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Canada & the UN > Canada on the Security Council (1999-2000) International Security in the 21st Century:
Challenges Confronting the UN Introduction General Themes and Conceptual Issues Complicating matters is the reality that globalization, failed states, and the end of the Cold War have not had a uniform impact around the world. Indeed, the nature and intensity of security threats, and the extent to which they affect peoples and governments, is extremely uneven across the international system. This is due to a number of intervening variables that are part of the larger reality of global disparities. The impact of change on the international security environment must be evaluated in the context of different geographic regions, states, patterns of enmity and amity, ethnicities, socio-economic demographics, and social structures. These intervening variables or "filters" influence the impact of globalization, failed states, and the end of the Cold War on different regions, states, groups, and individuals. As a result, it has been suggested that the world can be bifurcated into "zones of peace" and "zones of turmoil".4 In "zones of peace" stability and prosperity are the norm, and war and organized violence has become unthinkable as a factor in the relations between states and peoples. There is a high level of security cooperation and institutionalization, and security challenges can be met with considerable resources, flexibility, and well-developed conflict management mechanisms. In "zones of turmoil" instability and poverty are the norm, and violence and hardship is the experience of the majority of peoples. Security concerns exacerbate existing divisions and cleavages between states and groups, and there is a high level of distrust and a low level of security cooperation. There is a lack of resources to meet existing challenges, let alone new ones, and conflict management mechanisms are weak or nonexistent. "Zones of turmoil" are the breeding ground for the ‘complex humanitarian emergencies’ facing the UN. Complicating matters still further is the lack of conceptual agreement in the study and analysis of security. While virtually all observers of international politics agree that the international security agenda has changed significantly in the past decade, this may be the only point of general agreement on contemporary international security issues. There is no broadly accepted paradigm or theoretical framework to guide our questions, establish priorities, or evaluate prospective solutions. As a result, there is even a general lack of agreement on the nature of the term "security". Traditional approaches have defined security in the context of the Westphalian state system; security is political and military protection against external threats to the borders and the internal sovereignty of the state. For such "realists" (as political scientists refer to them) the insecurity of states flows from the anarchic nature of the international system, where there is no authority higher than the state to establish and enforce rules. Security in such a "self-help" world is therefore an interstate (between states) phenomenon. However, this traditional definition of security has been challenged by a variety of perspectives which seek to broaden the notion of security to include trans-boundary economic and environmental threats.5 In addition, the state as the object of security has been challenged by a focus on the security of groups or individuals. Such "human security" issues include poverty, access to food and water, health care, environmental degradation, human rights, personal safety and community safety. Security then becomes a trans-boundary and intrastate (within states) phenomenon. This latter approach has been favoured by the United Nations.6 As we shall see, the security challenges facing the UN reflect these larger thematic and conceptual issues. The Evolving Security Environment: the
Challenges Facing the UN The increased humanitarian dimension of war is in part a function of the increased destructiveness of modern weapons technology, but in most wars of the post-Cold War period the vast majority of casualties have been caused by less sophisticated small arms and land mines. Casualties and refugee movements can be explained by the vulnerability of civilians in intrastate conflicts (where they are often intentional targets) and the compounding effect of war on famine, drought, poverty, and the delicate balance between survival and unsustainable conditions in the poor and conflict-torn regions of the world. The UN has responded to the humanitarian dimension of war throughout its history, but in the post-Cold War era many UN efforts (such as Somalia and Yugoslavia) have been motivated, at least in the beginning, by a desire to alleviate human suffering. This effort has been driven at least in part by the so-called "CNN-effect"; pressure is put on governments to act by their population’s emotional responses to televised images. The increase in intrastate conflicts. In the post-Second World War era, there have been 187 wars in the international system. Of these wars, 129 (69 percent) were internal, intrastate conflicts (see table 1). There were no interstate wars in the international system in 1997. This represents a significant development in the evolution of war, which challenges prevailing views about the relationship between security and the state. As indicated above, "traditional" conceptions of security and war define threats as external to the state; that is, they come from outside a state’s borders. However, as Kalevi Holsti has argued, the main source of war in the last half-century resides in weak and failed states. Regions