Canada & the UN >  Canada on the Security Council (1999-2000)

Rebuilding the UN Capacity of Integrated Coordinated Responses to Hot Spots in an Era of 'Fireproof Houses'
Joël J. Sokolsky, Royal Military College of Canada

May I be permitted to add that in this association of mutual insurance against fire the risks assumed by the different states are not equal? We live in a fire-proof house, far from inflammable materials.

Canadian Senator Raoul Dandurand
Address to the League of Nations, 2 October 1924¹

Introduction
If the abrupt end of the Cold War was the great surprise of the last years of the 1980s, the expansion in the number and scope of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations was the least expected characteristic of the first years of the post-Cold War era. After having been largely regulated to the sidelines for most of the major events of the period of superpower stability, the UN found itself thrust into the forefront of the wave of regional instability that followed. Whether under Chapter VI or VII, peacekeeping moved from the impartial deployment of forces to secure political settlements between states to activities within states that increasingly involved foreign intervention followed by military occupation. Like an over-worked and under-funded fire-brigade the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) moved from hot spot to hot spot trying to put out the fires that threatened to engulf countries, regions and peoples. In doing so, the UN and its myriad of peacekeeping activities became the lightening rod for a more general and pervasive confusion about how to bring order to a seemingly disorderly new world order.

While this was understandable and although the heightened activity of the early 1990s did reveal serious flaws, the UN, especially the DPKO, did as well as could be expected given international realities. In recent years, the DPKO with varying support from the five Permanent members (P5) of the Security Council (SC) has moved to respond with changes. This paper will discuss some of those measures, arguing that responding to regional crises will require an elected array of measures and that the DPKO’s efforts in this context should not be under-estimated.

The International Security Environment
Assessments regarding the past performance and the future prospect of the DPKO to deal with global "hot spots" must begin from a realistic premise about the relationship between these instances of regional or domestic unrest and broader global security. This is especially the case with regard to the security interests of the P5, the West in general. While many western governments have called for administrative, organization and financial changes to the DPKO, it is not evident that even if all such changes were made, that its role would be any different or less difficult than it has been in the past.

In this respect, a critical approach must be taken to the concept of "cooperative security". The nation-state may no longer be the only international actor and many countries have become more interdependent. However, it is intellectually confusing and empirically unproven that the security of all nations, regions and ethnic groups is inextricably linked to that of others, especially that of the United States and its principal western allies. In the present international environment there are few regions whose instability would directly affect core western interests, particularly if that instability were of ethnic violence.

The West may be required, or wish to, intervene in certain struggles for its own interests. In these cases, shorn of its somewhat convoluted international relations theorizing, so-called cooperative security is often, as its critics in the Third World contend, little more than a rationale for Western dominance. By proclaiming an era of cooperative security the West is not calling for Third World countries to "co-operate" in the security concerns of the wealthy stable North and West. What is meant by cooperative security is that we are going to intervene selectively in Third World Regions (or in Eastern Europe) when instability there threatens our vital security or economic interests. Likewise the intervention may be necessary to impose what we regard as our values. This intervention may take the form of armed intervention and high intensity combat.

Values are important. Let us not disparage the CNN factor, behind it rests the real and noble humanitarian sentiments of Western populations. The media is effective in arousing public concern only because the public expects that the government will act in a manner consistent with its values. All interventions need not, and have not, taken place for reasons of vital collective western interest. Countries which send forces on these missions are not doing so to save the lives of others, nor to protect their own security interests. Genocide and humanitarian disasters are surely just grounds for the UN to lead or request other countries to do so. But humanitarian intervention is not a neutral or non-military act however much it must be accompanied by a range of non-military initiatives. Inevitably the lack of real interests in these tragedies leads to a cruel calculation in which Western states must decide how much blood and treasure they are prepared to risk for the sake of saving others. To the extent that the DPKO will always depend upon governments to supply forces, such calculations cannot be avoided, whatever new arrangements are put in place to speed up the UN’s response or streamline its organization.

