Lester Pearson’s Role in the UN & FAO

Canada & the UN > Lester Pearson’s Role in the UN & FAO

United Nations Association in Canada's "Lester B. Pearson's Role in the Formation of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and in Other United Nations Activities" Continued... (Part 5 of 6)

Peacekeeping and Peacemaking

Pearson believed that Canada had a responsibility and indeed, a vital national interest, in active participation in any international activity that would lessen the chances of another world war. As such, Pearson was a strong advocate of the UN's role in peacekeeping and in strong Canadian involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. As well, he was actively involved in negotiations that led to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. Through his involvement in early UN conflict solving, both he and Canada emerged with distinction.

a) Palestine, 1947

In 1947, the UK decided to end its mandate over the Palestinian territory which had existed since World War I. Pearson was elected chairman of the UNGA's Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), created in May, to study the rising conflict in Palestine. After complex debates and negotiations, UNSCOP developed a resolution providing that Palestine be divided into an Arab state, a Jewish state, and the city of Jerusalem with freedom of transit between areas and economic union between the states. While the majority of nations, including Canada, supported the partition with economic union, this idea was strongly resisted by Arab governments. Before tabling the resolution before the UNGA, Pearson argued that the method of application must be clearly defined before the adoption of any plan. He pushed for the formation of a four-nation working group that would develop a partition scheme which would ensure that the process would be done in as careful a manner as possible. On November 29, 1947 the UNGA endorsed the amended resolution outlining a partition plan.^F8 In recognition of his work, Pearson was awarded the medallion of valour by the newly created state of Israel.

b) Korea, 1950-54

The UN Security Council’s response to North Korea’s invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950 was to immediately (same day) adopt a resolution urging its members to supply military units to repel the invasion. As Secretary of State for External Affairs, Pearson was in a position to facilitate a swift agreement and participation from Canada. The Canadian contribution of an infantry battalion was to be the start of continuing Canadian efforts to build a UN system of stand-by units to be ready to respond to UN decisions to resist aggression.

However, the UN force in Korea discredited itself in the eyes of many when the Commander, General MacArthur (USA), provoked China into entering the war by advancing close to the Chinese-Manchurian border along the Yalu River.

Pearson continued to be involved in UN diplomatic activities to resolve the Korean conflict over the next three years. For example, in December 1950, he was one of a three man cease-fire committee set up by Nasrollah Entezam, President of the UN General Assembly, which drew up a statement of principles for a cease-fire agreement. Later, he attempted to disuade the USA from introducing a resolution at the UN to condemn China as an "aggressor".

During his tenure as President of the UN General Assembly in 1952-53, his main pre-occupation was the Korean conflict. He was involved with complex negotiations in drafting, and having the UNGA accept, a resolution on the repatriation of prisoners, and finally an agreement for parties to sign an armistice on June 27, 1953. Later, as retiring President, Pearson spoke to the UNGA stating that "From the Korean experience we have, I hope, learned some lessons. One is that collective action against aggression can work, even when that action is incomplete, in organization, support and participation. Korea has been a vindication of the principle of collective action, but even more, it has shown what could be done if all members of the United Nations were willing, collectively, to pay the price to make such action effective."³¹

As leader of the Canadian delegation to the UN, he continued to be involved in further meetings in 1954 which attempted to have North and South Korea arrive at a political agreement. This process ultimately failed, but overt hostilities did not resume and the military stalemate continues. The UN failed to achieve a lasting political solution, but it did halt the invasion and ended the fighting.

c) "Uniting for Peace" Resolution

Shortly after the start of the Korean War, the USA tabled a proposal which would profoundly affect the ability of the UN to act as an instrument of peace and security. To date, the UN Security Council had had the primary role for the maintenance of global peace. However, with the veto structure, its ability to act could be stalled by any one of its permanent members. The USA proposed that the UNGA (which acted through majority consensus rather than veto) should be given the authority to act when the Security Council failed to perform its peace-preserving functions. It would be authorized to meet at short notice and to recommend collective action, including the use of force if necessary, if the Security Council was unable to take action.

Canada and Pearson were very supportive of the resolution as it addressed one of their original concerns during the formation of the UN at San Francisco regarding the veto mechanism. At the fifth session of the UNGA, Pearson stated that "It has always been the view of our delegation that the Assembly should be a second line of defense for the security of members of the UN... The Canadian delegation welcomes the US proposals which will make it possible, in appropriate circumstances, to fall back upon the General Assembly as an instrument to express the determination of free people to resist aggression."³²

The "Uniting for Peace" Resolution 377(V) was adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 3, 1950.

d) Suez, 1956

Without going into the complex origins, in late October 1956 an uneasy truce in the Middle East between the recently created state of Israel and Arab neighbours escalated into war. The British and French, both with financial interests in the Suez Canal, interposed themselves between Egypt and Israel, occupying key points along the canal in order to keep traffic moving. However, neither country had any legal right to do so. International tensions around the quickly developed deadlock had major implications for world order.

