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Canada & the UN > Newton Bowles Reports
Human Insecurity Utopia, we know, means nowhere. So where are we? If we dig deep enough with Dante, Sigmund Freud, and Samuel Beckett, we may find ourselves in Auschwitz, Cambodia, Srebernica, Guatemala, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Timor, or almost anywhere. We are all there, more or less, in our own domestic loony bins. Why? Our prefabricated past? Our fluid fractured present? The predatory beast? Eros unleashed? The dread of death? The dread of life? Greed? Lust for power? The desperate poor against the bloated rich? The autonomous political juggernaut? The blind corporation? The amoral masses? We do agree, don't we, that something or somebody is at fault. The normal is not normal. Fix it. If we take an epidemiologic approach to violent conflict world-wide, we are sunk. No known cause, no cure. Many causes, many cures? Where to begin? United Nations? Kofi Annan does not have the luxury of a hermit's speculation. Having risen through the UN ranks from head Peacekeeper to Secretary-General, he is 7/24 engagé. (7 days, 24 hours.) As we have seen, he took the Assembly into this heart of darkness when he said, in effect, we-- the UN-- must act to prevent and stop slaughter of the innocent. Following the Assembly's debate, we have also seen that, while no one defended slaughter, many said hands off, it is our domestic responsibility, no external interference-- an argument that does not fit some painful facts. No government is perfect. Will governments repent their erring ways at the UN? This is where the UN stands or falters-- tomorrow, tomorrow and tomorrow. As you very well know, the UN with its Security Council was created in 1945 as the instrument for preventing or stopping war between States. Its economic and social functions were thought secondary. To our surprise and chagrin, post-Cold War we have witnessed dozens of conflagrations within States. The UN had neither doctrine nor experience on what to do about that. One good thing about this crisis is that it precipitated some deeper thought about what is peace, what is security, and what causes war. Circumstances and glimmers in the Charter have been leading the UN Security Council towards a better understanding of all that. A new approach, "human security" (a radical breakout from fortress fixation), was articulated by our Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy at the General Assembly two years ago. Canada was not alone in getting this idea; and indeed it makes for a whole new look at our war-prone times. Events and experience have brought us-- the United Nations-- to this threshold. Peacekeeping as buffer between warring states has stumbled into peacemaking, peace enforcement, even peace building (repairing or creating civilian institutions). This has come about in the 1990's through a series of ad hoc decisions by the Security Council, as well as diplomatic initiatives by the Secretary-General and his people. Lacking clear guidelines, lacking experience, lacking resources and institutional capacity, results have ranged from astonishing success (e.g., Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Guatemala) to disaster (e.g., Srebernica, Rwanda). The UN is denounced not only for what it has done, but even more for what it has not. Time to gather our wits. Although the Security Council is sitting in the control tower, the entire UN is involved. This was assured through Kofi Annan's choice of the General Assembly to make his pitch. In reviewing the "general debate" I have sketched the preliminary skirmish. The discussion resumed in October and December. Before picking that up-- and with apologies to you who know the whole story-- may I take us back a few years to recall what has led up to this critical point. In post-Cold War euphoria, in 1992, heads of State gathered at the first and only summit meeting of the Security Council. Affirming their commitment to the UN as the custodian of world peace, they asked Secretary-General Boutros Ghali to prepare a strategy paper on the UN's role in maintaining peace. This he did in the "Agenda for Peace" (1992) and its "Supplement" (1995). With the exception of "Peace Enforcement" (on which the Council was silent), the main proposals in these thoughtful papers-- Dr. Boutros-Ghali's major legacy-- were accepted by the Security Council and the General Assembly, namely: Emphasize prevention More preventive diplomacy Better fact-finding, early warning Preventive deployment of troops Peacekeeping whenever possible: neutral mediation Peace enforcement (Charter VII) as last resort, in principle a UN function. Because UN now lacks this capacity, it must be delegated by the Security Council to member governments. Post-conflict Peace building should be done Small arms and land mines must be controlled or eliminated, Sanctions should hit the war-mongers, not the commoners. Whether or when the UN should go beyond diplomacy in intervening in war-torn societies was tacitly left to case by case decision. Although no rule was made on when to go in, the prevailing notion linked such an intervention to countering a threat to international peace. The 1992 euphoria was soon gone with the wind. In 1994, there were 78,000 UN Blue Helmets in the field; in 1998, 14,000. The Somalia débacle had scared off the U.S., which shared its introversion by constraining the Security Council. NATO took over in Yugoslavia, the big one. In 1998, two new peace operations were launched (Central Africa Republic and Sierra Leone) and two more since then (East Timor, DR Congo ???). In 1999, NATO bombed Serbia/Kosovo (without Security Council authority) while the UN at last took over full responsibility for Sierra Leone (relieving the West Africans, mainly Nigeria). Indonesia's brutal sabotage of UN-organized elections in East Timor shamed the UN into action. The Security Council even sent some of its members to see for themselves what was going on in East Timor, and then to talk to political leaders in Djakarta. Something new. Winds of change. Although the "Agenda for Peace" put peaceful intervention-- mediation, etc.