Canada & the UN >  Canada on the Security Council (1999-2000)

Canada and the Security Council: Options and Opportunities

Summary of Key Observations

The discussions of the seminar Canada and the Security Council: Options and Opportunities focused on the three main elements the Canadian Government has identified as its primary agenda for its current term on the UN Security Council: increased Council transparency and accountability; the reassertion of the Council’s leadership and credibility; and the promotion of human security in light of the changing nature of threats in the post-Cold War era. The participants did not formulate a series of recommendations but a number of observations emerged which should be of interest, both to those at the seminar and to government officials. Without assigning any priority to the themes, these included the following ideas.

1. The issue of transparency is conceptually nebulous and morally ambiguous. There are two facets of this ambiguity: first, the difference between transparency and "openness" or "access" to the Council; and second, the need to balance the goals of transparency and openness against those of efficiency, stealth, and timely action. Many of the current closed, informal consultations could readily be held in the open, although open meetings tend to be more politicized and cumbersome.

2. The perception of an "opaque" Security Council, or one that is a closed shop, has fostered the cynical view that the UN is fundamentally unaccountable to the bulk of its constituents: the member states, and is harmful to the credibility of the UN as a whole. Non-permanent members, such as Canada, could strive to implement policies and procedures which would counteract this impression, and could use their voting power in the Council as leverage to insist that the voices of non-Council members be given a hearing on vital issues.

3. The institution of the Security Council presidency could be of tremendous value, if it was given creative leadership. Options for new procedures could include:

• representatives from a "rolling trio" consisting of the past, present, and incoming presidents of the Council meet regularly in order to contribute a degree of continuity to the presidency.
• the president of the Council make a point of meeting with non-Council member states upon assuming the presidency, particularly those states involved in incipient or ongoing crises.
• there be more substantive monthly reports from the country holding the presidency of the Council, with these reports to be issued, and posted on the Internet, soon after the end of a given presidency.

4. The complexity of Security Council-mandated missions demands input from parties which are sometimes not consulted under the current procedures, including NGOs, state contributors to peace operations, and belligerents in civil conflicts. Council should be encouraged to take account of the opinions of troop-contributing states on relevant issues, to seek and utilize professional military advice in planning and implementing peace operations, and to liaise more effectively with NGOs involved in relief and peace-building efforts. It is also clear that the provision of security for NGO ground operations should be made a top priority of the Council.

5. It is important to develop within the Security Council a greater capacity for long-range co-ordination. Such co-ordination should not be limited by procedural obstacles and must take into account the fact that a particular peace support operation on the ground may operate according to a different logic than co-ordination at the level of the Security Council.

6. Human security requires a long-term approach. The Security Council should resist the temptation to withdraw too quickly after successful elections or other operations. The Council must also be kept appraised of situations in states which are no longer directly on the Security Council agenda.

7. Co-ordination between the Security Council and regional security organizations is of great importance and there is a need to clarify the relationship between such organizations and the Council. Regional organizations don’t expect the Security Council to simply rubber-stamp their actions and the Council should continue to exercise its legitimate authority vis-à-vis regional peacekeeping initiatives. Only in ‘extreme cases’ should the use of force in the absence of explicit Security Council authorization be condoned

8. Sanctions are a significant issue. Ineffective sanctions exact a high cost, not only in terms of casualties and population displacement, but in terms of regional instability and increased dangers to humanitarian workers. Bringing more resources to bear on sanctions enforcement, either through inviting interested states to participate in sanctions assistance missions or in channelling resources directly to those states which possess the will to implement sanctions but not the means, could enhance the effectiveness of sanctions regimes.

9. Idealism with respect to human security must be tempered with a strong dose of realism. Any expansion in the concepts of human security must emphasize the tenets of incrementalism, attention to contingency, and coalition-building and recognize the concerns of Council members regarding the erosion of state sovereignty. One can take existing models of human security practices and apply them to new circumstances, thereby encouraging the construction of an evolving body of precedent. Countries should also take advantage of "operational entry points" and make use of every practical opportunity, such as the renewal of Security Council mandates, to place human security concerns on the Council agenda

10. Particular attention should be paid to developing a North-South dialogue regarding human security, with a view to enhancing the perceived legitimacy of the Council’s actions in this field. Issues of long-term development should be raised at the level of the Council in the context of discussions of preventive diplomacy and peace-building.

11. The current financial crisis risks preventing the Council from undertaking effective peace-building and conflict-prevention operations. Member states — Canada included — are asking their military and police personnel to undertake more missions with fewer resources, and that this could soon pose grave challenges to the success of peace operations. There should perhaps be a re-invigoration of the UN’s traditional emphasis on peace-keeping as opposed to peace-making, in recognition of the fact that more complex peace operations cannot succeed on a shoestring budget.

12. It is important not to create unrealistic expectations about the extent to which one country, like Canada, could further the human security agenda in a short period of time. There are dangers of disenchantment and disappointment should sights be set too high.