The global threat was three-fold: 1) the possibility of dividing the Commonwealth due to differing positions regarding the UK’s action; 2) a significant divergence of policy between the USA and the UK whose cooperation was the basis of the western alliance; and 3) a real potential for damage to the UN as an organization by countries unilaterally taking military action when the UN Security Council was still in the process of examining the original dispute. For Canada, there was the additional ramification of being forced to choose between the USA and the UK over such an important and fundamental issue.

Cease-fire resolutions proposed at the UN Security Council were swiftly vetoed by the UK and France which were both permanent members. As a result, the USA took the issue to the UN General Assembly where the veto did not apply, and where other countries, such as Canada, were able to voice their own proposals and to vote on a global security issue. In light of the crisis, the UNGA called an emergency session on November 1, 1956.

When Pearson arrived at the UNGA session, members were debating a USA resolution calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of all invading forces which was ultimately adopted after a vote of 64 to 5, with 6 abstentions.^F9 Canada was one of the abstentions, and following the rules of procedure, Pearson was permitted to explain the reason for the abstention.

He stated that the USA resolution was "a moderate proposal couched in reasonable and objective terms, without unfair or unbalanced condemnation" but went on to say that he felt that it was inadequate and therefore Canada had abstained. "... It does not provide for any steps to be taken by the United Nations for a peace settlement, without which a cease-fire will be of only temporary value at best... What then, six months from now? Are we to go through all this again? Are we to return to the status quo? Such a return would not be to a position of security, or even a tolerable position, but would be a return to terror, bloodshed, strife, incidents, charges and counter-charges, and ultimately another explosion which the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization would be powerless to prevent and possibly even to investigate."³³ He insisted that a mere cease-fire and withdrawal was not enough, that there must be arrangements to police the cease-fire and to prepare for a political settlement. And finally, he advanced the idea of an international police force as the solution. While it was not a new or uniquely Canadian idea, the timing, the wording and Pearson’s unique role at the UN laid the grounds for the establishment of an United Nations Emergency Force. Pearson "... was able to do it because he was well thought of by the Israelis; he had been President of the Assembly; he knew half of the Foreign Ministers by their first names; he had the support of the USA; the Egyptian Minister, Fawzi, could talk to him rationally"³⁴; and he had expert knowledge of UNGA procedures and politics.

After two days of skillful diplomatic back-corridor negotiations with key delegates and the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, and having received Canadian cabinet approval to table a specific resolution, Pearson presented the Canadian resolution to the emergency UNGA session on November 3, 1956 stating "The time has come for the UN not only to bring about a cease-fire, but to move in and police the cease-fire and make arrangements for a political settlement."³⁵ Canada’s resolution was passed 57 to 0, with 19 abstentions (including France, UK and USSR). In the days that followed, the UN Emergency Force commanded by Major-General E.L.M. Burns (Canada) was deployed, the UK and France ordered a cease-fire, Israeli forces withdrew, the canal reopened and a temporary peace was established.

By not condemning, isolating or antagonizing the States involved, Pearson was able to end the crisis through the United Nations by the creation of an international police force which would separate the combatants; would end the immediate fighting; and would allow the UK and France to withdraw from the crisis with a minimum loss of face and before being formally condemned by the UN.

e) Nobel Peace Prize, 1957

In 1957, Pearson’s remarkable diplomatic achievements in peacebuilding, and in particular in resolving the crisis of Suez through the establishment of a UN Emergency Force, was recognized and honoured with the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize. In his presentation speech, Dr. Gunnar Jahn, Chairman of the Nobel Committee emphasized that "the Peace Prize has not been awarded to the politician or to the secretary of state as such, but to the man Lester Pearson because of his personal qualities -- the powerful initiative, strength and perseverance he has displayed in attempting to prevent or limit war operations and to restore peace in situations where quick, tactful, and wise action has been necessary to prevent unrest from spreading and developing into a worldwide conflagration."

Click here to read Pearson's acceptance speech, entitled "The Four Faces of Peace".

f) Cyprus, 1964

During his tenure as Prime Minister of Canada, an outbreak of fighting between Greek and Turkish Cypriots erupted on Cyprus. The UN immediately authorized the sending of a supervisory force in order to keep the two sides apart. USA President Lyndon Johnson phoned Pearson and stressed the need for Canadian participation in the UN force. Pearson immediately instructed the Canadian military to begin airlift preparations but required approval from the House of Commons to actually authorize their departure. He tabled his proposal as soon as the next sitting of the House began and received unanimous consent. The prompt arrival of the UN force stopped the fighting from reaching crisis proportions and is a clear example of the UN’s potential for containing the outbreak of war.

