|
|
|
|
  |
 |
 |
 |
|  |
Canada & the UN > Canada on the Security Council (1999-2000) Canada on the Security Council: After 162 Days Mesdames et Messieurs, Bonjour. I am delighted to be in Edmonton and to be here with you today. One hundred and sixty two days ago, we took our seat at the Security Council table. In this short period of time, the Council has been engaged in a number of crisees and the Council membership is proving to be as challenging as we had anticipated. While the press cannot manage more than one crisis at the time, the UN Security Council is seized of all crisees; I counted 23 in the past few months. The following is an enumeration to give you an idea of the menu of the Council: Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bougainville, Burundi, Central African Republic, Croatia (Prevlaka Peninsula), Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Georgia, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia, Lybia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Soudan, Tajikistan, the Western Sahara. In principle the Security Council works on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays; in practice, it meets almost every day of the week. An average month at the Council includes 5 formal meetings, 15 to 20 informal meetings, a dozen expert’s meetings, 3 to 5 troop contributor meetings, 2 sanctions committee meetings, an Arria formula meeting and an open meeting. Preparing for discussions and statements, taking part in the debate, negotiating draft resolutions and statements, and reporting on developments, requires all the energy of a reinforced political section. The political section of Canada's mission is normally composed of three officers, but for our term in the Council we've added four officers and three support staff. Beginning in 1995 and throughout our election campaign, we listened, and extensively consulted and canvassed our constituents: the UN membership and the Canadian public -- including some of you here today. We also took the opportunity to test ideas about directions that the Council could take in today’s international environment. Canada won its Council mandate with more votes than either of our competitors. This conferred considerable credibility to our mandate. Evidently, our international personality (more than our reputation), our sustained contribution to the work of the UN and our platform -- based on an emphasis on human security and a drive for greater transparency in the work of the Council -- had great resonance with the UN's member states. Today, I would like to describe some of the ways in which I believe the world has changed since we last served on the Council in 1989, discuss how Canada has responded to these changes, and review several of the challenges currently facing the Council. Finally, I'll outline some of the ways we propose to use our mandate to make a contribution to international peace and security, while at the same time addressing Canada's foreign policy priorities.
Historical Context The founders of the UN began the charter with the words: "We the Peoples". They knew instinctively that States exist to serve peoples and not the other way around; and, they knew that people all over the world were looking to them to ensure that the nightmare of a world war would never again be repeated. That hope was captured in words that echo down to us across the decades: "We the Peoples determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". The expectation was that the Security Council could actually prevent conflicts. The idea was that instead of armies engaged in a global conflict, great powers could oppose one another with vetoes. And to give credit where credit is due, the Council has been singularly successful at this objective. But twice in the life of the Security Council, the broader goal of conflict prevention has been approached and expectations heightened. This happened for the first time immediately after World War II. It was quashed by the Cold War which literally froze the Security Council in all but the most neutral matters of interest to the permanent members. The second time this happened was at the end of the Cold War when it looked, for a very short time, that a "new world order" would include a revitalized Security Council. This expectation seemed reasonable at the time. But since then, the veto has fallen back heavily and permanently on the Council, only lifted when there is agreement among the five permanent members. The poignant words of the founders of the Charter cannot be pronounced today without a profound sense of frustration -- we know how far we are from fulfilling that expectation.
A Changed International Context Since Canada's Council last tenure the global context in which the Council operates, the membership it represents, and the challenges it faces are much different from a decade ago. While international peace and security -- obtaining it and maintaining it -- remain the central concern of the global community and the main responsibility of the Council, the world has changed (and continues to change) and so must our definition of peace and security. Our game plan needs an update. Recent events in Kosovo and Angola tragically demonstrate that civilians are increasingly the main victims, if not the targets, of many violent conflicts. It is estimated that 90% of casualties from armed conflicts are civilian. This is partly the result of a change in the complexion of war with the majority of conflicts occurring inside, rather than between states. But regardless of their origins, violent conflict not only threatens the peace and stability of the international community, but also produces human tragedies of devastating proportions: massive refugee flows and the grossest violations of humanitarian law, including genocide. Let's consider Africa. The genocide in Rwanda and the subsequent conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have at least received worldwide publicity, even if far too little effective international action. But there are other wars, hardly less murderous, which have not received nearly as much attention. For instance:
It goes without saying - Africa has the largest global share of conflict, but who notices that more than 70% of the Council's time is devoted to Africa? Yet, no part of the world is immune. Today, we are still focussed on what's happening in Europe. We are witnessing, in the former Yugoslavia, scenes which Europe thought it had left behind forever in '45. In the last two months, in Kosovo, those scenes have reached a ghastly climax. Who among us, seeing or hearing these things, has not burned with indignation? Who among us has not felt that something must be done to stop it -- something swift, forceful and effective? And yet, who among us is not also troubled by the implications for a rules-based international system and for the United Nations itself? Canada worked hard, hand-in-hand with its partners, to identify a peaceful solution to the problem of Kosovo. Over many months and through numerous attempts, we tried to let Milosevic know that he must not mistreat his ethnic Albanian citizens in Kosovo. No diplomatic efforts were spared. In the end, even though it was not possible to get a clear mandate for the use of force from the Security Council, there was no choice but to act decisively to stop the ethnic cleansing that deported or internally displaced half a million Kosovars before the NATO air campaign had begun. The general principles adopted by the Group of 8, and Canada, were an important step in the direction of defining the resolution of the Kosovo crisis. Diplomatic efforts have never been neglected. Canadian policy dictates that we must put an end to the culture of impunity, and give full support to the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia which has a legal obligation to prosecute all those responsible for crimes against humanity. Furthermore, it is vital that the International community push ahead with the creation of the permanent International Criminal Court.
