

10

FUTURE CHALLENGES OF UN PEACEKEEPING

This chapter derives from a United Nations Association in Canada (UNA-Canada) public dialogue, held on February 6th, 2007 in Victoria, to mark the 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping. The event included a public forum and a closed experts' roundtable. Participants of the closed experts' roundtable and panelists at the linked public dialogue event discussed the changing nature of UN peace operations. In doing so, participants examined new challenges to UN peacekeeping and identified opportunities for strengthening UN peace operations in the future. The opinions expressed in this chapter and the recommendations are derived from UNA-Canada's consultation process and are not necessarily the views of the organization. In addition, the recommendations do not represent agreement by consensus among the participants, and may not include all views outside of this limited consultation process.

The closed roundtable featured **Michael Bloomfield**, Rapporteur, University of Victoria; **Dr. Jim Boutilier**, Special Advisor (Policy), Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAF), Department of National Defence; **Ray Crabbe**, Fellow with the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI); **Dr. Greg Cran**, Director of the School of Peace and Conflict Management at Royal Roads University; **Derek Fraser**, President of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA); **Peter Gantz**, Peacebuilding Program Officer with Refugees International; **Jeremy Kinsman**, Canadian Ambassador to the European Union from 2002-2006; **Pierre Kyer**, Royal Canadian Mounted Police; and **Will Matthews**, Manager, Resilient Communities Disaster Preparedness, Red Cross; and **Emily Schroeder**, Project Officer, UNA-Canada. **Dr. Michael Webb**, Acting Chair for the Political Science Department of the University of Victoria acted as moderator for the event.

UN PEACEKEEPING IN THE 21ST CENTURY¹

The current context in which UN peacekeeping operates has changed fundamentally since the beginning of the 1990s. To reflect the changing strategic environment in which peacekeepers are deployed, the nature of peacekeeping operations has undergone major changes. Contemporary UN peacekeeping operations are increasingly complex and multidimensional, requiring greater coordination and cooperation between the various actors involved, including military, civilian police, and civilian organizations

¹ In this chapter, the term 'peacekeeping' refers to operations authorized by the United Nations (under Chapters 6, 7 and 8 of the UN Charter) to monitor cease-fires and/or support the implementation of peace agreements, and to initiate peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities.

and agencies. The nature of peacekeeping mandates has also changed, as missions are increasingly deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and require more robust rules of engagement. In addition, as the protection of civilians is more and more incorporated into peacekeeping mandates, it requires clear rules of engagement on the use of force.

As peace operations evolve, new challenges surface, some of which are more daunting than others. As the international community tries to tackle these challenges, it is important to realize that overcoming them can only strengthen the United Nations organization and UN peace operations in particular. Similarly, it is also crucial to identify opportunities for reinforcing the UN in order to enhance its capacity and effectiveness in conducting and sustaining peace operations.

IDENTIFYING NEW CHALLENGES

Participants to the roundtable first discussed several new challenges facing UN peacekeeping operations. They are: political will; troop and financial constraints; capacity of forces; rapid deployment and standing capacity; rules of engagement and the use of force; and the rule of law.²

POLITICAL WILL

The political will of western nations to engage in peacekeeping missions was a point of interest throughout the conference. Although participants acknowledged a decline in political will of developed nations to contribute larger contingents to UN peacekeeping missions, there was some disagreement over the extent of the phenomenon. Several participants pointed to a growing aversion on the part of developed countries to troop casualties and reluctance to deploy large contingents under UN command. These reasons, along with the increasing engagement of many western nations in Iraq and Afghanistan, led Ray Crabbe to suggest the future involvement of western states in peacekeeping to be questionable at best.