Commission on International Development, 1968 - 1969

Almost immediately after his retirement from Canadian politics, Pearson was approached by Robert McNamara, President of the World Bank, which was calling for a major international study by a group of independent experts to analyze the past record of development assistance and to provide solid proposals on how the huge disparity in wealth existing between different countries could be lessened. On the condition that he be able to select the commissioners, the staff and the process and substance of the inquiry, in August 1968, Pearson assumed the duties as Chairman of the Commission on International Development stating that "I accepted because I believe no problem to be more important to the future of the world."³⁶

After an exhausting amount of travel for meetings and consultations with representatives from over 70 nations (both developing countries receiving aid and developed countries providing aid), Pearson and the other seven members of the Commission published its report "Partners in Development" in the October 1969. Hailed as a comprehensive textbook on international development assistance, the report convincingly and carefully argued that developed and developing countries must work in partnership if development is to succeed. It also provided convincing information and persuasive recommendations for donor countries to be more generous with economic aid. While the report may not have had any discernible direct impact on the policies of developed countries, it provided substantive ammunition for developing countries and is still frequently cited in international development debates.

According to Edward Hamilton, head of the Commission staff, Pearson "was the catalyst which allowed the whole enterprise to function and eventually to fulfill its charge" and that the report was "Pearson’s report, not because he wrote it but because it is difficult to imagine how it could have been done without him."³⁷ Indeed, much to Pearson’s discomfort and without his authorization, several languages translated the report as simply "The Pearson Report". However "he was partially mollified by the completely valid technical argument that the word ‘partners’ is almost impossible to translate into other tongues."³⁸

Even after the work of the Commission was completed, Pearson continued to be a consistent and convincing advocate of worldwide economic assistance, and of the need to put distribution, equity and employment at the very centre of development strategy.

Lectures and Speeches, 1969 - 1972

During his final years, Pearson returned to academia as a career, teaching predominantly on those major international events in which he was personally involved and lecturing on the need to strengthen the UN. An historian by training, Pearson knew the value of historical research, of learning from past events, of teaching the importance and relevance of preceding events before blindly leaping into something new. His students had the unique privilege of benefiting from Lester Pearson’s experience in the League of Nations, the formation of the UN and its various agencies, of the perils of war and the need for international peacekeeping, and of his vision of the UN moving towards "economic and social progress and away from poverty... toward the progressive realization of human rights and the dignity and worth of the individual person."³⁹

In 1969, the British Broadcasting Corporation honoured Pearson by asking him to give its annual, exclusive Reith Lectures -- a series of six 30 minute radio talks. In these talks, collectively titled 'Peace in the Family of Man', Pearson was able to reach a broad audience in voicing his strong beliefs in global peace and the role of the UN in achieving it. He stressed that excessive nationalism was the strongest obstacle to building a peaceful community; that there needs to be global economic cooperation and assistance to developing countries; and he proposed reforms to the UN in order to increase its efficiency and efficacy. "We must apply the science and art of politics to the affairs of the international community with the intensity of personal involvement that we give to domestic affairs. We must cultivate international ideals, develop international policies, strengthen international institutions, above all the United Nations, so that peace and progress can be made secure in the family of man".⁴⁰

What Made Pearson Successful at the United Nations

As Pearson’s son, Geoffrey Pearson, wrote "Success in diplomacy, like success in other fields of public policy, ... depends on a combination of three main factors -- timing, experience, and personality. If the times offer no challenge, or, on the contrary, overwhelm the efforts of statesmen to control events, the diplomatic record is likely to escape notice. Without experience, as in any profession, one starts at a disadvantage, and if one leaves a poor impression on friends or foes experience may not help much. Pearson enjoyed success on all three counts. ... There truly was a ‘new world order’ to be created in the years after the war, and it was in Washington, where he served from 1942 to 1946, that the creation began. So, while time and chance were fortunate omens for Pearson, it remained his challenge to exploit them. This he did, both by taking advantage of Canada’s new weight in world affairs as a result of the war effort, and by cultivating strong and enduring relations with the statesmen of the time."⁴¹

Much has been written about Pearson’s experience, career and abilities and the unique coincidence of his being in Washington at the opportune time for involvement in the creation of the United Nations and its agencies. Much has also be written about the horrors and despair of living through two successive world wars -- strong motivations for working towards international cooperation for lasting peace. Pearson not only lived through the two wars, he was an active participant in the latter years of World War I from 1914 to 1918, first serving with the Canadian Army Medical Corps for two years in England, Egypt and Greece and later becoming old enough to join the Royal Flying Corps. While pursuing a B.A. and subsequent M.A. in modern history, he watched as the world pinned its hopes on the League of Nations, established in 1919 after World War I, to prevent the reoccurrence of further global conflict. And during the late 1930’s, while serving in the High Office of the Commissioner for Canada in London, UK, Pearson was a participant in some of the final meetings of the League, living through the difficulties of watching its potential and promise disintegrate and ultimately fail.

All of these experiences never seemed to dim his idealism, his motivation, his drive, his unique personality about which fellow colleagues often wrote. Rarely does one find a negative description of his character.

Lester Pearson’s name should always be remembered as one of the men who had an enduring, influential impact on the formation and direction of the United Nations, and in particular for his vision of what more the United Nations could be. In defending and defining his vision of the role of international cooperation, and more particularly the United Nations, Pearson stated in his acceptance speech for the Victor Gollancz award: