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Canada & the UN > Canada on the Security Council (1999-2000) Rebuilding the UN Capacity of Integrated
Coordinated Responses to Hot Spots in an Era of 'Fireproof Houses' Introduction This time of uncertain transition from the Cold War is still playing itself out, but now it involves almost four times as many sovereign states as existed at the creation of the United Nations following the last breakpoint in modern international affairs. Some of these new states emerged from the post-colonial period; others are the result of the breakup of states previously held together by force of power or personality; and still others have been created through violence. Regardless of their origins, together we now have a global community of 185 states of varying sizes, shapes, and dispositions. As each has become a member of the United Nations system, they have been accorded the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of membership, including one vote of equal formal weight within the General Assembly. Yet it is evident that not all members of the UN are equal. Aside from the obvious differences in the characteristics that define who they are, there is substantial variation in both achieved and ascribed status. Neither geography nor demography are adequate descriptors, and though scholars have attempted various algorithms to deduce "power quotients" even these remain sufficiently imprecise and subjective to be inadequate alone to predict or explain the wide range of behaviour and situations faced by states. More to the point, what today defines a "small state" and what determines vulnerability are not easily generalized. Singapore is a very, very small state in terms of territory, resources, and demography, but has shown much greater resilience to the perturbations of recent economic stresses than has its much larger and more populous neighbour Indonesia. Yet Singapore’s administrative order, military preparedness, and methods of governance reveal a sensitivity — some might suggest vulnerability — to its demographic makeup, its territorial marginalism, and its continued unease concerning the intent of its neighbours. At the same time, it has leveraged its role as an entrepot economy and regional hub into a country of presence and influence far larger than its physical size or population might warrant. Both its achieved and ascribed status — what it has accomplished and how others perceive it — belie its geographic and demographic limitations. In the northern hemisphere, Switzerland might come to mind in similar terms. While both countries are sensitive if not vulnerable to domestic cleavages with trans-border linkages, both are also more stable, more secure, and more influential than their geographic or demographic statistics would predict. The Elements of the Problem Security. For brevity’s sake, let us acknowledge the debate on the increasingly diffuse nature of security. Although there are some who continue to insist that this term must be reserved for the classic issue of aggression directed against the territorial integrity, political institutions and population of other states, increasingly security is acknowledged to include a broader range of issues which, in their various forms, threaten the core values, institutions, and capabilities of the state and of those for whom the organs of the state are responsible. Hence, while we can debate the finer points, there is now a growing discourse on security that encompasses military threat, economic threat, demographic threat, environmental threat, and cultural threat. What is evident is that no longer is the armed forces the only or necessarily the best instrument by which these threats can be addressed. Taking this discussion one step further, consider security to be the process by which the responsible agent (in our case, the national government) controls entry and exit across the boundaries which define its areas of responsibility. The movement of peoples is managed by immigration authorities and border police; the movement of technology is managed by customs inspectors and commercial officers; the movement of disease is managed by agricultural and health inspectors and immigration officers; and so forth. In principle, almost everything that can be transported or sent across national boundaries is regulated, managed, inspected, and accounted. Governments and their peoples feel "secure" in knowing this to be the case, and hence we find most governments becoming members of international or regional regulatory bodies. However, it is evident that the illicit movements of people, substances (e.g., drugs), money laundering, technology, etc are being perceived as threatening peoples, national communities, institutions, and in the case of factors such as microbes and viruses, far-flung populations. The fact that both national and international bodies are devoting considerable portions of their material resources to addressing these challenges is at least a partial indicator of the seriousness of the situation. There is no doubt that none of these is the equivalent of military aggression, whether trans-border or domestic. Yet most countries of the OECD are devoting increasingly large proportions of their intelligence assets to these "softer" sides of the security equation. These vulnerabilities are no less for small states whether of the north or south, and indeed in the long term may be more significant than the classic issue of military threat. With notable exceptions that require no detailed comment, today there are relatively few cases of large-scale trans-border military aggression. Other than those situations which are of a protracted nature and already have involved either the UN or some other external body, most military violence today relates