Contracting, Collaboration and 'Window Washing"
Given the limited resources available to the UN, the unlikelihood that these resources are going to increase and the political constraints that will always be present, the so called contracting out of certain peacekeeping operations’s makes sense for the UN. It is a solution which has worked in Yugoslavia, Haiti and Albania and holds promise for other areas. Under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, former Warsaw Pact members and Soviet Republics are training to undertake peacekeeping missions in Europe and many have participated in NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR). Contracting out should not be seen as an abandonment by the UN of its responsibility, rather as a means of pursuing its mandate. If the only choice is having the UN do nothing, it is reasonable for the Security Council to turn to "coalitions of the willing". In some cases certain countries, whether because of traditional ties or proximity, have a greater stake in supporting efforts to restore stability and domestic order. With a closer connection to the "hot spot" there is often a greater willingness to commit resources.

The UN has also adapted by engaging in cooperative activities with certain regional organizations or coalitions which can, should, or will anyway, take the lead in dealing with local problems. This has been the case in Latin America where collaboration was undertaken with the Organization of American States (OAS), in Liberia where the UN Observer Mission (UNOMIL) is working with the Organization of West African States (ECOMOG), in the former Yugoslavia where UN missions have worked with IFOR and SFOR and in some former Soviet republics where the UN cooperates with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Recent efforts to foster collaboration with the Organization for African Unity (OAU) is addressing regional issues there.² Properly undertaken, with the rich countries supplying logistic and financial support and regional countries providing the forces, contracting and cooperation can provide the framework for meeting the interests of smaller members. The eclectic array of operations now in existence is simply a reflection of the diversity and complexity of the issues the UN faces and the need to allow some of them to be handled by states or groups of states in a better position and more willing to deal with them. This is one of the lessons of the 1990s.

There is also the view, argued in the American literature that traditional troop contributing nations (TCNs) should take care of matters that do not require major combat forces, thus preserving the American military, which has been reduced in recent years, for major challenges to US and western interests. Here is an international division of labour suited to American interests and American domestic politics. "In other words, America proclaims that ‘superpowers don’t do windows’, so if you want your local windows washed you had better gear up to do them yourselves.":

...the United States should focus its security policies on major threats such as other great powers or rogue regimes that can upset the balance of power in key regions. America’s allies should take the lead in local crisis management, peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief operations.³

To a certain extent this has already happened. David Malone, Director General of the International Organizations Bureau at the Department of Foreign Affairs, recently observed that, "where conditions for UN peacekeeping seem promising, TCNs will continue to offer their personnel and equipment." Recent missions in Angola and Haiti, did not have difficulty attracting contributions. But, "neither the member states nor the UN Secretariat today believe that the UN is equipped for large scale enforcement or for rapid military intervention in dangerous humanitarian crises."⁴

There are, though, problems with this approach for the DPKO and the TCNs. Window washing may be viewed by some as a humble task, but it takes skill and good equipment to operate twenty stories up. Moreover, the UN must be careful that, while it is doing the windows, the scaffolding does not suddenly collapse beneath it, nor that it is taken away. This could happen in a number of ways. First, at the time of deployment semi-dangerous situations may escalate into extremely dangerous ones. Without combat-capability the mission and the peacekeeping forces would be at risk.⁵ Second, when the DPKO takes over to wash the windows after the Americans have gone in to construct the building (restoring peace in an area of unrest) the UN may find that the situation will deteriorate and again the UN forces will be at risk unless they have adequate capabilities. Third, the DPKO could deploy to a dangerous place at Washington’s request and with US support, and then find that a new crisis, one more threatening to American interests could arise elsewhere. This problem would leave the UN forces in a possibly more dangerous situation and/or long-running commitment. Thus while the DPKO must be prepared to respond, the UN must be careful not to deploy to hot spots simply because Washington does not wish to go.

