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Canada & the UN > Newton Bowles Reports
The Security Council: High Ground, Low Road During 1998, the Security Council launched only two small peacekeeping operations (Central African Republic, Sierra Leone). Peacekeeping was otherwise taken over by regional or subregional organizations (in Africa ECOWAS, in Europe NATO), nominally with Security Council imprimatur (subcontracting-- or is this outsourcing war?). At the same time, the Council opened its doors to the humanitarians, holding open meetings (open to all U.N. members) on the impact of contemporary wars on civilians, on women and children, on refugees, on humanitarian aid generally; and also on broad-based post-conflict peace-building, and the Council's responsibility for preventing conflict, for "human security." Some say-- this comes mostly from NAM and China-- that such basic social and economic issues belong in the General Assembly (and ECOSOC), not the Security Council. Others-- the more "developed"-- would criticize the Council for ignoring the devastation of civilians-- 2 million children killed in war this decade-- because wars now are mostly domestic and are targeted specifically on ordinary people. It is indeed high time that the Security Council sat up and took notice of what every TV knows. Thus human rights, thinly disguised in humanitarian drapes, have filtered into U.N. Security. Cynics may say it's all talk, now that the Council has no teeth. And yet exposing this contemporary tragedy at this high political level cannot be bad. If you don't admit you have a problem, you aren't going to do anything about it. It follows that the Council remains the central forum for exposing violent conflict, anarchic conflict, wherever-- Afghanistan, the Congo, the Caucuscus. Humanitarians and human rights advocates need exposure, concern and support throughout the whole U.N. system. Once again, a glance at the past-- how it all began-- may help us understand the contentious neglect of the Security Council today. The overriding authority of the Security Council tells us what the World War II Allies had in mind for the U.N. The Security Council with its five permanent members-- the five Allies-- makes decisions that are binding on the entire membership. As in war, so in peace the Allies must act in consort-- any disagreement could obstruct or delay, hence the "veto." Yes, the Security Council should consult the general membership and the G.A. authorizes financing of Security Council operations. But that was a mere formality. Security Council membership carried with it the responsibility to contribute and participate more than others in the work of the U.N. Emerging from a staggering war, the Allies saw security as military stability. There was only a perfunctory nod in the direction of social stability. The basis of international peace was military: there was (and is) a Military Staff Committee, and U.N. members were obliged to provide armed forces on call. That's how it began. But the ink was hardly dry when the Alliance fell apart and the forty-year hibernation set it. No war, no peace. A.D. 1989, the USSR collapses, leaving a weak Russian bear and her wandering cubs. Brave new world! In 1992, the Security Council for the first and only time assembles heads of state. Exuding confidence in the benevolent power of their U.N. (i.e., the Security Council), they ask their Secretary-General to work up an overall strategy for U.N. maintenance of peace-- hence Boutros Ghali's Agenda for Peace (1993) and its Addendum (1995). By 1994, the Security Council had fielded 78,000 peacekeepers, and the U.N. peacekeeping budget was a lot bigger than the regular budget. But not for long. By 1997, peacekeepers deployed had dropped to 18,000; and to around 14,000 in 1998. What happened? Three things. First, the nature of conflict, call it war. Rare now are wars between countries, the only kind foreseen when the U.N. was created. Today, armed conflict is nearly always inside countries, with spill-over effects. What are the international security implications of domestic strife? What right does the U.N. have to get into domestic fights? Second, even in wars between countries, conflicting political fixations (so-called "national interests") choke the Security Council. Third, after losing 18 marines in Somalia, displayed in horrid detail on television, the supreme U.S. refused to commit troops to U.N. peacekeeping, despite the fact that the failed operation in Somalia was the direct responsibility of the U.S. commander on the spot. (Another wiseacre remarks that CNN is the sixth permanent member.) Results: when a small (5,000 troop) intervention could have prevented impending tragedy, the Security council withdrew from Rwanda-- and no one was willing to go back in to restore "security." In old Yugoslavia, while atrocities accumulated, the Security Council fumbled for three years (1992-1995), leaving it to the U.S./NATO to take over. In Africa West, with the Security Council standing aside, a subregional group-- the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) led by Nigeria-- tried to stop the visceral brutalities in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Faute de mieux, the Council went through the motions of approving these interventions, sometimes with a more-or-less symbolic presence (e.g., in Sierra Leone). So the Security Council is dead? Check it out. There are still 