to some combination of: unresolved border adjustments; access to and control over valuable natural resources; ethnic, linguistic, religious, or tribal differences; and attempts by one party to overthrow by force the party in power. Rarely do we see one country invading, occupying or destroying another, though the use of military force to destabilize or to overthrow a regime occurs. The presentation of military force also is often used to influence through threat and intimidation. In all of these situations, small states remain vulnerable. Although cross-border movement often occurs and at times involves external actors, most of this violence is internally directed and part of a domestic or so-called civil conflict. Here it is the security of individuals, social groupings (communal or confessional identities), and their leaders who are at risk, along with the regime in power. Indeed, in these situations the so-called "security forces" are often the instruments of insecurity, whether they be the government’s own military and police or the militias of those competing for power. In more stable polities, most military preparedness — the procurement of military weapons systems, the training of armed forces, the development of military doctrine — is undertaken as insurance against possible threats, based on a worse case calculus of how capabilities might mix with intent and thereby lead to provocative action. With a few notable exceptions, the militaries of the south or developing world are oriented inward and the militaries of the north and the OECD are oriented outward. Small State Vulnerability. "Small" is a relative term; small as compared to what; small in what terms? The implications vary depending upon the factors under consideration and the context. One simple way to consider the vulnerability of small states and their security situations is to borrow from scholarship that has considered the factors which together provide an idea of what determines a state’s capabilities and what promotes a government to undertake specific policies and activities. Classical economists and Marxists, realist international relations scholars and neo-Gramscians, and diplomats as well as international corporate leaders agree on one thing: that some combination of population, resources, and technology combine to provide the fundamentals for social and economic development. How people govern or otherwise organize their political, economic, and social lives may vary by circumstance and preference, but all are in some way based on these material conditions. And it is these fundamentals which, regardless of one’s political, philosophical, or ideological positions, form the bedrock of the ideas of power and influence which remain an integral aspect of foreign policy and international affairs. How these factors of population, resources (human and natural/physical), and technology occur within any country does much to locate that state within the hierarchy of global politics. These factors impose constraints and provide opportunities for the accumulation and distribution of wealth and the creation of capabilities which are either more or less resilient to internal or external shocks. The country profile thus created also offers insight into the degree of vulnerability faced by the country, its institutions, and its people whether to challenges from without or from within. Some scholars have noted that limited territory often goes with peripheral geographic position within a region, though there seems little direct correlation between that and whether or not the country has more or less impact on its region or whether this enhances or reduces vulnerability. More researchers have commented on the distinctiveness of small states in terms of their domestic characteristics, notably that they are less internally cohesive in social, economic, or political terms than larger countries. In such cases, small states become synonymous with weak states. But others comment on the capacity of small states that are more socially cohesive and with substantial resources as being able to harness their endowments in ways that allow them to reduce vulnerability and pursue their international objectives. Obviously, as we already noted, there is little solid evidence to allow for simple generalizations. From north to south and east to west, from OPEC countries to the Baltic states, the forces of globalization and politicization are transforming the place of small states in the international community, the pressures they face, and the instruments available to them to pursue their interests. That said, there is a common view that small states must approach foreign policy in a somewhat more constrained and focused manner than do others. Smaller states often have limited human resources, thereby constraining the range of expertise and the number of personnel available in functional operations. They must be concerned with their position within the region, being sensitive to and contributing discretionary resources in support of policies which ensure effective management of local and regional affairs, even if that means limiting involvement in international institutions and policy initiatives that are worthy and might be of direct benefit. For those issues beyond proximate relations, small states of necessity need to work through multilateral processes and institutions. Hence, small states are vulnerable to the dilemma of requiring, on the one hand, to focus on matters near rather than far, yet at the same time they need to allocate resources to enlarge their participation in multilateral forums which are designed, in principle and often in practice, to leverage the power of the many modest countries to counter the interests and capabilities of the large.1 The vulnerability of small states derives in