-- way ahead of Blue Helmets, the Security Council was slow to leave its military barracks. What drew it out was the shift to intra-state conflicts, targeting civilians, mostly women and children. Feeding woman and children had been the rationale for Somalia. Massive humanitarian aid was assigned to the UN in ex-Yugoslavia. Both operations had foundered on political rocks. The lesson: any big humanitarian operation is inevitably mixed up in political and military warfare. Indeed, such humanitarian crises are political both in origin and resolution. Cease-fire is the beginning, not the end. The whole society needs restoration, healing, stability, livelihood-- that is, development. The UN Charter hinted at security concerns like this, saying that ECOSOC may advise the Security Council. This is a flash point for General Assembly sensitivity. Although the obvious linkage of security (peace, stability) and growth has penetrated the management of development (even the World Bank is into conflict resolution), the Security Council has no need to craft its own economic and social policies. What it must do is devise ways to mitigate the impact of war on civilians, especially refugees, the displaced, women and children; and to see that humanitarian aid gets to those in need. For the Security Council to pay more than perfunctory attention to civilian suffering is a qualitative breakthrough. This has happened in the past eighteen months: open meetings have been held on children and armed conflict (June 1998, March and August 1999); the protection of humanitarian assistance to refugees and others in conflict situations (September and November 1998, February 1999); maintenance/promotion of peace and security: humanitarian activities (December 1998, January 1999); the protection of civilians in armed conflict (September 1999) and the role of the Security Council in preventing armed conflicts (November 1999). Addressing the Council on 29 November, Kofi Annan pressed on with his challenge at the Assembly's opening: While war is the worst enemy of development, healthy and balanced development is the best form of long-term conflict prevention. If any of you recognise that statement, it is because I said it last month in an address to the staff of the World Bank. That was, I believe, an appropriate forum in which to broach that subject. For all its awesome authority, this Council alone cannot help member states to remove the long-term causes of conflict. Many of these fall within the terms of reference of other parts of the United Nations system, including the Bretton Woods Institutions, UNDP, ECOSOC, and even the International Court of Justice. Effective action would often require joint action by many different organs and agencies, just as it requires joint action by different government departments within Member States. These different agencies often have separate agendas and in the past have not been used to thinking-- let alone working together. This is now improving, but there is still scope for much closer co-ordination of policy among them, and also, in many cases, between them and NGOs or private corporations. The Council may wish to take the initiative in organizing discussion of the many and complex issues involved at the highest level-- perhaps at a meeting to be held during next year's Millennium Assembly. It is my hope that this meeting today will help the United Nations forge a consensus on these vital questions, and restore prevention to its rightful place as the first responsibility of the Security Council, and of the Organization as a whole. Responding to the Secretary-General, the November Presidential Statement (reproduced at Annex 2) is far-reaching in its implications. Here the Council reaffirms its commitment to preventing conflict wherever, requiring a comprehensive international approach to poverty, human rights and social/economic development. he responsive mood of the Council and Secretariat was surely affected by two recent probes into UN failures, the report on Srebernica (November 1999) and on Rwanda (December 1999). Both reports show that member governments failed miserably by withholding adequate funds for these operations (in the case of Rwanda, it was negative support-- forces withdrawn and not replaced). Both reports also identify incapacity, failed communicating, and bad judgment in the Secretariat and the military. That both critiques were released promptly and uncensored is salutary for all concerned. More percussive, however, were the booby traps of Kosovo and East Timor in influencing reactions in the Council and indeed in the whole Assembly. What the Secretary-General wanted was an inclusive discussion of preventing massive rights violations and violent conflict, looking at the whole spectrum of international interventions, force coming at the very end as the last resort. Instead, preoccupation with force took over. The danger here was that frigid polarization-- North/South, NAM/G7-- would get in the way of finding common ground. Stated in bald extreme-- Force yes, Force no-- the poles cannot be bridged, but the actual situation is not that simple. There is no absolute State sovereignty. The reign of international law is incremental. (Ergo, outlaws are excremental.) Yes, serious differences are why we need international conversation and negotiation. Serious differences cluster around the Security Council, as we see in the General Assembly's review of the Council's work; and, once more, its future (reform of the Security Council). While the majority, being