populated by strong states are by and large peaceful, while regions populated by weak and failed states, where domestic or internal conditions of anarchy prevail, are prime locations of war.12 The origins of this phenomenon lie in the legacy of the collapse of colonialism and multinational empires. This led to the creation of newly independent states with a poor match between borders and nations. Conflicts in Africa, the Middle East, and in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union reflect this legacy to various degrees. In many of these states, security threats are not conceptualized in terms of external threats, but in terms of internal threats such as insurgencies or separatist movements. The diversity that was the legacy of colonial domination is a threat to the unity of many states. As a result, there is a clash between the principles of sovereignty and integrity of borders and the principle of self determination. Efforts are made to foster unity by promoting loyalty to the state rather than nation, in a process known as "nation-building". However, such efforts create security threats to communities of peoples (in the form of threats to their way of life), stimulating conflict between the state and national groups living within it. For the governments of such states, security is thus defined in terms of the threat to the existing authority, and military and paramilitary forces are directed at the suppression of such threats to the regime in power, rather than the security of the borders or the sovereignty of the state. The continued relevance of interstate conflict. While the frequency of intrastate conflicts is crucial to understanding contemporary conflict, traditional interstate conflict remains a fundamental source of war and tension in the international system. Despite the fact that 69 percent of wars occurred within states since 1945, it is nevertheless the case that since World War II , 58 wars took place between states. What is notable by way of trends in interstate war is the location of these conflicts. There has been an absence of war between great powers, although great powers have been involved in wars (Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands, the Gulf War). The bulk of wars have taken place between or within smaller countries and more confined geographic regions. There has also been a remarkable absence of interstate wars in North America (none since 1913-1915), Western Europe (none since 1945) and South America (none since 1941, excepting the Falklands war which was fought between Argentina and Great Britain). On the other hand, interstate wars have been frequent and destructive in other regions, most notably in the Middle East and in Asia (see table 1). Furthermore, there continues to be a persistent threat of future interstate wars. Examples include India/Pakistan; Spratly/Paracel Islands (China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines), China and Taiwan; Israel/Syria; North Korea/South Korea; Peru/Ecuador, Greece and Turkey (Aegean and Cyprus), and Armenia/ Azerbaijan. States also continue to use military force for interventions and coercive diplomacy; between 1945 and 1991, there were 690 cases of direct military intervention in the world.13 And finally, military preparedness remains a primary concern of state security. An encouraging trend can be found in the decline of financial resources devoted to military ends. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a downward trend in world military spending. In 1994, world military spending totaled $US840 billion, the lowest level of expenditure since 1966 and a 35 per cent decline from a peak of $US1.3 trillion in 1987. Most of this reduction, however, comes from the dramatic fall in military expenditures in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.14 The prominence of ethnicity as a cause of conflict. Ethnicity has been one of the major sources of conflict in the international system in the post-Cold War period; in 1994, ethnicity was a prominent component in all but three of the 31 major armed conflicts in the world.15 The bitter ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Liberia, Sri Lanka, and Rwanda are tangible examples of ethnic conflict within states. It is tempting to reduce explanations of such conflict to single causes, such as history or hate. In most cases, there are multiple causal factors behind the outbreak of such conflicts, such as: nationalist leaders who exploit bigotry and intolerance; economic and political grievances; desires for autonomy or independence; social change derived from industrialization or commercialization; a confrontation between state nationalism and ethnic nationalism; and the inability of the state to maintain order and prevent domestic anarchy. The violence and brutality of contemporary communal conflicts has shocked and appalled most observers, as these wars have witnessed the re-introduction of "ethnic cleansing" and genocide into contemporary international politics. Ethnic cleansing is the forced removal of peoples from their area of residence; because territorial gain in ethnic wars is reflected in the composition of people living in that territory, forcing populations to leave is a cornerstone of military campaigns. Genocide is the deliberate, systematic extermination of an ethnic, religious, or national group. Samuel Huntington has raised the possibility that ethnicity may have a larger, more profound dividing influence on the international system. For Huntington, the world can be divided into eight civilizations, and while states will remain the most powerful actors in the international system, the principal source of conflict between nations and groups will be cultural. Wars will occur