While agreeing with Crabbe on the importance of the West's strategic leadership, Jeremy Kinsman noted that perhaps the apparent waning willingness of western nations to commit forces to peacekeeping is overstated. While he admitted that there has been a decline in western troop contributions to UN missions relative to the contributions of developing nations, he argued that other factors are also responsible for this decline. In his view, the case for humanitarian intervention was stained by its use as an excuse for the United States (US) to enter Iraq. While he acquiesced that public opinion is beginning to regain confidence in the international system, electorates throughout the developed world remain split on the question of humanitarian intervention and governments remain risk averse in their foreign policy. Despite this setback to the case for humanitarian intervention, Kinsman sees a chance for progress on the horizon. As the Security Council is no longer

² These challenges echo those identified by the 2000 Secretary-General's Panel on Peace Operations, chaired by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, and that are being tackled by the Security Council and other bodies: enhancing preparedness; speeding up deployment; strengthening the deterrent capacities of peacekeepers; and ensuring full political and financial support by Member States. See United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (Brahimi Panel), 2000. Available at: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/.

paralyzed by Cold War politics, and as the setbacks of the 1990s and beginning of the 21st century are slowly dissipating, he saw a reason to be cautiously optimistic about the future of UN peacekeeping. Russia and China are showing a new willingness to cooperate and the US is learning the inadequacy of unilateralism.

In light of the weakening political will on the part of developed countries, participants discussed the growing willingness of developing countries to get involved in UN peacekeeping. The last five years have seen an unprecedented growth in UN peacekeeping, contributing to a considerable increase in the demand for peacekeepers. As a result, developing countries have stepped up and are now assuming the burden by contributing the majority of peacekeepers.³ Once again, however, opinions varied widely as to the underlying reasons for such an increase.

Crabbe, for example, suggested that the increase in the contributions of developing countries partly reflects the desire of African states to assume greater responsibility in the area of peace and security. He questioned the motivation of some UN peacekeeping contingents, by pointing to the monetary incentives for countries to contribute troops, which can add up to a significant windfall for a developing economy. Skeptical of the phenomenon, he further noted that the growing involvement of developing countries in peacekeeping has created the negative perception that “developing country soldiers are being sent to keep western soldiers safe.” Kinsman offered a different view, suggesting instead that it is simply a division of labour according to capacity, as many of the developed states are operating at close to full capacity in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

TROOP AND FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS

Closely related to political will are the challenges posed by troop and financial constraints. Troop and financial support are crucial elements of a peacekeeping deployment, without which a peacekeeping mission cannot assume its full range of capabilities. Within this theme, participants addressed the challenges that an increase in the number of peacekeepers coming from developing countries poses to peacekeeping.

Most participants agreed that many of the concerns surrounding the increasing role of developing countries in peacekeeping stem from their lack of capacity. While it was acknowledged that there have been many good contingents from developing countries, several participants pointed to the fact that many of these contingents are under-funded and lack training and/or equipment. This view was echoed by Pierre Kyer, who stated that many of the developing country contingents he saw while working in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) were much less efficient. While on location in the field, he witnessed troops with little preparation (e.g. lacking a driver’s license) and with limited knowledge of the local culture and language.

³ As of 31 October 2006, the 10 top contributors of UN peacekeepers were Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Jordan, Nepal, Ghana, Uruguay, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa. Together, they account for 60 percent of all UN military and police personnel.

⁴ The Economist, “Call the blue helmets: Can the UN cope with increasing demands for its soldiers?,” 4 January 2007.

With these examples in mind, Greg Cran noted that the absence of developed nations poses new challenges to peacekeeping operations. Wider and more challenging mandates not only require more money, but also more specialized capacities (i.e., army engineers and logisticians, heavy-lift aircraft, proper command-and-control and intelligence-gathering, etc.).⁴ As Crabbe explained, peacekeeping missions rely on the command and control, logistics, as well as leadership strategies offered by western militaries and in the absence of this expertise, peacekeeping becomes much more challenging. This is an operational challenge which must be addressed, as specialized armies and capacities are in short supply.⁵ While the capacity exists, it is mostly concentrated in western countries with established militaries, and it requires each member state to voluntarily contribute their capacity and equipment to a UN mission. In response to this challenge, Cran remarked that the focus should be on improving the capacity of developing contingents.