There Are Other Challenges While traditional military conflicts remain a major concern, the nature of threats to global security is evolving. The challenges posed by illicit drugs, terrorism, environmental despoliation, human rights abuses and the proliferation of small arms have moved to the front of our agenda. They cannot be solved unilaterally. The common denominator of these new realities is their human dimension, the safety and well-being of the individual. Human security has become a new measure of global security. Promoting humanitarian objectives requires that we see security not only in terms of state needs. This is not to say that traditional state-based security concerns are obsolete. Indeed, human security and national security are opposite sides of the same global security coin.
Canada's Response In response to the new global realities, longstanding Canadian foreign policy goals have been adapted to new international circumstances. Let's review some of these goals: Engagement not isolationism: Canadians have long been open to the world. This openness creates both prosperity and vulnerabilities. Directly or indirectly, others' insecurity becomes our problem and, in some cases, our insecurity. Promoting peacebuilding: Human security can be enhanced by strengthening the capacity of a society to manage its differences without violence. To that effect, the Canadian government established a Peacebuilding Initiative two years ago. Working with civil society, the Initiative funds practical projects to build democratic institutions and increase local capacity to help on the way to sustainable peace. Advancing fundamental standards of humanity: New and updated international humanitarian and human rights instruments help to guarantee protection for individuals. They can expand the reach and scope of humanitarian norms by setting a higher standard of global behaviour to which we are all bound. This was the objective, for example, behind our strong support for the conclusion of the UN Convention for the Protection of Humanitarian Workers and the creation of the International Criminal Court. In February, during Canada’s Presidency, Minister Axworthy chaired an open-session devoted to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Reforming international and regional organizations: Institutions established in a different era, such as the Council, need to be able to evolve to face the changing nature of threats to peace and security -- especially the human dimension of these threats. This will give us the collective capacity not only to respond to crises but to actively move human security forward. Pursuing new, innovative partnerships and coalitions: One example: Canada, with Norway, has established a flexible framework for cooperation among like-minded countries from all continents to advance action on human security issues: on children in armed conflict and on the proliferation of small arms. However, foreign policy is no longer the exclusive prerogative of nation-states and diplomats. New actors on the international scene have a growing influence and responsibilities, including non-governmental organizations, business associations, and trade unions. These new actors can play a positive role in achieving our objectives. The ban on anti-personnel mines is a perfect example. Using soft power concepts -- creatively: Powerful ideas rather than powerful weapons, public diplomacy rather than backroom bargaining -- these are also effective ways to pursue human security objectives. In the information age, new communications tools should, can, and have been used effectively in the service of our goals. Finally, Using robust action -- when necessary: Promoting human security
can also involve the use of sanctions and military force. Canadians
have fought and died in defence of human freedom and security. Our pursuit
of human security confirms this tradition. Our focus on human security should therefore not be misconstrued as softness. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how dealing with the devastating impact of landmines, the proliferation of small arms, the scourge of drugs, the exploitation of children, that proposing preventive measures against war crimes, and organizing concrete global action to confront them could be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Furthermore, Canada has been called upon to give leadership, training and direction on peacekeeping, drug interdiction, policing and the development of innovative approaches to overseas aid. Our resources are limited but they are put to good use. And when conditions warrant, we are prepared to use vigorous action in defence of human security objectives.