along the "fault lines" where these civilizations meet.16 Furthermore, globalization only serves to exacerbate cultural differences and conflict, as the global spread of western culture and power is provoking a backlash against the west; Kishore Mahbubani suggests that the central axis of future conflict in the world may well be between western civilization and the non-western civilizations of the world.17 The role of economics as a cause of conflict. As an international security issue, economics has an interstate and intrastate dimension, one which flows in large part from the phenomenon of globalization. There has always been an intimate link between economics and war between states. Through war, states could acquire territory, natural resources, population, and industrial capacity. During war, economic targets have often been a priority. Even when they are not at war in a military sense, states are engaged in a struggle for economic power. There is a concern that the contemporary international system is heading into a future characterized by an intense economic competition between states which could escalate into political and military rivalries and possibly even wars. After the Cold War, economic power is regarded as the key index of power in the world. As Robert A. Issac argues, "Although the Cold War has ended, the primacy of insecurity—of the infinite striving for security—has not. Where military security prevails, such as in most of the industrialized democracies, there has merely been a shift in the form of insecurity to the economic or psychological realms, as nations seek to increase economic competitiveness and to reduce unemployment."18 States will compete for economic advantage because of the fear of relative gains by other states.19 Edward Luttwak has suggested that states will compete with each other to achieve economic power and "desirable roles" in the world economy, such as industrial supremacy and technology and information leadership.20 Economics is also a cause of war within states. Global disparities in wealth and the unequal distribution of wealth within societies are on the increase. Of the US$23 trillion world GDP in 1993, $18 trillion was in the industrialized economies, and only $5 trillion was in the developing countries, with 80% of the world’s population. This division is exacerbated by the fact that while growth has been dramatic in some 15 countries in the world, which has brought rising incomes to 1.5 billion people, 100 countries experienced declining or stagnant growth rates. Of these states, 70 now have average incomes which are less than they were in 1980. The poorest 20% of the world’s population saw their share of global income fall from 2.3% to 1.4% in the last 30 years, while the share of the richest 20% rose from 70% to 80% in the same time period. This effectively doubled the ratio of the share of global income between richest 20% and the poorest 20% from 30:1 30 years ago to 61:1 today.21 The relationship between these grim economic figures and conflict is direct and real. Global inequality has taken a devastating toll on the human condition in much of the world. In all, 1.3 billion people live in abject poverty, without access to basic nutritional requirements, health care, waste disposal, or adequate housing. Coupled with high rates of population growth, this situation is producing social tension in many regions of the world. Shantytowns and slums become breeding grounds for crime, street gangs, drug trafficking, and extremist political movements. The wide (and visible) gap between the rich and the poor has generated new tensions or worsened old ones in many societies. Poverty and population growth can also exacerbate existing ethnic, religious, and class cleavages within society, sparking or stimulating intrastate conflicts. The demographics of a growing number of young adults, unable to find work or sustain their families, will drive domestic unrest as well as migration within and across states. Environmental degradation and international conflict. Like economic conflict, environmental degradation also has an interstate and an intrastate dimension. There has always been an intimate link between resource scarcity and interstate conflict and war, and this link has been clearly evident in the twentieth century. One study of twelve twentieth century conflicts found that access to oil or strategic minerals was an issue in ten of those conflicts, and that five of the conflicts involved cropland or fish.22 In the contemporary international system, the dispute over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea carries the potential for interstate conflict over the right to exploit oil and mineral deposits on the seabed. Water may also become an increasing cause of interstate conflict. As Peter H. Gleick argues, "…water and water supply systems are increasingly likely to be both objectives of military action and instruments of war as human populations grow, as improving standards of living increase the demand for fresh water, and as global climatic changes make water supply and demand more problematic and uncertain.23 The threat of war over water will be most acute in arid regions, where water resources (in the form of lakes, rivers, or acquifers) are controlled by a number of states with a history of antagonistic relations. The most prominent examples of areas in which water has had security implications is the Middle East (in particular the Nile and the Jordan River Basin), Central Asia and South Asia.24 In addition to provoking conflict and war between states, environmental degradation and resource scarcity can provoke political upheaval, social instability, and wars within states. Just as states may clash violently over the