An increase in peacekeeping operations also translates into financial implications for the UN system and its member states. The surge in operations witnessed in the past few years has not only raised the demand for peacekeepers, but also caused the annual budget of UN peacekeeping to triple from its level ten years ago, putting more pressure on member states. The annual budget is currently in the range of \$6 billion.⁶

RAPID DEPLOYMENT AND STANDING CAPACITY

A third issue under discussion was that of rapid deployment and the possibility of building a standing capacity under UN auspices. Rapid response to crises and post-conflict areas remain difficult to achieve, and as such, constitute a considerable obstacle to the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. It is increasingly recognized that to respond to the challenges posed by contemporary conflicts, forces must be mobile, flexible, effective, and sustainable. As the UN does not have a standing peacekeeping capacity, it must rely on voluntary contributions from member states, causing the process of planning, authorizing and deploying a peacekeeping operation to be extremely complex.⁷

Crabbe noted that according to the Brahimi Report, soldiers must be on the ground within six weeks for most peacekeeping missions to be successful and the majority of missions to date have failed to respond in a timely manner. He described organizations that study the UN structure as well as those conducting country background studies as absolutely invaluable for mission success. In his view, it is crucial to have an understanding of the multifaceted approaches to peacekeeping and to have command and control headquarters that possess regional knowledge. He suggested that there is a need for more multinational regional headquarters around the world if the UN is to create the ability for rapid deployment. He further explained that there is a need for greater flexibility in UN deployment requirements. Instead of reinventing the wheel for every mission and counting individual soldiers and equipment based on the monetary will of contributing

⁵ Jean-Marie Guéhenno, *Key Challenges in Today's UN Peacekeeping Operations* (transcript) (Washington D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, May 18, 2006). Available at: <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10766/>.

⁶ The full deployment of the operation in Lebanon and the mission in Darfur could raise the budget to \$7 billion.

⁷ Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century Project, *Draft - UN Capstone Doctrine* (Sweden: The Challenges Project/Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2006). Available at: http://www.challengesproject.net/roach/UN_Doctrine.do?pageId=96.

nations, he advocated for working with set peacekeeping “packages” that can be deployed much faster. Examples of such ‘force packages’ include SHIRBRIG, the NATO Response Force (NRF), the EU Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), the EU Battlegroups, and the African Standby Force (ASF). Crabbe also recognized that the UN has collected rosters of military and civilian personnel; however, these rosters, in his opinion, are largely unmonitored and have not worked in the past.

Regarding the issue of standing capacity, Gantz argued that a significant standing capacity for UN peacekeeping would not be created any time soon. He did note, however, that there is a small standing police capacity of about fifteen police officers in the UN system. The UN Standing Police Capacity (SPC) is a new UN mechanism to help establish police components in new UN peace operations. The SPC can also support ongoing operations. Although few in number, Gantz sees the initiative as a foot in the door for those advocating a permanent military and police force that could rapidly deploy to conflict situations as the need arises. In his view, while the will to create a standing capacity for UN peacekeeping forces remains elusive, it is difficult to overstate the value of having core staff in place to ensure that each mission builds on previous experiences. This would allow for continuous improvement in the speed and efficiency of future UN missions.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE USE OF FORCE

Participants discussed rules of engagement and the use of force. The fundamental principles of UN peacekeeping — consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defence — have, in specific cases, become obstacles to the deployment and success of UN peacekeeping missions. In particular, respect for the non-use of force has, in many cases, proven to be impractical in the face of large-scale massacres and detrimental to the mission both morally and physically. Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia, and East Timor are stark examples of the consequences of the non-use of force. In response to the new strategic environment, today’s missions are for the most part deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorizing peacekeepers to use “all necessary means” to protect themselves and threatened civilians. For example, the missions in the DRC, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Haiti have, as part of their mandate, the explicit authorization to use force to protect civilians. However, this use of force raises a number of questions, such as the level of force at which it becomes too much and the extent to which peacekeepers should protect civilians if such protection can jeopardize a mission’s objectives.

Kinsman noted the need for military peacekeepers to have clear rules of engagement that are suited to the particular mission to avoid repeating situations where peacekeepers lacked in both capacity and mandate. Indeed, it is crucial that when a force is deployed, the mandate under which it will operate matches the needs on the ground. Boutilier agreed that there is a need for a much stronger UN in current missions and that this must start with robust rules of engagement. Crabbe, on the other hand, argued that mandates have improved in strength and clarity since the early days of peacekeeping, and rules of engagement are now very detailed. In Afghanistan, for example, he claimed that soldiers know exactly what they can and cannot do. In his view, the real issue with rules of engagement is the need for UN forces to develop a credible deterrent capability. According to him, the major mistake made in the Balkans was to offer no assurances as

to the consequences of breaking the ceasefire. As a result, he argued that the UN must act as a greater deterrent by creating a fourth principle of “credibility of force” to compliment the three principles already in place. One aspect of this credibility would be to force the UN to be clear about the consequences of violating cease-fires.