excluded, want to limit its functions (General Assembly over all), at the same time there is tremendous pressure to get into it. Discussion of the Council's last report to the Assembly focussed on its private and confidential ways, and the indigestible lumber of its chronology. As it is, the Council has a hard enough time reaching agreement on its heavy platter of day-to-day bitters. On many current issues, it uses the device of a "Presidential Statement" to register some sort of common understanding, without the binding formality of an official Resolution. I can't imagine that the Council could put together an annual political retrospective. Appended to the Council's report are monthly summaries by succeeding Presidents; and among these are valuable insights. You may decry the Council's tiresome exhortations; but you can't say it is lazy. I don't have figures for the calendar year 1999; but during the 12 months (16 June 1998-15 June 1999) covered by its report, the Council held 121 formal meetings and 239 "consultations of the whole" (i.e., open to all UN members), considered over 90 reports by the Secretary-General and "processed" more than 1,400 other documents, adopted 72 resolutions and issued 37 Presidential statements. Among its concerns in 1999 were ex-Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Burundi (including the war crimes tribunals), Afghanistan, Libya, the Middle East, Iraq, Western Sahara, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Angola, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Somalia, Timor, Haiti, Georgia and Tajikistan. Anyone taking the Council seriously, as does Canada, won't be spending long weekends out in the country. Most home-grown wars are happening in Africa-- the latest count I have seen is 19-- so that the Security Council could hardly close its eyes to that richly troubled continent. "Home-grown" is not the whole story, since many problems are the legacy of the colonial powers (e.g., the Sudan, a colonial marriage of Islamic Arabic North with Christian animist nilotic South). After colonization, came Cold War manipulation of weak states (e.g., Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia) setting off stubborn malignancies. Dead cold wars live on most horribly in Jonas Savimbi, boss of UNITA in Angola, once the darling of the U.S. CIA. "Home-grown" has further to be qualified by the intrusion of wicked international commerce-- talk about intervention!-- into the filthy lucre of diamonds, gold, and oil, thereby subsidizing and sustaining bloody conflict (e.g., Angola and Sierra Leone). Well aware of these external sources of its troubles, Africa has been ambivalent about tackling today. It has correctly complained about the neglect of Africa by the Security Council, while at the same time opposing UN intervention (Blue Helmets) as a neo-colonial facade. This is all mixed up with the economic dependence of Africa on international investment and trade. Security Council indifference was one factor in pushing some African states into regional peacekeeping, most notably the ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States) armed intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In the Horn, IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) has tried to mediate in the Sudan and Somalia. Central Africa and Southern Africa are also making regional arrangements to defuse conflict. The OAU (Organization for African Unity), notoriously divided and weak, in 1999 set sail on an ambitious voyage of unification and reform. Heads of OAU States, meeting in Algiers July 1999, announced new rules for the club: beginning with its next meeting, no military regime would be let in. Said President Obasanjo of Nigeria: We are also agreed on the overriding need to uphold codes of decency, ethics and minimum standards of decorum among African Governments and their leadership. Gone are the days when the OAU turned a blind eye to the excesses and abuses of power by member Governments. Forceful and undemocratic changes of Governments will no longer be overlooked or tolerated. We intend to condemn in absolute terms all violations of these codes and to ostracize their perpetrators. It is our duty and moral responsibility to treat our citizens decently and humanely. The OAU wishes to create an African political and economic union with a Pan-African Parliament. Soaring into distant realms, Côte d'Ivorie said: "Africa can continue to exist only if the African Union becomes a true power." Resolution of African conflicts is the top OAU priority. Here I quote the Foreign Minister of Cameroon: No matter what the cost, we must eradicate wars and conflicts in Africa, particularly in Central Africa. We must halt the spiral of bloody confrontation and fighting in that subregion, which pits ethnic group blindly against ethnic group, political group against political group. It is not true that love of and devotion to one's own people or faith in one's own ideals must be proved by one's hatred towards others. These grim tragedies, as we know, are not inevitable. Fundamentally, they are the result of practices to which Africa must put an end; otherwise, the continent will be for ever left out of humankind's majestic march towards modernity. The diagnosis of the causes of this situation is already apparent: poverty, destitution, ignorance, the absence of good governance, the fragility of the nations and States concerned, and acts of interference of all kinds are at the heart of the problem Together we can combat them and overcome them. Hitherto the OAU has had little capacity or inclination to get involved in the messy process of conflict defusing. Ethiopia-Eritrea and the DR Congo are test cases. That OAU at summit has decided to take this on is good. So far, however, it needs substantial help from the UN. While Africa has been looking to its own