17 ongoing peacekeeping operations, vicious conflicts old and new confront the Council; and sleeping dogs-- the meshing of security, humanitarian aid, good governance, human rights, economic development-- are awake and roaming the corridors. Sated with tergiversation-- well, shilly-shallying-- the Security Council is still the most powerful arm of the U.N.; and its problems are core problems of the whole embryonic multilateral "system," of whether and how governments can collaborate, indeed of whether national governments can govern in this interdependent world. Reform? And there has to be tension between the exclusive Security Council and everybody else. The Security Council is under pressure to "reform"-- to become more representative of today's U.N. (especially developing countries), to be more open in consulting beyond its members and letting everyone in on what it is thinking and doing. Is it good, politically and functionally (maybe they are the same), to have 5 first class members-- the vetoing Permanents-- and 10 second class members, serving two-year terms? Why these two imperial ghosts among the Permanents-- France and the U.K.-- while the European Union is coalescing? Reform of the Security Council remains the most divisive issue for the U.N. After five years of exploration, there is no agreement on the basic questions: How many members? How many permanents? Does the veto remain, in what form, and who gets it? How arrange representative election? Germany and Japan (although identified as "enemy states" in Article 53 of the U.N. Charter) are the "West's" (or are we "North"?) favoured candidates for new permanents, but they certainly won't get in without major representation of the "South." Everyone agrees that the Council must be kept relatively small-- adding perhaps another 5 or 10 to the present 15 members. Regional groups have not been able to agree on their candidates-- and whether new members are floating or permanent makes a big difference. The only thing that came out of this Assembly was an agreement that any decision on reforming the Security Council requires approval by two-thirds of the whole U.N. membership (not two-thirds of those present and voting), i.e., no sneaky maneuvering to trick the Assembly. What to do? I revert to Ukraine's Ambassador Udovenko: in place of rigidity and mistrust, political will and courage. A Busy Council Although no sunburst lights up this tunnel, there is some marginal illumination. Fulfilling its Charter obligation, the Security Council presents an annual report to the G.A. The most recent report, covering the year ending 15 June 1998, runs to 360 pages; and instead of simply compiling or listing Council resolutions, it presents the Council's work in two sections: Questions considered by the Council; Matters (communications) presented to the Council but not discussed. Besides considering some general peacekeeping questions, protection for humanitarian assistance and the overall situation in Africa, the Council in that year touched on Albania, Iraq/ Kuwait, Liberia, Cyprus, Angola, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, ex-Yugoslavia (Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia), the Middle East, Haiti, Georgia, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, Tajikistan, the Western Sahara, Somalia, Rwanda and nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. The Council held 103 formal meetings and 215 "consultations of the whole" (i.e. with non-members); adopted 91 resolutions and issued 41 statements by the Council's President. (Presidential statements express the consensual views of the Council, often more interesting than formal resolutions.) An innovation is the monthly "assessment" by successive Presidents (a new President each month, in alphabetical order), among which were perceptive observations by Sweden, Costa Rica, and Portugal. For example, Sweden said that, while the Council had gone out of its way to open up consultations with troop contributing countries, these countries seldom "provide real input to the considerations of the Security Council." Sweden also noted that internal conflicts require both traditional peacekeeping and "political, economic and humanitarian assistance" with civilian police playing an important role. Costa Rica stressed the need to "democratize" the Council, and presented a "position paper" by the 10 elected members of the Council on improving working methods (fuller participation by other U.N. governments and non-governmental entities, fuller review of sanctions, fuller sharing of information on current and forthcoming Council deliberations). Portugal reported that, on his initiative, the Council had addressed the issue of child soldiers, hearing from Olara Otunnu on 11 June and 29 June; and pledging its support to the U.N. effort to curb this practice. Portugal also initiated monthly meetings of those chairing the several sanctions committees established by the Council on "convergence" and effectiveness. Of special interest to you, dear readers, my Canadian target (if you are still awake), is the opening to NGOs: a lunch for concerned NGO representatives hosted by Portugal as Council President, "for comprehensive and detailed briefing on the Council's discussions and deliberations," a practice which is continuing monthly (bring your peace-meal). Rather than leaving you hanging breathless in the middle of last June, I have gone over the continuing