While all participants agreed that the UN has made progress on rules of engagement, the problem, according to Gantz, is that rules of engagement are still decided in an ad hoc way. In his view, the UN should develop a more professional approach to peacekeeping by developing doctrine. He argued that the UN should identify the desired outcome and identify how they are going to reach it. While Crabbe argued that UN peacekeeping operations already have an end-state in mind, he admitted that, since missions are often deployed hastily, defining an end-state can indeed be difficult. The process, he added, is further complicated by the need to draft rules of engagement appropriate for each national environment in which these missions operate.

Responding to Gantz’ proposal for a peacekeeping doctrine, Kinsman stated that because the UN is made up of member states, weaknesses in doctrine are simply a reflection of the inability of member states to come to a consensus. He pointed out that general guidelines would likely be too difficult to sell and that perhaps ad hoc rules of engagement are better. He further suggested that a case-by-case approach offers material reasons to support ad hoc rules of engagement. More specifically, Kinsman expressed the need for the UN to create a case-by-case ability to employ strong Chapter VII mandates to make peace in conflict zones, and argued that Canada should be at the vanguard of this movement. While the UN used to be divided along East-West lines, the new divisions, he explained, are between the haves and have-nots, the democratic and non-democratic states, and those worried about sovereignty and those who feel this sovereignty should be broken in cases where humanitarian intervention appears necessary. Kinsman noted that in Rwanda the international community failed to see the aggressor, failed to authorize resistance, and ultimately failed to protect citizens at risk. In his opinion, there has been a paradigm shift from the security of states to human security that sometimes necessitates force by the international community. Building on previous points, Webb argued that perhaps the best option for addressing peacekeeping is to have a balance between a case-by-case approach of building precedents and having guidelines in place from which to work.

On the question of the protection of civilians, Gantz recognized the need for a strong mandate to use force in order to offer security for civilians, but suggested that we need to be careful that this does not derail the larger mission. To clarify his point, he used the example of Darfur where both the Government of Sudan and the rebel groups are attacking civilians. If UN forces abide by the principles of consent and impartiality, both the Government and rebel groups become partners in peace. If, on the other hand, UN forces are forced into combat with members from either group in order to protect members of the civilian population, they run the risk of driving a partner in peace out of the peace process.

Overall, participants stressed the need to ensure that UN forces receive mandates appropriate for each mission, including a credible deterrent capability when necessary. At the same time, the UN must study the effects of supplying a strong mandate to use force on the wider goals of the mission. When defining rules of engagement, the UN must strike a balance between an ad hoc approach specific to each mission, and a general framework allowing for consistent and timely deployments.

RULE OF LAW

A final challenge explored by participants was the UN's ability to engage in comprehensive peacebuilding efforts through the establishment of post-conflict rule of law. This issue was found to be extremely pertinent to the future of peace operations, considering the increasing scope of UN peacekeeping missions in aspects relevant to the rule of law. According to Gantz, the immediate priority when first deploying a peacekeeping mission must continue to focus on ensuring a basic level of security, without which daily activities cannot commence. In the longer-term, however, he advised that the priority should shift to enhancing local institutional capabilities while simultaneously devolving authority to local establishments and actors. The challenge in establishing this local rule of law, Gantz argued, rests in the multiple issues at play, including the types of rules and laws that must be implemented, and the model (if any) to follow in doing so. The process requires, among other things, the elaboration of a constitution and the implementation of transparency mechanisms. It also requires training professionals, government officials, and a judiciary, including police, prisons and court officials, all of which demand special skills and special guidance. Gantz used the example of Haiti to demonstrate how the accomplishments of the international community can be as easily reversed if all factors for good governance are not in place before UN forces are withdrawn. He explained that while the police were fairly effective, the courts and prisons were not, causing an increase in extra-judicial responses to crimes and offenses. In the end, the lack of institutional capabilities was a major factor in the reversal of the situation in Haiti, and resulted in the efforts of the international community being compromised.