Improvements at the DPKO: Not to be Under-estimated
With these cautions in mind, the DPKO with the support of some member countries, has moved to implement a number of improvements over the last several years and is planning for more. Such measures are not to be under-estimated. These include creating separate offices for Operations and Planning and Support as well as the establishment of a Mission Planning Service. The Situation Centre now operates around the clock and there are Policy and Analysis and Lessons Learned units.

The most important problem of deployment remains to be addressed. As of early 1998, nearly 70 countries had earmarked 88,000 personnel and related equipment under Standby Arrangements. Since 1994, the UN has operated a logistics base in Brindisi. A Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters is awaiting funding to become operational. In 1997, several members, operating outside the auspices of the UN launched the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) for rapid deployment under a Chapter VI mandate. Headquartered in Denmark, with plans to include a range of training and support activities, nearly 5,000 troops from several countries are already committed to SHIRBRIG.⁶

Not all of these initiatives will come to fruition nor have they received the full support of all members. For example, at a recent meeting of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, several smaller states expressed reservations about SHIRBRIG and that it might detract from the DPKO’s efforts. Some saw it as "a new privileged formation of those Member States which had wide capacities to finance their participation in it." Others noted that SHIRBRIG could help the DPKO, but that it should be "inclusive and draw upon as many Member States as possible."⁷ This seems to be a reasonable approach. There is no reason for the DPKO to jealously guard an unrealistic exclusivity in the planning, training and organization of forces which can be made available to it on short notice. This is especially the case when some members in a better position to maintain this capability are prepared to shoulder more of the burden. It will always be up to the Security Council to make use of any forces, whether national or multinational, that are available and ultimately up to the national governments to decide to deploy them. Other alternatives, such as those for a UN military force, composed of volunteers not part of national units, are simply not viable.⁸

Conclusion
As Canada and the world would soon learn, Senator Dandurand was wrong in 1924. But today, in the absence of a general global threat, most countries see themselves whether they openly acknowledge it or not, as being immune from the flames of the regional and civil instabilities that threaten other countries and peoples. This applies not only to the United States and its Western allies, but to smaller less powerful member states.

It follows then that the DPKO is not in crisis. Its problems and shortcomings are simply a reflection of international realities. It will never be fully prepared to be able to respond in a totally integrated fashion to the world’s hot spots. The reason for this is that while there may well be many such spots, those which truly threaten international peace and security will be dealt with by the United States and American led coalitions with or without UN sanction. The DPKO will be left to deal with those areas of conflict and instability which the international community cannot totally ignore, but which the P5 will not deem as being hot enough to singe their interests.

The challenge for the UN and especially the DPKO is to at once acknowledge this reality and yet be able to assist those being in immediate danger to be burned in the world’s hot spots, while securing the support of those nations which are, perhaps for the moment, safe in fire-proof houses.

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† Joël Sokolsky is Professor and Head of the Department of Politics and Economics at the Royal Military College of Canada and Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Relations at Queen’s University in Kingston. He teaches Canadian and American foreign and defence policy.

1 Reprinted in Walter A. Riddell, ed. Documents on Canadian Foreign Policy, 1917-1939 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1962), 464.[back]

2 United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Peacekeeping redux..but still indispensable," <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/yir97/peacekp.htm>.[back]

3 John Hillen, "Superpowers Don’t Do Windows," Orbis 41 (Spring 1997), 257.[back]

4 David Malone, "The UN Security Council and Peace Operations, 1990-96," Canadian Foreign Policy 5 (Winter 1998), 87-88.[back]

5 See, Louis Nastro and Kim Richard Nossal, "The Commitment-Capability Gap and Canadian Foreign Policy", Canadian Defence Quarterly 27 (Autumn 1997).[back]

6 United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Making Headway with logistics and capacity", <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/yir97/peacekp.htm>.[back]

7 United Nations,Press Release GA/PK/152 (31 March, 1998), <http://www.un.org/plweb-cgi/idoc.pl?422>.[back]

8 See for example, Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer UN Military Force (Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences: Cambridge, Mass., 1996).[back]