and not necessarily those that are ideal.

The following developments within the international environment and the UN more specifically, present clear possibilities for strengthening rapid response capacity. They are:

1. The rising influence of many different types of NGOs, regional organizations and other global actors in international affairs. As a cohesive group, they are likely to provide strong impetus for change at the UN.
2. The public's increasing engagement and efforts to garner support for UN reform and influence political will. A more engaged "world public" is necessary to foster changes within the UN and other organizations.
3. The growing expansion of civilian capabilities within rapid responses. Civilian capabilities allow for more integrated approaches to rapid responses.
4. The emergence of new partnerships between the UN and other regional organizations (i.e., NATO, EU, ECOWAS, and AU). These partnerships allow for greater flexibility in peacekeeping operations, and a greater rapid response capacity due to the 'sequencing of operations' between regional and sub-regional organization and the UN.²⁴
5. The increasing support on the part of Member states toward improvements at the UN (such as early engagement for national decision-making and policy improvements), as well as improvements at the national level (such as the establishment of national crisis analysis centre and rapid response technical assessment capacity).

RECOMMENDATIONS

Many themes and directions for future work emerged from the Oct. 19 and 20 events. A significant component of the discussion focused on strengthening the political will of states to efficiently and effectively respond to global crises. Overall, there is a necessity to strengthen political resolve and ensure that there are sufficient military and civilian capabilities to guarantee success in rapid response missions. Several recommendations were also based on the need for greater research into global rapid response initiatives to identify the most effective way to proceed on the issue, both globally and within Canada. Although much work remains to be done, important starting points are identified for resolving the rapid reaction debate and for enhancing the UN and the international community's ability to respond rapidly to crises across the globe.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS DPKO AND SC:

As the opportunities for reforming UN systems and structures, and for fostering support amongst Member states for change are limited, it is necessary to look at other avenues for developing greater rapid response capacity.

²⁴ de Coning, Cedric. 2006. "The Future of Peacekeeping in Africa." *Finnish Institute of International Affairs* (FIIA), Report 14, 41. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?lng=en&size51=10&v33=60072&id=23624>.

1. The UN DPKO should continue to support greater integration within its missions and strengthen the coherence between the military, police and civilian activities. This can be achieved by:
 - a. Promoting the development of civilian expertise within the UN and within individual Member states.
 - b. Continuing to support the creation and expansion of a UN roster of civilian specialists, as well as rosters within Member states.
2. The UN DPKO should devise new approaches to partnerships with regional organizations to enhance their legitimacy, as well as their capacity on the ground. This could be achieved by further exploring, through research and discussion, how different types of response mechanisms and partnerships could complement UN deployments.
3. The UN DPKO should strengthen the capacity, both institutionally and on the ground, of regional and sub-regional organizations in Africa by:
 - a. Forming a cooperation agreement with the AU to enable more focused capacity building efforts and strengthen the latter's sustainability in the field and multidimensional capability.
 - b. Working to transform SHIRBRIG to ensure that it can meet UN requirements, including the ability to deploy under a Chapter VII mandate. This could be achieved by formally amending the MOU establishing the Brigade to allow for Chapter VII deployments, by strengthening the Brigade financially, and by committing a specific number of troops to the Brigade.
 - c. Developing a formal arrangement with SHIRBRIG whereby SHIRBRIG members dedicate a certain number of forces for rapid deployment. These forces could train together once a year, thereby establishing similar rules of engagement and provide for greater effectiveness in operations.
4. The Security Council should consider the authorization of longer deployment mandates (i.e., 12 months) for all missions (including by SHIRBRIG and regional organizations). Longer deployment mandates would allow for greater mission stability and would help in the design and implementation of long-term mission goals. Longer mandates would also increase a mission's sustainability in the field, providing it, in turn, with greater flexibility and credibility on the ground. Nevertheless, longer deployment mandates should not be authorized without the necessary resources to fulfill these mandates.