OPPORTUNITIES TO STRENGTHEN UN PEACEKEEPING IN THE FUTURE

Participants went on to discuss a number of opportunities for strengthening UN peacekeeping missions on the ground including the integration of peacekeeping capabilities and the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Other opportunities, such as new technology and civil society initiatives are also incorporated in this report, though participants did not specifically address them.

INTEGRATION OF PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES

Panelists first discussed the need for further integration of peacekeeping capabilities and actors. In this context, an integrated approach is one aimed at strengthening the coherence of UN deployments in post-conflict environments. More specifically, integrated missions "are supposed to bring the UN's resources and activities closer together and ensure that they are applied in a coherent way across the political, military, developmental and humanitarian sectors. The purpose is not simply to rationalise resources, however; just as importantly,

integration is seen as a prerequisite for tackling a set of peacebuilding challenges that are themselves narrowly intertwined.”⁸ Apart from benefiting the peacekeeping mission, greater integration will also benefit transition planning between peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, by promoting the inclusion of a comprehensive peacebuilding approach from the onset of a peacekeeping mission and by generating greater attention on the long-term process of peacebuilding.

Within this theme, participants examined four types of integration: the integration of military and police forces from different nations, the integration of UN forces with regional organizations, the integration of military and civilian actors, and the integration of NGOs in peacekeeping missions.

(1) Integrating national contingents

On the issue of integrating national contingents, Kyer spoke of the lack of coherence he witnessed in the DRC, as different national police and military forces trained local groups. The participants also discussed the unwillingness of many nations to place troops under the command of foreign officers in multinational forces. While there was general agreement that the desire to keep soldiers under national command was to ensure the protection of national forces, Webb suggested that this may also reflect nations’ fear of being invisible, as they often utilize these missions to build international influence and identity. Kinsman agreed and added that peacekeeping forces need positive acknowledgement in order to maintain public support at home.

(2) Integrating UN and regional forces

Given the constraints facing regional organizations, the development of strategic partnerships between regional organizations and the UN is increasingly looked upon as the preferred option for meeting the peacekeeping demand. Hybrid missions can help to bypass the challenges posed by political will and troop constraints, provide for a more rapid response to crises, and can prove to be more robust and capable than a UN mission on its own. Hybrid missions may be the best option for the future, owing to their combination of UN legitimacy and regional or local capacity.⁹ One example of a hybrid mission includes Afghanistan, where a UN Political mission, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is working alongside the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. A hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping force is also proposed for Darfur, though this hybrid force would be much more integrated than the operation in Afghanistan (the latter could be qualified as coordinated rather than integrated).¹⁰ Still, one must keep in mind that regional organizations vary in strength and capability.

⁸ Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent, and Karin von Hippel, *Reports on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and London: King’s College, March 2005):

6. <http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/view/viewdocument.aspx?id=2&dodocid=665>.

⁹ See Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).

Echoing a James Dobbins study on the UN's role in nation-building, Fraser argued that the UN remains the option of choice for missions that require less than 20,000 troops; for missions requiring more than 20,000 troops, however, a larger organization like NATO, and increasingly the EU, may be much better suited for these tasks.¹¹ Under these circumstances, Fraser believes that Canada has an interest in supporting both the UN and NATO, as both offer a certain space for leverage in diplomacy and international negotiations.

(3) Integrating military and civilian actors in peacekeeping missions

Participants agreed that close communication and coordination between military and civilian actors are essential if peacekeeping missions are to be successful. Peacekeeping missions now incorporate a mix of actors, including military observers, civilian police and support staff, as well as civilian organizations and agencies, making the interaction between all parties crucial to the good functioning of the mission. Civilian organizations and agencies, including UN agencies, local and international NGOs, civilian relief and development agencies, are essential in addressing the demands of post-conflict societies that do not usually fall under the competency of the military. Such demands include delivering humanitarian aid, training police, monitoring elections, building local capacity and institutions, and supporting reconciliation. As a result, in recent years the concept of 'civil-military cooperation' (CIMIC) has become increasingly common, and a resounding expression in both training materials and at UN headquarters. In fact, support from CIMIC units and activities have become a necessity in peacekeeping operations to enhance the military's ability to communicate and coordinate efforts with civilian groups. Often, the sheer size of civilian groups present in the field and their wide-ranging levels of professionalization make for a difficult relationship, making CIMIC activities even more relevant.