control of vital resources, in some cases communal groups within states may clash violently over the control of resources. In such cases, environmental degradation and resource scarcity contribute to increased economic deprivation. As Thomas Homer-Dixon argues, "A widening gap between state capacity and demands on the state, along with the misguided economic interventions such a gap often provokes, aggravates popular and elite grievances, increases rivalry between elite factions, and erodes a state’s legitimacy."25 The overall result is the erosion and collapse of social order as the state slowly or rapidly disintegrates as different factions and groups battle over what little remains to them. All of this occurs in those areas of the world least equipped to respond to such crises or to manage them effectively.26 In the face of such conditions, a natural reaction of people is to flee to escape the violence of war or the hardships of economic deprivation. Environmentally induced conflicts can thus create large refugee movements. Such movements can provoke communal conflicts between migrant peoples and the peoples in the receiving region. This is true of international refugees (those that cross state borders) and internally displaced refugees (those that flee from one area of a country to another). As Nazli Choucri has argued, "The masses of forcefully uprooted persons…might become a key element in the lethal feedback dynamic between environmental degradation and violent conflict."27 Some of the most dramatic examples of the link between environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and economic deprivation can be found in Africa. According to Dr. Bukar Shaib of the World Commission on the Environment, Africa’s crises are essentially environmental in origin: "Africa is dying because her environment has been plundered, over-exploited and neglected."28 The stresses caused by environmental degradation can also be found elsewhere, such as the Philippines, Haiti, Bangladesh, and Brazil. If projections of future stresses on the environment and consequent resource scarcities are correct, then we can expect conflicts that are provoked (in whole or in part) by environmentally induced grievances to become an increasing fixture of conflict and war in global politics. Morton Kaplan has postulated that environmentally induced conflicts will spread to include larger and larger regions of the world, eventually to include the developed world as well.29 Transboundary threats in an era of globalization. The security agenda confronting the UN includes several transboundary security concerns fueled by increased globalization. The proliferation of weapons is one such concern. In the contemporary international system, the most prominent proliferation concern is with the horizontal spread of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons). Also of concern is the horizontal spread of conventional weapons, which include a wide variety of weapons systems such as fixed wing and rotary aircraft, naval vessels, missiles, and armoured vehicles, as well as smaller individual weapons such as assault rifles and land mines. The proliferation of weapons is regarded with anxiety because regional arms races can exacerbate existing tensions or raise levels of distrust and hostility. In addition, should war break out, the parties to the conflict will be equipped with weapons technology capable of high levels of destruction. There is also concern that sub-state groups such as terrorist organisations are acquiring more and more sophisticated weapons systems. The control of the spread of weapons systems and weapons technology is therefore regarded as an important contribution to both the prevention of war and reducing the level of violence in future wars. International terrorism remains a concern. In terms of the number of incidents of international terrorism per year, the trend is not upward. International terrorist activities surged in the 1980’s to a peak of 665 incidents in 1987. The number of incidents declined during the 1990’s, falling to a 25-year low of 296 incidents in 1996.30 Nevertheless, terrorist incidents tend to be spectacular and highly publicized; as a result, governments are compelled to respond and make discernible gains in the battle against international terrorism because of public outrage. In fact, one must question whether international terrorism deserves all the attention it receives. Without diminishing the impact that terrorist activity can have on individual lives, there is some doubt as to whether international terrorism presents a significant threat to national and international security when compared with other security issues.31 On the other hand, there is a concern that terrorism, if unchecked, will spread and become more frequent, undermining democratic norms and individual rights, provoking authoritarian actions by governments, and creating the impression of disorder and vulnerability. Traditionally, organized crime has been regarded as a domestic political problem for societies and governments. While this is still largely the case, criminal activity has become increasingly internationalized. Today, transnational organized crime is increasingly identified as a serious global security issue. Indeed, at the 1995 summit in Halifax, the G-7 states declared that such activity represented a growing threat to the security of the G-7 countries.32 Transnational crime has been identified as an international security issue because of its scale and scope (the retail value of the global drug trade has been estimated at between US$180 to 300 billion annually),33 its expansion in the global economy (organised crime has expanded into international banking, investment, finance, and business