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UNA-Canada Research Papers> Agendas for Change Papers
by Jane Boulden and David Cox This paper was funded by the International Development Research Center The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and not necessary of the United Nations Association in Canada. This paper draws upon the discussions of the Agenda for Peace Working Group chaired by Mr. Geoffrey Pearson of the Canadian Committee for the 50th Anniversary of the UN. However, in its current form it is not a report from the group, but rather a set of proposals for further exploration. - - - - - - - Introduction: The Current Status of An Agenda for Peace Following its release in June 1992, An Agenda for Peace dominated discussion and debate during the 47th Session of the General Assembly. On balance, the Secretary-General's report was received warmly but cautiously by many states at the UN. Specifically, the developing countries resisted what they considered to be the interventionist thrust of An Agenda for Peace, epitomized, perhaps, in the Secretary-General's comments on the limits of state sovereignty. On the other hand, the western countries broadly approved of the Secretary-General's approach, but carefully avoided direct consideration of the most provocative recommendations on peacekeeping, notably those on the establishment of a UN standby force ("peace enforcement units") and the expanded concept of peacekeeping ("hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned"). In the outcome, at the end of the 47th Session the various resolutions and notes by the General Assembly and the Security Council had provided openings to implement some important recommendations, especially those on preventive diplomacy, the establishment of an early warning system, and improved management of peacekeeping operations. At the same time, the fate of An Agenda for Peace remained in the balance, particularly if its more than 40 recommendations are seen as a comprehensive blueprint for a reformed and re-energized United Nations. Since the end of the 47th Session events in Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti have dulled the reformist edge at the United Nations, and, with that, enthusiasm for An Agenda for Peace has diminished to the point where it is effectively off the agenda. The response of the United States has been particularly disconcerting. During the fall it became evident that the Secretary-General would not find support in the US Congress for US leadership -- neither for multilateral UN operations, nor even for an expeditious resolution of the massive US deficit at the United Nations, without which the world organization remains doomed to continued penury. President Clinton's address to the 48th General Assembly clearly signaled a switch in US security policy away from support for the United Nations: if any further confirmation was needed, the United Nations was not mentioned in recent statements by Warren Christopher and Vice-President Gore on current US security priorities. Nevertheless, the substantive recommendations in An Agenda for Peace may have staying power. Together, they constitute a comprehensive framework for UN reform which, for the most part, reflected the accumulated judgements of experienced officials and observers both inside and outside the United Nations. Leaving aside the (relatively few) peacekeeping recommendations which were novel, eleventh-hour additions to the report, the recommendations reflect a high degree of consensus on a practical approach to the strengthening and reform of the United Nations. Even though there is a current fatigue with An Agenda for Peace, therefore, its recommendations will likely continue to focus the discussion of UN reform. In these circumstances, the best approach may be to disaggregate the Secretary-General's recommendations, and re-present those which are the most important, have the most chance of implementation, and/or are of greatest interest to Canada.
Definitions This review does not propose to address all of the recommendations in An Agenda for Peace. However, it may be useful to consider selected recommendations following the structure of the Secretary-General's report, specifically preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building. Since peacemaking in particular has occasioned a good deal of confusion, however, some elaboration of the definitions provided by the Secretary-General may be helpful. An Agenda for Peace defined four consecutive phases of international action to prevent or control international and civil conflicts. Preventive Diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peacekeeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples.
Preventive Diplomacy Responses at the United Nations Improved information gathering and analysis is the essence of early warning and preventive diplomacy. The General Assembly debate on An Agenda for Peace focussed on preventive diplomacy, and culminated, in December 1992, with the adoption of Resolution 47/120, which spelt out in some detail the steps that might be taken to improve preventive diplomacy. In general, these measures represented a broad consensus that the United Nations should improve its ability to receive, analyse and act on early signals of potential conflict more or less along the lines proposed by the Secretary-General. Specifically, Resolution 47/120 called for:
In a parallel action, the Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General's views (in paragraph 25 of An Agenda for Peace) on the increased use of fact-finding, and encouraged him to make greater use of his powers under Article 99 of the Charter to bring such information to the attention of the Security Council. It also supported strengthening the capacity of the Secretariat "for information gathering and in-depth analysis", suggesting that outside experts could be seconded to help with political analysis and "eminent persons" should be available at short notice for fact-finding missions. Resolution 47/120 and the Security Council statement on fact-finding undoubtedly strengthened the position of the Secretary-General. Many of the recommendations required organizational change and the strengthening of the Secretariat in ways which, in the past, had been resisted by the Member States. This was perhaps most evident in the invitation to the Secretary-General to strengthen the early warning capabilities of the Secretariat. Boutros-Ghali promised that a plan for an early warning mechanism would be presented to the 48th session of the General Assembly in the fall of 1993. A secretariat task force reported on the requirements for early warning in the fall of 1993. The task force concentrated initially on the technical requirements (computer compatibility, data flows, etc.) of a system which would coordinate the extensive information bases already existing in the UN family of agencies. On that basis, it is possible to envisage that each department or agency would have a focal point for the assessment of early warning data, thereby making it possible for the senior managers of the United Nations to collate such information and create an alert chain which would give the Secretary-General and the Security Council some assurance that, as they considered any specific issue, all relevant information would be at their disposal. The political crises of recent months have delayed review of the early warning report by the relevant UN organs. Since the concept of early warning has been supported by both the Security Council and the General Assembly Resolution 47/120, as well as, on many occasions, by individual Member States, it seems essential that this review take place as soon as possible. Moreover, early warning was a key recommendation in An Agenda for Peace. It might be appropriate, therefore, now to ask the Secretary-General to provide a progress report on the responses to An Agenda for Peace and the steps taken to implement those recommendations which, like early warning, have received broad support.