(4) Integrating NGOs in peacekeeping missions

The participants recognized that NGOs are vital to peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions and that greater coordination between NGOs and UN missions on the ground can only strengthen the delivery of field operations. NGOs are crucial in helping to foster greater sustainability in peace operations and can play a major role in the development of local capacity building. They facilitate sustainability by creating local partnerships, they help to empower community-level establishments, and they engage in the transfer of knowledge and training. Their capacity and willingness to remain in the field well after a UN peacekeeping mission has left, also renders their presence essential to achieving sustainable peace. Nevertheless, there is still no standardized way of engaging NGOs in peacekeeping missions.

¹⁰ While a hybrid mission refers to the combination of UN and non-UN forces, these forces can portray different levels of cooperation. For example, Durch and Berckman identify four levels of operations: fully integrated, coordinated, parallel, and consecutive. See William Durch and Tobias C. Berckman, "Définition et délimitation des opérations de paix," in *Guide du maintien de la paix 2007*, ed. Jocelyn Coulon, 16 (Québec: CEPES, 2006).

While some participants viewed the integration of the NGO community as the next step toward greater coherence in peacekeeping missions, others observed that NGOs often object to being integrated, especially with government forces. Recognizing this reluctance on the part of NGOs, Will Mathews argued that NGOs may be more inclined to integrate at a later stage in the conflict cycle, in particular during the peacebuilding stage. This integration would require the clarification of the goals and roles of all parties involved.

Cran mentioned that he witnessed successful integration of military and civilian organizations while working in Eastern Indonesia where women's organizations are working on issues of post-conflict stress. Still, he recognized the need for further integration in order to ensure that all organizations involved in either peacekeeping or humanitarian relief can devise a coherent way forward. Part of this strategy, he mentioned, must involve the local population, as the most successful projects as part of the Tsunami relief effort were those conducted in partnership with the locals. Boutilier, for his part, referred to the way in which military and NGOs have come together on many occasions, as the "micro-globalization of the battlefield." In other words, the more complex and inter-connected situations in the field become, the more inter-dependency and coordination is required between both organizations working alongside in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions.

Overall, participants agreed that more work needs to be done to integrate UN peacekeeping forces from different nations, to integrate military and civilian components of UN missions, and to integrate the efforts of UN forces and the NGO community. These objectives can be realized in part by ensuring that the goals and roles of the various actors involved in peacekeeping are clearly defined.

TRANSITION FROM PEACEKEEPING TO PEACEBUILDING

Participants also examined the UN's ability to effectively transition between the shorter-term peacekeeping efforts and the longer-term peacebuilding processes that are required for the ultimate success of contemporary missions. The participants agreed that peacekeeping has changed drastically in recent years and that the transition to a long-lasting peace requires a concerted and lengthy peacebuilding process.

The 2005 Report of the Secretary-General entitled *In Larger Freedom* states, "Deploying peace enforcement and peacekeeping forces may be essential in terminating conflicts but are not sufficient for long-term recovery. Serious attention to the longer-term process of peacebuilding in all its multiple dimensions is critical; failure to invest adequately in peacebuilding increases the odds that a country will relapse into conflict." Many practitioners have realized that peacekeeping forces are not sufficient to help countries in their transition from war to lasting peace, making the inclusion of a sustainable peacebuilding strategy a necessary component of transition planning and management. In this regard, the newly created Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office intends to help fill the void between war and peace by creating institutional and systematic links between peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peacebuilding efforts.

Mathews noted that many times UN forces come into a conflict zone not knowing what to do, demonstrating the need for an integrated model. This, in turn, requires determining what constitutes sustainable peace in each context as well as what it will take to get there. He continued by arguing that in Kosovo the Canadian contingent was a fine example of what it means to build peace as they were out in the communities, working with locals building houses and being involved in various other community activities.

Crabbe further noted that police forces, legal systems, and other political infrastructure cannot be built overnight. In other words, local capacity takes time. Echoing this view, Fraser stated that it takes a minimum of seven years for peacebuilding results to occur. Other participants agreed, but still felt this timeline was too short.