work of the Council to date. Besides the countries mentioned above, the Council addressed the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritria and the upset in Guinea-Bissau. The war-crimes tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda were reviewed. Special meetings and statements on Africa took place on 16 September, 24 September (Foreign Ministers participating), 19 November and 30 November (three Presidential statements: endorses the Security-General's report, recognizes socio-economic sources of conflict, commends efforts of OAU and subregions, supports the co-deployment of U.N. monitors in African peace operations, supports control of small arms). On 10 November, the Council also heard from the High Commissioner for Refugees, Madame Sadako Ogata, who observed that the number and the intensity of conflicts is growing. The distinction between war and peace is blurred, making it harder to identify and help displaced populations. Humanitarian agencies must not be left alone to face security problems. Following up on the Council's consideration of humanitarian action amid conflict on 29 September (with Louise Frechette and ICRC), on 21 January 1999 Under-Secretary Sergio de Mello (Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief) made a full presentation to the Council on the dangerous overlap and confusion between humanitarian and political issues, on the need to uphold humanitarian law, and the urgent need to protect humanitarian workers in the field. This was followed on 12 February 1999, with Canada's Foreign Minister Axworthy in the chair, by another open Council meeting on women and children victims of war. Continuing from the June 1998 consideration of child soldiers, the Council deplored what is happening to children, and asked the Secretary-General to suggest what should be done. With December bombs falling on Iraq, the Security Council closed out 1998 with a general statement on "Maintenance of Peace and Security, and post-conflict Peace-Building," as near as the Council has come to updating Boutros Ghali's Agenda for Peace. The gist of this brave statement, amidst the encircling gloom, is that the Security Council, having recognized that peace in Africa "requires a comprehensive, concerted and determined approach, encompassing the eradication of poverty, the promotion of democracy, sustainable development and respect for human rights, as well as conflict prevention and resolution...", now encourages the U.N. (the Secretary-General) to find ways to strengthen peace-building structures in peace operations. Throw the poor dog a bone. "Peace building," the advance from military to human security, activates Article 65 of the U.N. Charter which says ECOSOC may assist the Security Council. A good idea, but who is in charge? ECOSOC means the General Assembly means everyone clamoring to take over Security. Jurisdiction aside, comprehensive peace-building must prevail. Not to be dismissed is the Council's continuing informal but serious review of sanctions: can they be targeted to spare the poor and hit the powerful; and can they be enforced? Outsourcing Amidst this flurry and slurry, the reality is that more and more action is being taken outside the Security Council. For the old boys at least, legitimacy derives from the Council. Waning confidence in the Council is reflected in the 1998 decision of the OAU to ignore Security Council sanctions on Libya over the Lockerbie plane explosion. Only two new U.N. peacekeeping operations were launched in 1998 (Central African Republic and Sierra Leone). Theories differ on whether a regional organization is better or worse for peacekeeping: more knowledgeable because close, less neutral because too close, etc. Anyhow, only NATO has the military (if not political) capacity. OAU has a conflict solving "mechanism" on paper but it is weak and politically on hold. The Secretary-General has established a U.N. liaison office in the OAU. OAS wasn't able to take on Haiti; and the few old border disputes in the Americas are being resolved bilaterally with neighbourly mediation (Uncle Sam always at the ready). The C.I.S. is improvising in the Central Asia hinterland, with hand-holding by Russia, the OSCE and the U.N. In a report on UN/OSCE cooperation, the Secretary-General said that, in this region, the U.N. had taken the lead in Georgia (Abkhazia) and Tajikistan, while the OSCE assisted in Moldova, Georgia (South Ossetia) and Azerbaijan. There is no regional security apparatus in Asia, only the talk-shop of the ASEAN Forum. The Security Council has no rules of the game for sub-contracting, it is all ad hoc case by case. Our good Secretary-General has taken the commendable initiative of
bringing the regionals together to agree on how to collaborate. The
most recent consultation, in New York 28-29 July 1998, assembled 15
organizations: besides those mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Commonwealth Secretariat (ex-Britannia),
the Francophonie, West Africa (ECOWAS), the European Community and the
European Union, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the Western European
Union, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference. The current Presidents of the General Assembly and Security
Council, as well as senior U.N. people attended. The talk was about
prevention, early warning, exchange of information, exchange of staff
and of experience. Willing hands await "political will." |