The Security Council The Security Council remains the paramount global instrument to safeguard peace and security. A strong, effective and purposeful Council is therefore essential. But what about its credibility? Many perceive the Security Council as falling short of its responsibilities. As I've said, expectations exploded at the end of the Cold War. Between 1991 and 1993, the Council launched 15 new peace operations, compared to 17 in the previous 50 years. More remarkably, the Council began to address civil and a intra-communal conflicts. The Council authorized a series of so called "second generation" peace operations (for example, in El Salvador, Haiti, Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia). They had complex mandates, often including democratization, human rights protection and humanitarian assistance alongside more traditional peacekeeping roles. Unfortunately, this era of euphoria has given way to a period of more constrained activity. The Council has begun to limit its involvement in an increasing number of conflicts. Setbacks in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda dampened the resolve of Council members to stay the activist course. Other factors also affect the Security Council's capacity to act. Most disturbing of these is the shortage of funds caused by the arrears in payments of several UN members -- notably the United States (which imposes its restrictive policy to the Council). This inability to meet expectations has led to a severe erosion in the credibility of the Council. Perhaps the most dangerous consequence of this loss of credibility is a lack of decision making: we have already seen this when the OAU’s decided last year not to abide by the existing Libyan sanction’s regime. The Council remained silent. Canada's time on the Security Council comes at a historic juncture. It is an opportune moment to try to renew the vigour of the Security Council witnessed in the early '90s. Canada will work to shape a more determined Council, one which focusses more on the human dimension of security and the unprecedented civilian toll of modern conflict. We will endeavour to do so by working to broaden the Council's agenda and decisions to include human security themes, to reassert its leadership, and to make its operations more transparent and responsive to UN member states. The Council has already made some progress toward broadening its scope of operations. The interpretation of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security (the litmus test for Council action) now includes intra-state issues when these threaten international or regional peace and security. The need to respect state sovereignty has by no means withered. But its absolute inviolability has been challenged (in some cases outweighed) by the need to act in support of humanitarian goals, to restore stability, and in defence of individuals, as in Somalia, Cambodia, Haiti, and Kosovo. As Kofi Annan said recently in a speech to the Commission on Human Rights: "No government has the right to hide behind national sovereignty in order to violate the human rights or fundamental freedoms of its peoples." "Emerging strongly, but I believe surely, is an international norm against the violent repression of minorities that will and must take precedence over state sovereignty." To address today's security agenda, the Council must embrace an even more comprehensive, updated view of its mandate. Canada will work to enhance the Security Council’s capacity to address non-traditional threats to international peace and security. For example, the Council could make more active use of conflict prevention instruments. Regrettably, the mandate of the first preventive deployment in the history of UN peacekeeping, UNPREDEP, which helped to ensure that the conflicts did not spill over into Macedonia, was not renewed due to the Chinese veto which was motivated by bilateral concerns. Another tool is the use of sanctions. They are powerful and destructive and need to be used appropriately to be effective and credible. It is clear that sanctions must become more targeted, to increase their effectiveness, and to reduce their effect on innocent populations. Making sanctions more specific, and realistic, will enhance their enforcement and their credibility but without the active cooperation of the international community, their effectiveness is questionable. International business has a role, here, to play. In Angola, for example, the Council imposed an arms embargo on UNITA [National Union of the Total Independence of Angola] forces. This was a welcome, precedent-setting move that for the first time the UN aimed sanctions at a non-state entity. However, evidence suggests that this embargo is not being respected. Sanction busters need to be identified and held accountable. As chair of the Angola Sanctions Committee, Canada is committed to work to this end, in particular by ensuring full compliance with existing sanctions relating to oil, diamonds, and arms. Ambassador Fowler has recently returned from Angola where he investigated and consulted on many of these issues. And, the Council must renew its leadership. This means that its authority,
especially concerning the use force, be respected. But it also means
that the Council must assume its responsibilities -- and take hard decisions
-- when needed. Consequently, its credibility depends on a willingness to address threats to peace and security wherever they occur. And when it decides to act, it needs to have the resources to do so effectively. The progressive starvation of peacekeeping resources, human and financial, is a nightmare. The Council also must collaborate with other international bodies, including key UN agencies, and not ignore the importance and contribution of non-state actors, in mobilizing resources. Also, Canada will continue to promote collaboration between the Council and other regional and sub-regional security organizations. All have their roles, but such arrangements must spring from willing and effective partnerships, not from a void created by Council inaction. Finally, to be more effective, the Council needs to be more representative and transparent. In practical terms, this means the Council should take on new members and increase its size -- not just add a few new permanent members. It also means that the working methods of the Council should evolve so all UN members know what the Council is doing. And, this also means that the veto should be limited to issues concerning
threats to/ and breaches of/ the peace, as well as acts of aggression.
This would this enhance the long-term effectiveness of the Security
Council, and respect the original intentions of the drafters of the
UN Charter. In Conclusion What's in the future? Admittedly, Canada has an ambitious agenda. There are certainly no guarantees that we can achieve what we set out to attain in a two-year term. We need to be realistic. And clearly, the real-time demands of the world will inevitably – indeed already have! -- intruded on even the best-laid plans. So, over the next year and a half, we'll include human security concerns in the Security Council's activities, endeavour to help reassert the Council's leadership, and attempt to make it more transparent and responsive to the views of the international community. The Security Council is not an institution open to revolutionary change, no more than the UN. Canada has no illusions about the feasibility of introducing sweeping reforms. We'll bring our values and interests to bear on the Council during our term. Instead, we'll explore how and when it may be appropriate for the Council to take action in conflict situations in which it was not engaged in the past. The Security Council has, in fact, moved slowly in the direction that Canada is advocating: a steadfast, pragmatic, constructive engagement, a non-dogmatic approach. I look forward to hearing your views. It's your input that we need to make Canada's contribution to the Council over the next 18 months the most effective and valuable possible. I thank you. |