NEW TECHNOLOGY

On the subject of technology and intelligence, Gantz mentioned that UN peacekeeping operations currently have limited intelligence and information analysis capability, making it extremely difficult for leaders in the field to operate.¹² Missions in the field also lack in advanced monitoring technology such as remote sensing and positioning expertise. However, such technologies are forthcoming and incredibly suitable for UN peacekeeping operations. As Walter Dorn explains, “Sensors can increase the range and accuracy of observation, and permit continuous monitoring over much larger areas. It is now possible to spot a person walking at night 10 kilometres away using ground-based radar. Much greater ranges can be obtained from planes and unpiloted aerial vehicles. Infrared viewers on the helmets of peacekeepers can greatly increase the effectiveness of patrols at night, when most of the nefarious activities, such as ceasefire violations and arms/contraband shipments, take place.”¹³ Such technological advancements will undoubtedly bring new opportunities for field missions. In particular, the use of greater technology will provide peacekeepers with greater access to information, making them more effective and enhance their safety by helping to protect them and detect intruders.

CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES AND SUSTAINABILITY

Other opportunities for strengthening UN peacekeeping are created through civil society initiatives, which seek to increase support for the implementation of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. One example is the development of skills and capacities outside the government such as the creation of rosters or catalogues of military officers, civilian and police experts, as well as other experts who can deploy to UN missions on short-notice (CANADEM’s civilian roster is one example). The use of these rosters can help to circumvent a lack of political will and can also enable more rapid deployments of peacekeeping forces.

¹¹ James Dobbins et al., *The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq* (Washington D.C.: RAND Corporation: 2005).

¹² See also Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping (PEP), “Capacity Problems with the UN Peacekeeping System,” *PEP Briefing Note* (Washington: PEP, 2004). Available at: <http://www.effectivepeacekeeping.org/bn-unglobal/>.

¹³ Walter Dorn, “Canada: The Once and Future Peacekeeper?,” *Peace Magazine* 30 (Dec. 2006): 16. <http://peacejournalism.com/ReadArticle.asp?ArticleID=12227>.

CANADA

In response to the decline in the willingness of developed nations to contribute larger contingents to UN peacekeeping missions, participants strongly agreed that Canadians should play a major role in mobilizing support within the Canadian government for future UN peacekeeping missions. Canada has a long history in peacekeeping and the Canadian public is proud of its nation's involvement. As such, participants firmly believed that Canada is in a unique position to utilize its identity as a champion of multilateralism to garner the necessary political will both domestically and internationally (at the UN and as part of the G8) to continue strengthening this tradition.

Participants also noted that Canadian institutions can play a significant role in the training of UN peacekeepers and in strengthening their effectiveness by engaging in capacity-building exercises. As many UN peacekeeping troops lack in preparation and equipment, participants recognized that UN forces would benefit from increased training and technologies provided by Canadian military and police personnel.

Participants also saw a role for Canada in further advancing the paradigm of human security and in operationalizing the norms surrounding the responsibility to protect (R2P). Canada should utilize the legitimacy it enjoys as a peacekeeping nation to help solidify support for these vital concepts. As Kinsman observed, peacekeeping is a Canadian legacy and, as such, it is the responsibility of each successive Canadian government to act as a steward of these multilateral ideals. As Canada largely contributed to the conceptualization of R2P, it must also contribute in solidifying and operationalizing the concept. In this respect, Kinsman insisted that Canada has both the burden and privilege to move R2P forward by helping to catalyze the international will for peacekeeping operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

UN peacekeeping operations have evolved enormously since the 1990s, bringing with them new challenges, but also new strengths and confidence in UN structures and contributions to peace and security. Of noticeable importance is the fact that participants shared similar opinions when addressing the role of UN peacekeeping in the future. There also was a common recognition that the international community has drawn lessons from past operations and it is working to strengthen UN peacekeeping capacity and efficiency.

As new challenges are bound to appear in the future, it is important not to discourage ourselves and to view these challenges as positive obstacles for further strengthening the international community's response to crises. Similarly, it is important to look at the existing opportunities for bolstering UN peacekeeping, and for encouraging greater engagement on the part of Western countries, in particular Canada.