activity), and the threat it poses to government authority and the conventional economy (in Italy, the Mafia has used assassinations and bombings to intimidate the Italian government and Italian law enforcement authorities, and in Russia organized crime accounts for a major portion of economic activity which is beyond government regulation and taxation). The expansion of crime into an international activity and the growing communication and cooperation among organized crime syndicates has been facilitated by the growth of global interdependence. The establishment of free trade areas and customs unions (especially in North America and Europe), has facilitated the flow of criminal goods and services across borders. The weakening of state authority in many countries has eroded the capacity of police and judicial systems to combat organised crime. In other cases, there is a close relationship between government and organized crime. The Contemporaty Security Agenda and
UN Conflict Management: Responding to the Challenges The intrastate nature of the vast majority of contemporary conflicts in the world has challenged the UN’s obligatory commitment to sovereignty and the integrity of borders. The instinctive response of the UN (and governments around the world) to failed states has been to preserve the territorial integrity of the state in question. While this is understandable in terms of the desire to avoid a widespread revision of borders in the international system, in certain cases the UN has been put in the position of trying to forge a state where crucial preconditions (such as a desire of the parties to rebuild the state) is absent. The phenomenon of failed states has led the UN into the realm of "peacebuilding" or "national reconstruction" efforts aimed at establishing the viability of a previously weak or failed state. This process includes promoting elections, building political institutions, training police forces and restructuring judicial systems, disarmament of warring factions, returning displaced persons, and providing administrative assistance. This effort is built on the premise that political and economic liberalization (democracy and free market economics) will promote stability and consolidate peace. However, there is evidence that peacebuilding has certain conceptual flaws. Political liberalization can reinforce and entrench political differences and divide peoples. Economic liberalization can widen inequalities and create economic dislocation. Both of these tendencies undermine the national reconciliation required for long term success.35 In addition, the concern of contributing states over "exit strategies" and avoidance of quagmires has led to the creation of unrealistically short operational time frames. Success may require long term commitments of ten years or more to maintain the integrity and management of the reconstruction effort. In particularly intractable cases (Somalia, Bosnia) the UN may have to consider alternatives to peacebuilding, including cooperation with more authoritarian leaderships capable of implementing agreements and the establishment of peace settlements that ratify the disintegration or ethnic partition of states. Together, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and human suffering in war have driven contemporary efforts to develop humanitarian intervention doctrines and capabilities in the UN system. In the field, the UN has protected the delivery of relief supplies, managed refugee populations, and established "safe areas". However, the practice of humanitarian intervention is not encouraging. Without dismissing the alleviation of suffering that such efforts can achieve, humanitarian motives drove the UN into conducting relief efforts during hostilities or unstable cease-fires. Under such conditions, the threat to UN personnel is elevated, the pretension to impartiality is difficult to maintain, and mandates and rules of engagement for the use of force are nearly impossible to calibrate. Challenges to UN activities revealed the lack of robust enforcement behind humanitarian efforts, a lack of credibility which reached its zenith in the fall of UN safe areas in Bosnia. Negative experiences in Somalia led to a weak response in Rwanda — at precisely the time when a modestly robust humanitarian intervention could have saved thousands of lives. Efforts to design a comprehensive and near-universally accepted doctrine of humanitarian intervention are probably doomed to failure in the face of widespread disagreement among UN members on the desirability and nature of such a doctrine.36 In the security realm, globalization will not offer the UN any respite from conflict. In contrast, globalization will create opportunities for conflict and complicate management efforts directed at the wide range of transboundary security issues discussed earlier. One vision of globalization and economic interdependence is the creation of a less conflict-prone world; peoples that are linked together and economies that are bound together will create mutually valuable links and benefits that would be damaged by war. Another vision of globalization warns that interdependence also creates vulnerabilities. To the extent that these vulnerabilities represent security threats to states and peoples, globalization may provoke conflict and even war. Responding to interstate and transboundary security issues will require a closer relationship between the UN and regional conflict management and confidence-building mechanisms, in particular the development of regional institutions and arms control agreements. Such arrangements will promote political and security cooperation that will prevent or reduce conflict and promote cooperation on transboundary security