hemorrhages, the Security Council itself has been studying the continent and what can be done. A special Council meeting in September 1997 asked the Secretary-General to prepare a study and recommendations. Coming out of this was a remarkable document exposing underlying sources of conflict (poverty, etc.) and the need for comprehensive external support, while at the same time telling Africans to put their own house in order. (It was relatively acceptable for an African Secretary-General to say that.) The report also decloseted international crime-- the trade that pays for small arms, etc. This pioneering study, going seriously into cause and cure, was certainly a precursor to the Secretary-General's intervention address last September. The many ongoing conflicts in Africa, case by case, have been a major preoccupation for the Council in 1999. Africa is what U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke has put on the agenda during his Presidency of the Council in January 2000. At last the UN is to have an adequate deployment (11,000) in Sierra Leone; and is on the brink in DR Congo, if the combatants settle down. The neglected disaster in Angola-- 2 million displaced, 40% serious malnutrition in young children-- is getting serious attention. Several African delegates praised the courageous initiatives of Canada's Ambassador Robert Fowler who, as chair of the Angola Sanctions Committee, has made several trips to the field to smoke out the illicit funding (arms for diamonds, etc.) that sustains this horror. (Our own Partnership Africa Canada has just released a meticulous study of the criminal diamond network that generated Sierra Leone's disaster. Who wants diamonds after this.) The present situation in Angola stems from Savimbi's refusal to join a coalition national government after he lost the 1992 election. Are UN sanctions now being enforced? Can there be a political solution? Before adjourning in December, the General Assembly had an overall review of Africa, conflict and development; and established a Working Group to seek new and comprehensive ways to help countries emerging from conflict. Coming back to the basic policy issue-- intervention-- posed by the Secretary-General last September, where are we? Predictable polarization has threatened constructive debate, not only in the General Assembly but also in the Security Council's Permanent 5-- China and Russia against the rest. In the Assembly, several speakers-- Egypt, the European Union-- said: let's get together and formulate guidelines for why, when, how. More realistic, perhaps, was Mexico in saying: let's think this over. What then about Security Council reform? On expansion and membership, to make the Council more "democratic" and more representative of today's UN, essentially no progress. About the veto, everyone except the Permanent 5 thinks its use should be strictly limited, since there is no hope of killing it just now. Most think it should apply only to forceful intervention (Chapter VII); which would not obviate another Kosovo paralysis. Germany made the rather quaint suggestion that anyone using the veto at any time should tell the Assembly why. Hear this, moreover, in a statement by the PERM 5 Foreign Ministers issued on 23 September 1999: The Ministers reaffirmed their support for reforming the Security Council, with a view to broadening its representation and enhancing its efficiency and effectiveness. They also emphasized that any attempt to restrict or curtail their veto rights would not be conducive to the reform process. While stuck on increasing membership, the Council has made real progress in becoming more "transparent" in its doings and its relations with others. The Council's work plans are available to all UN members and the S.C. President holds frequent briefings for non-members. The press gets written briefing. Weekly situation reports are circulated. Various arrangements can be made for consultation and participation of non-members, especially when a member is involved in something being considered by the Council. Canada was a leader in pressing for these reforms which will surely defuse some of the tension with the General Assembly. Opening the Assembly's debate on this intractable issue on 16 December last, President Gurirab said many delegations had told him another debate would be a waste of time. Many others, however, "with equal force of passion" felt it would be important to give everyone a chance to reaffirm their commitment to the UN, and their intent to offer practical suggestions on reform. Security Council End View An exhilarating (and exhausting) accompaniment to my doing this report
is that things keep happening. Chairing the Security Council in January
2000, Ambassador Holbrooke gets U.S. Senator Jess Helms into the UN
to break bread and shake fist; a miraculous consensus is achieved on
Swede Hans Blix (retired head of IAEA) as the new chief weapons inspector
for Iraq; and Canada's Robert Fowler keeps the heat on UNITA-Angola
with evidence of demands for guns and video evidence of Savimbi's crimes.
Holbrooke has made January Africa Month. HIV/AIDS, worse than war, gets
a full day with Al Gore, would-be successor to Bill Clinton, giving
the political punch. Nelson Mandela, coöpted to save Burundi from
doing a Rwanda, graces the Council with his dignity. And, mirabile,
the heads of the seven African states involved in the mess in DR Congo
spend a whole week at the UN (Security Council, Secretary General).
To name them, Kabila of DR Congo, dos Santos of Angola, Chiluba of Zambia,
Chissano of Mozambique, Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Museveni of Uganda and Bizimungu
of Rwanda. All key officials were there including Foreign Ministers
of seven other countries (Canada was there). A major effort to douse
this dangerous fire. There will be a UN presence on the ground. |