Many recommendations and possible future directions emerged from the February 6th event. These are presented on the following page.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL (SC):

1. To increase UN credibility in peacekeeping operations, it is crucial that the SC send clear messages to governments and rebel forces as to the consequences of violating cease-fires and the possibilities for sanctions and ICC extraditions.
2. In devising peacekeeping mandates, the SC must continue to ensure that the mandate under which a force will operate matches the needs on the ground, while at the same time being conscious of the possible negative consequences a stronger mandate can have on the overall goals of the mission. It is also important for the SC (and the international community) to be flexible in its response to crises. In particular, the SC should be able to take advantage of opportunities and to respond to changing conditions on the ground.
3. To encourage continuity between peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, the SC, DPKO, and the Peace Building Commission should work more closely together in identifying proper sequencing and prioritization of activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (DPKO):

1. In line with the recommendations already identified in the report on UN Reform, UN DPKO should move forward on the development of a unit of core UN staff, including both military and civilian personnel that could be in place at the onset of a peacekeeping operation to ensure that each mission does not have to start from scratch. This would allow for continuous improvement in the speed and efficiency of future UN missions.
2. DPKO should strengthen and expand the newly created Standing Police Capacity to enhance the UN's ability to deploy rapidly to post-conflict situations.
3. DPKO should promote the recruitment and deployment by Member States of women police officers to better contend with gender issues and crimes specifically targeting women.
4. In the context of UN integration with regional organizations, DPKO and the African Union should agree on practical measures to promote a systematic and structural approach to coordination and cooperation.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS ON THE GROUND:

1. Increase coordination and communication between the various countries involved in the training of local police through joint meetings and training exercises. Greater interaction could improve the consistency of the training and skills provided to local police, ensure the compatibility of objectives and interoperability among local police units and facilitate their future integration under one command.
2. To the extent possible, push for the integration of longer-term peacebuilding initiatives into UN missions by incorporating plans for addressing DDR and SSR at the onset of a peacekeeping mission. This could involve conducting needs assessment on which programmes could be devised that reflect the conditions on the ground. Doing so could also support the development of integrated institutional capabilities at the local level.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS:

1. The Canadian government should work together with like-minded states to push the Security Council to adopt a balanced approach to peacekeeping operations by emphasizing the use of both case-by-case analysis and guidelines. This could be achieved by supporting the in-depth study of the underlying socio-political setting that led to the current crisis or conflict, and tailoring measures to address the particular political, economic, and social context.
2. In strengthening peacekeeping operations, the Canadian government should:
 - a. Try to catalyze political will for the approval of UN peacekeeping missions within the UNGA, G8, and other international fora.
 - b. Work with like-minded states to try to make the SC more transparent in its decisions to undertake peacekeeping missions.
 - c. Create working groups among UN member states to address the issue of the “use of force.”
3. In ensuring the UN’s financial capacity, the Canadian government should review its overall financial contribution to UN peacekeeping, as well as its donations to specific peacekeeping missions (e.g., the UN mission in Haiti and the AU mission in Darfur).
4. In strengthening regional organizations, the Canadian government should devote more resources to building African military and civilian peacekeeping capacity and provide greater technological and logistical support to the AU for peacekeeping operations.

5. The Canadian government could organize a seminar on Canada-UN to discuss UN cooperation with regional organizations, focusing on the military and civilian aspects of this cooperation.
6. The Canadian government should strengthen its engagement in capacity-building exercises of developing country peacekeepers.
7. The Canadian government should consider greater involvement in Francophone countries where Canadians skills and expertise can make a difference.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CANADIAN AND INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOS):

1. NGOs working alongside peacekeeping missions or that send personnel to field missions should ensure that all the personnel they deploy receive basic training in civil-military cooperation.
2. NGOs working alongside peacekeeping missions or that send personnel to field missions should promote communication with leading military officials in peacetime, through roundtable discussions, working groups, conferences and joint training. Increased interaction outside the context of operations will help once in the field.
3. Canadian NGOs engaged in peacekeeping issues should partner with leading Canadian peacekeeping training centres to develop joint training sessions where civilians and military could exchange knowledge and share lessons learned.