5. The Security Council should support the strong involvement of emerging powers, such as China and India, in the development of rapid response capabilities. By garnering support from a wider range of states, military forces will be seen as more legitimate and credible when they are actually deployed, thereby increasing the odds of success.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CIVIL SOCIETY AND NGOS IN CANADA AND INTERNATIONALLY²⁵

To increase the support for rapid response capabilities, it is important to build domestic and global constituencies that influence political figures to take action when crises occur. While public opinion is not always effective in influencing global affairs, at the regional level, transnational public opinion can impact political will to respond to crises through regional organizations. In addition, the public and media should not overlook the fact that UN Member States influence its effectiveness as an organization, as well as its abilities to act when crises arise. In fact, many UN Members are far more supportive of its *inaction* during crises than of the mobilization of its resources.

1. Civil society and NGOs should support existing (as well as the establishment of new) centers of excellence to provide expertise in a wide range of areas, such as human rights and law-related issues, on an ad-hoc basis. These centers, for example, could help to further clarify how issues of sovereignty and national interest impede on the development of greater rapid response capabilities, and could contribute to an elaboration of R2P processes and structures, as well as its application on the ground.
2. Civil society and NGOs should encourage public engagement in human rights and international issues as a means of building domestic and global constituencies to influence political figures in taking action when crises occur.
3. Civil society and NGOs should examine current and new avenues for enhancing the search capacity of UN organizations and NGOs for civilian personnel. Doing so could include exploring the availability of catalogues of civilian forces and looking at actions taken by organizations to circumvent the lack of international action.
4. Civil society and NGOs should take a serious look at UNEPS proposal to advance merits of the cause.

²⁵ While these recommendations are targeted primarily at Canadian civil society and NGOs, they can also apply to civil society and NGOs around the world.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT

The Government of Canada's 'whole of government' approach calls for the integration of civilian, military and diplomatic strategies. To achieve greater policy coherence in situation of crises, all departments must work together in a concerted manner under clear and defined mandates. To improve the framework, it is also necessary to encourage cooperation between governments and NGOs to ensure the success of both types of organizations in assisting with crises situations.

1. The Government of Canada should strengthen the political resolve of its departments involved in peacekeeping through the elaboration of clear mandates and objectives with regards to defence, diplomacy and development.
2. The Government of Canada should work towards including NGOs into its 'whole of government' approach in a focused and coherent manner. In doing so, the Government should explore possibilities for future philosophical and practical cooperation, at the same time as ensuring that NGOs maintain their independence and identities.
3. The Government of Canada should ensure that there are sufficient military and civilian capabilities for success in rapid response missions. This could be achieved by cooperating with Canadian NGOs, by supporting existing and new rosters of civilian expertise, and by putting more emphasis on the development of the civilian side of peacekeeping, as opposed to its military component.
4. The Government of Canada should promote greater cooperation with the EU, especially in the areas of civilian capacity building to respond to crises.
5. The Government of Canada should further define existing military and diplomatic structures to incorporate R2P principles into rapid response systems and decision-making processes. This could be achieved in collaboration with research institutes, as well as cooperation with other UN Member states.
6. The Government of Canada should strengthen the capacity, both institutionally and on the ground, of regional and sub-regional organizations in Africa. In particular, Canada should:
 - a. Continue to support African capacity building and the African Union (including African Standby Force).

- b. Continue to support the ASF. Support for the ASF has concentrated primarily on its military component. Few efforts have been made to develop the civilian or police dimensions of the ASF framework. Doing so would ensure that the “multidimensional nature of contemporary peace operations can be fully integrated into the AU peacekeeping concept.”²⁶
7. The Government of Canada should enhance SHIRBRIG’s capacity and preparedness in responding to crises. This involves working towards decreasing deployment times and enhancing sustainability in the field.
8. The Government of Canada should enhance its role within SHIRBRIG, both financially and in terms of military and civilian personnel by:
 - a. Supporting the civilianization of organizations such as SHIRBRIG through the inclusion of non-permanent civilian staff.
 - b. Considering contributing a civilian foreign-service officer to SHIRBRIG on a one-time basis, to serve as a Policy and Liaison Officer at its headquarters. The holder of the post, which would rotate among member countries, would be responsible for proposing and planning wider civilian participation in SHIRBRIG’s activities, while contributing to other activities.
 - c. Continuing to chair the UN peacekeeping committee and investing money in peacekeeping reform;
 - d. Remaining focused on keeping a leadership role within SHIRBRIG and peacekeeping in general;
 - e. Encouraging broader public awareness of SHIRBRIG and support for its deployment.

²⁶ de Coning, 41.