concerns such as weapons proliferation, terrorism, and crime. It is not within the scope of this paper to offer detailed suggestions for changes within the UN system: this has already been done in much larger studies.37 However, there are some general directions worthy of mention in the context of the larger themes discussed in this paper: Conflict Prevention. The intrastate origins and dynamics of most contemporary conflicts suggest the need for a shift from traditional methods of conflict prevention (diplomacy, international organisations) toward alleviating the demographic, economic, and environmental conditions that breed instability and conflict. To this end, development efforts should be oriented toward basic human needs and the creation of local and state level social safety nets. Governments should be encouraged to promote widespread economic and educational opportunities and respect for minority rights and local autonomy. Development measures focused on women and children will reinforce community stability and health. Declining foreign aid budgets will undermine this most basic of conflict prevention instruments, but reallocation of funding and cooperation with non-governmental organisations should serve to alleviate at least some of the conditions which can lead to conflict. Conflict Management. The UN must continue to take steps to develop its capacity to respond more rapidly in times of crisis. The development of early warning mechanisms and generic contingency planning should be accelerated. The indicators (or "triggers") that give rise to armed conflict can be detected early; they include increased human rights abuses, inflammatory rhetoric in the media, disregard for institutional or legal procedures for leadership transition, arms buildups, and political and economic repression of dissenting groups. An early warning unit would monitor such developments and report to the Secretary-General on a regular basis. Certain indicators would "trigger" a heightened awareness of the situation within the UN and the Security Council and facilitate the rapid initiation of preventive action, subject to agreement by the Security Council. Such action could include preventive diplomacy, economic measures (sanctions and inducements), and preventive deployments. The UN must also put into place the operational requirements of a rapid reaction capability along the lines proposed by Canada. Conflict Resolution and Consolidation of Peace. The success of UN conflict management efforts will depend in large part on the capacity of the UN to match such an effort with the specific nature and requirements of each complex emergency. To this end, the UN must continue to develop the coordination of military, political, and non-governmental organisations. In particular, the UN must develop a continuity of effort between humanitarian relief efforts and longer term development, beginning with the closer coordination of the units responsible in the UN system. The UN must also develop and facilitate local organisations that can rebuild civil society and create patterns of cooperation and instruments of conflict management that will build long term peace and pave the way for the host country to assume complete responsibility for governance and well-being. The UN has proved adaptable in the face of a changing security environment. Improved cooperation among the major powers in the Security Council has enabled the UN to take some tentative steps toward adapting to the new security agenda. Absolute loyalty to the concept of sovereignty has eroded in favour of international responses to humanitarian crises.38 The UN has sought to expand its cooperation with regional organisations with a view to those organisations assuming a larger conflict management role. "Traditional" peacekeeping has been adapted to take on new roles and tasks required of responses to complex emergencies. In response to war crimes and genocide, the UN has created international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Reform of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs enabled these units to operate more effectively. Steps continue to be taken on the creation of a rapid reaction capability. Liaison and coordination with non-governmental organisations has improved. In short, progress has been made in adapting to the paradox of contemporary conflict management; responding to conflict within states and security issues across states through an organisation composed of states. It would be unfortunate if the UN were to turn to a strict interpretation of "traditional" peacekeeping as a guide for future conflict management efforts.39 While "traditional" peacekeeping still has an important role to play in the UN tool kit, it is an excessively restricted vision of the role the organisation is capable of playing in the world. Nevertheless, despite the progress that has been made through the hard lessons of 1992-1995 (which have come at great cost to the credibility of the UN), much needs to be done if the UN is to respond more effectively to the security issues of the future. † Allen Sens is a professor of political science at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver and a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations. His research interests include European security, Peacekeeping, and Canadian foreign policy. 1 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1995), pp. 39, 69.[back] 2 See John Ruggie, "The United Nations and the Collective Use of Force: Whither or Whether?" International Peacekeeping, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 1-20.