large part from their internal characteristics and their position within the international system. This means that these states have concerns which may not be shared by many larger states, and in those cases where they are, are not accorded the same degree of importance. There is a useful distinction to be made between small states and their more powerful counterparts in terms of their primary security focus. Small states tend to display far greater concern over domestic, internal challenges than external aspects of security. Although small states may be no less vulnerable to external threats, they usually face the pragmatic consideration that they have insufficient resources on their own to address these threats and hence must seek some type of external assistance.2 Small states therefore are less likely to initiate threatening activity or to respond unilaterally to external threats. On the other hand, internal challenges to regime or state security which by definition are also challenges to sovereignty, often are tied to trans-border issues, interests, and actors. Hence, one of the obvious "new security agenda" items that has emerged in this period of post-Cold War transition has been the politics of intervention ranging from external actors providing assistance upon request of the threatened regime to military as well as humanitarian involvement in failed or dismembered states. Without exception such activities which offer a stark indicator of vulnerability have been targeted to small states whether of the south or north. This distinction between the primary security concerns of small versus other states is most obvious in those situations where countries are still engaged in processes of state formation. On the one hand, such states are preoccupied with state-building, something that focuses on the expansion and consolidation of political authority, perhaps the evolution of civil society, as well as the development of state capacity; that is, the institutions for both governance and external relations. In this type of small state, both institutions and societies are most vulnerable to external influence. These small states are particularly vulnerable to economic and demographic factors. With notable exceptions, as a result of their comparative lack of development, these states are vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the international economic system and to population movements. The manner of insertion of these countries into the post-colonial system has had a lasting impact, a legacy which seems to have exacerbated their already tenuous and vulnerable economic position to the current processes of globalization of finance and of production. Another aspect of vulnerability involves how the governments and their representatives of these states are treated by others. Despite their equality in principle under the inherited Westphalian inter-state system and as codified in the practice of the UN General Assembly, as a result of their lack of power, they may be neither perceived nor treated as equals. The subordinate position of these states within the international system is structurally reinforced since even in those situations where they could play a significant role, they often have insufficient human or material resources to sustain a diplomatic presence. Such states are less likely to be in a position to maintain comprehensive networks of diplomatic ties, and though their concerns, their positions, and their experts may be well regarded by others, without the capacity to sustain a presence and provide the material commitments, they will be hard-pressed to ensure that their interests are protected. Small states therefore are in a double bind: they need to use the multilateral system yet they often face structural impediments to doing so. They thus are vulnerable to the capacity of others to set the agenda and to mobilize and allocate the resources necessary to effect policy. The Place of the United Nations While it may be a truism to note that the Cold War perverted much of what the UN stood for and was created to do, it is probably too soon to assert with any confidence that the end of the Cold War has brought changes sufficiently fundamental that all members feel equally confident in its role or capacity to serve their interests. Nonetheless, we must acknowledge that during this period of post-Cold War transition, there already are signs of adjustment. Serious efforts at financial and administrative reform are underway; focused concern with how better to use military and other coercive instruments in peace making, peace enforcement, and peace keeping efforts are under consideration; peace building and human security envelopes have established new opportunities for longer-term UN commitments for rebuilding war-torn societies. The potential role of the UN in reducing the vulnerability of small states has become, if anything, more critical. A simple acknowledgment of the increased numbers of small states, their comparative social (demographic), economic, and political fragility, and the expanded capacity of governing regimes as well as competing groups to organize for political and, unfortunately, rather serious military action has challenged the traditional notions of sovereignty and the inviolability of the state. Chapter VI and VII UN-sponsored or supported actions are but one indicator of the seriousness of the situation and the expanding role of the UN. Another is the concern about burden-sharing, not only among the members of the UN but between the UN and regional organizations. Discussions about burden-sharing and about subsidiarity are indicators of the growing demands that no single institution or country is willing to carry. Hence, along with more small states and more vulnerable countries (note that not all small