[back] 3 This terminology is borrowed from Ferdinand Braudel, The Structures of Everyday Life: The Limits of the Possible. Vol. 1. (New York: Harper and Row, 1981). [back] 4 See Max Singer and Aaron Wildarsky, The Real World Order: Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1993).[back] 5 See, for example, Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982); Jessica Matthews, "Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs 68 (Spring 1989), pp. 162-177; and Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991).[back] 6 See especially the United Nations Human Development Report 1994. (New York: United Nations, 1994).[back] 7 Jack S. Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System, 1496-1975 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), p. 117.[back] 8 Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, 1991 (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1991), p. 20.[back] 9 See Hal Kane, The Hour of Departure: Forces that Create Refugees and Migrants. (Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, 1995), pp. 18-19.[back] 10 See G. Strada, "The Horror of Landmines, Scientific American (May 1996), p. 40; United Nations Human Development Report 1995 (New York: United Nations, 1995), p. 45; and James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi, Dirty Little Secrets: Military Information You’re Not Supposed to Know (New York: William and Morrow, 1990), p. 199.[back] 11 See Paul Lewis, "UN Hopes Number of Refugees Falls," New York Times (March 20 1994), p. 11; and United Nations Human Development Report 1995, p. 14.[back] 12 Kalevi J. Holsti, "War, Peace, and the State of the State," International Political Science Review, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1995), p. 319.[back] 13 Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 6th ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991997), p. 428.[back] 14 World Military and Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1995. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 1-2.[back] 15 Data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, quoted in Michael T. Klare, "Redefining Security: The New Global Schisms," Current History 95 (November 1996), p. 356.[back] 16 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations?" Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993), p. 22.[back] 17 Kishore Mahbubani, "The West and the Rest," The National Interest (Summer 1992), pp. 3-13.[back] 18 Robert A. Isaac, Managing World Economic Change: International Political Economy. 2nd Ed., (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1995), p. 30.[back] 19 See Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America’s Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security 16 (Summer 1991), p. 78, and Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," in Charles W. Kegley Jr., ed., Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), pp. 151-171.[back] 20 Edward Luttwak, "The Coming Global War For Economic Power", The International Economy, 7 (September/October 1993), p. 20.[back] 21 Data from this section from United Nations Human Development Report, 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 2.[back] 22 Arthur Westing, ed., Global Resources and International Conflict: Environmental Factors in Strategic Policy and Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 204-210.[back] 23 Peter H. Gleick, "Water and Conflict: Fresh water Resources and International Security," International Security 18 (Summer 1993), p. 79.[back] 24 See Thomas Naff and Ruth Matson, Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation? (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), and Miriam R. Lowi, "Bridging the Divide: Transboundary Resource Disputes and the Case of West Bank Water," International Security, 18 (Summer 1993), pp. 113-138.[back] 25 Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict," p.25.[back] 26 See Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Random House, 1993).[back] 27 Nazli Choucri, "Environment, Development, and International Assistance: Crucial Linkages," in Sheryl J. Brown and Kimber M. Schraub, eds., Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992), p. 101. [back] 28 Quoted in F. Akpan, "Environment and Development," APRI Newsletter, 5 (September-October 1990), p. 18.[back] 29 See Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, pp. 44-76.[back] 30 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1996 (Washington, DC: United States Department of State, 1997).[back] 31 See J. Simon, "Misunderstanding Terrorism," Foreign Policy (Summer 1987), pp. 104-120.[back] 32 Robert Chote and Peter Norman, "Leaders Zero in on Crime and Nuclear Safety," Financial Times (19 June 1995), p. 5.[back] 33 P. Williams, "Transnational Criminal Organizations: Strategic Alliances," The Washington Quarterly 18 (1994), pp. 57-72.[back] 35 Roland Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," International Security 22 (Fall 1997), pp. 54-89.[back] 36 See Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian Action in War," Adelphi Paper 305 (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 30.[back] 37 See, for example, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the Next Century, Report of the 25th Vienna Seminar, March 2-4, 1995 (New York: International Peace Academy, 1995); Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighborhood (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Kofi Annan, Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform (New York: United Nations, 1997).[back] 38 See Roberts, pp. 19-20.[back] 39 "Traditional" peacekeeping refers to Chapter VI authorized observer or interpositionary missions which relied on lightly armed impartial peacekeepers deployed with the consent of the warring parties in support of a peace agreement or ceasefire.[back] |