states are equally vulnerable or introduce burdens for others to address) are greater demands on international and regional institutions, on major states, on international financial institutions, and increasingly on international non-governmental organizations. Yet in many ways the United Nations remains the preferred multilateral organization. It is the only universal body that has organs in which each member has an equal vote. If properly funded, it has the institutional capacity to undertake long-term commitments and to coordinate functions which would ensure not only relevant expertise being available but should provide for appropriate integration of these increasingly complex multifaceted undertakings. Hence, while the UN might not be able to undertake all or even most of the policies required to address the problems of vulnerability in small states, it probably should remain as either the lead institution or as a principal involved in the coordination and management of activities. Efforts which focus on the enhancement of institutional capacity and human resources for governance, on the promotion of economic reform and sustainable development, and on the creation and protection of civil society all fall within some of the traditional functions of UN specialized agencies as well as under the newer rubric of peace building. Issues of the internally displaced as well as refugees, both of which are symptoms of and contributors to state vulnerability, also fall within the purview of the UN system. Each of these general categories addresses aspects of state vulnerability in terms of the resilience of the country to manage its affairs, to begin to meet the needs of its people, and to become better able to withstand the shocks that often come with changes in the economic and political environment. Security challenges posed by military threats and organized violence also fall within the purview of the UN Charter, although nominally under the provision either of a threat to international peace and security or in response to a request from a member country facing aggression. With the removal of the bilateral strategic umbrella, security politics have the potential to become a more central and more effective part of the UN machinery. This also affords regional organizations opportunities to better coordinate their efforts. From the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum through to the process of NATO enlargement and on to the CTBT, IAEA, anti-personnel land mines, and arms registries, there is a broadening effort through the UN and regional organizations to address the problems of military technologies and the continued use of military violence to resolve political or other differences. The multilateral study on a UN rapid reaction capability and the ongoing efforts to reorganize the UN military advisor’s office augurs well for a more effective and efficient military operational role for the UN. The recognition of the need to coordinate military security with human security policies in the face of massive refugee and internal population movements is also long overdue. Together this eventually should contribute to a global early warning and conflict prevention regime. Small states can only benefit from participating in these efforts. On the other hand, it is well recognized that some of the standard principles of western thinking on security cooperation, including such core notions of transparency and confidence building, are problematic for many countries. Furthermore, whether on weapons of mass destruction, missiles, or other high technology military assets, both small states and developing countries have long felt aggrieved by the prerogatives claimed by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Regardless of the merits, these are issue that no longer can be handled by declaration or fiat. It is therefore necessary that major powers that dominate much of the security discourse seek ways to incorporate the concerns of smaller countries. The UN remains the principal vehicle to pursue these issues. The vulnerability of small states would seem to be one of the foundational issues of relevance to the United Nations system, just as the UN should become a principal instrument for enhancing the well-being and security of small states. † David Dewitt is Professor of Political Science and Director, Centre for International and Security Studies, York University, Toronto. Kenneth Boutin is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science and a researcher at the Centre for International and Security Studies, York University, Toronto. 1 There is a limited scholarly literature on small states from which we draw. Given the terms of reference for this brief discussion paper, we avoid formal allusion to such work nor do we address the academic debates.[back] 2 There is a troubling dynamic unfolding that deserves mention. An increasing number of small states which perceive themselves to be in positions of military threat (especially but not solely from outside) are allocating larger amounts of their budgets to weapons purchases. Furthermore, it is evident that more are considering the "value" of investing in weapons systems of increasing sophistication and destructive power, including various types of weapons of mass destruction. Although much of the most horrific slaughters in recent years — almost all of which have occurred within small states — have been accomplished with rather low technology weapons, this interest in mobilizing larger forces with more sophisticated weaponry is a serious concern, aggravated by the realization that much of the "threat" comes from within or is constructed for domestic purposes. Hence, the role of international bodies in efforts at early warning and prevention is of heightened importance. [back] |