Canadian Responses Canadian policy statements have long emphasized the importance of preventive diplomacy. In a joint brief to the Secretary-General in January 1992, the Nordic countries, Australia, New Zealand and Canada proposed the development of a comprehensive early warning system which would encompass both potential conflicts and an assessment of global trends. The brief argued that the United Nations had access to a great deal of information through its own agencies. Therefore, "[t]he Organization should rationalize and enhance its capability to collect, analyze and disseminate -- within the Secretariat and to the relevant U.N. organs and, as appropriate, to Member States -- information on current and potential threats to international peace and security." An Anglo-French proposal to the Secretary-General, which appears to have the broader support of the European Community, identifies various forms of assistance that Member States could provide to the Secretariat: personnel to undertake fact-finding missions, visit trouble spots and provide good offices; information based on national intelligence to be provided to the Secretary-General as appropriate, and equipment for transport, communications and services. The Anglo-French brief suggests that participating states should provide the Secretary-General with lists of personnel categorised by task, and indicates that Member States could finance much of the cost through national budgets. Along these same lines, in his speech to the 49th Session of the General Assembly, Canada's Minister for Foreign Affairs, André Ouellet, announced that Canada had prepared an "inventory of resource persons suited to missions of good offices or specializing in elections, human rights, the administration of justice" and other related fields. Ouellet went on to propose that better use should be made of the expertise of people in the field in strengthening the UN's preventive capacity. To this end he suggested that ECOSOC should hold public hearings with a view to anticipating problems and developing strategies for responses. The findings of the hearings would be presented to the Secretary-General and the Security Council for further action. Canadian policy recommendations on preventive diplomacy, therefore, might now focus on the following:
Peacemaking Conceptually, peacemaking -- action to bring hostile parties to agreement essentially through peaceful means -- is distinct from preventive diplomacy -- action to prevent disputes from arising between parties. In practice, however, the techniques are similar and, perhaps as a consequence, peacemaking through peaceful means under Chapter VI of the Charter has received little separate attention.
Responses at the United Nations Apart from the proposals on the use of military force and peace-enforcement units, the principal recommendations on peacemaking concerned the greater use of the World Court, the application of economic sanctions, including support to innocent states incurring special economic problems as a result of sanctions, and amelioration of potential conflict through social and economic assistance. In February 1993, the Security Council appeared to accept totally the Secretary-General's observations on the relationship of humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-building. It emphasized the critical role of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs as a coordinating agency for the various agencies and functional offices of the United Nations, and argued that "this capacity should be utilized systematically at a pre-emergency phase .... to assist Governments in averting crises that could affect international peace and security." Other than inviting the Secretary-General to explore ways of advancing cooperation with non-governmental relief organizations, however, the Security Council declaration did not initiate further specific measures on humanitarian assistance. In June 1993 Boutros-Ghali commented further on the need to coordinate humanitarian assistance efforts with peacemaking and preventive diplomacy. An early warning system, for example, would include data on humanitarian crises and serve the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Boutros-Ghali declared that he had taken measures to ensure the necessary coordination amongst the Departments of Political Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs and Peacekeeping, "as well as between all United Nations organizations and organizations". He was not specific, however, about what these measures were, and, at the United Nations, there were continuing doubts expressed informally about the ability of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs to persuade UN agencies to accept its coordinating role. These doubts seem to have been justified when in November 1993, Jan Eliassen, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, resigned, citing lack of support from the 38th Floor. The Secretary-General himself, however, lacked support: his proposal to unify all country-level activities of the United Nations under a single country representative was decisively rejected by the General Assembly, while his claims, as chief executive officer of the United Nations, to coordinate the activities of the specialized agencies have made little impression on those fiefdoms. In spite of the institutional inertia and obstacles to change, some adjustments have been made within the United Nations. During 1994, the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) began a dialogue and developed a framework for coordination and cooperation between the two departments. This framework will be adjusted as experience with new operations suggests needed changes.
Canadian Policy On the essential question of the use of foreign aid, and other forms of social and economic assistance, to help ward off conflict at a "pre-emergency" stage, a Canadian response would clearly involve a review of Canada's bilateral and multilateral aid policies. As with post-conflict peace-building, it raises fundamental questions about the purposes and assumptions of Canada's aid policy. To date, the Canadian Government does not appear to have made a specific response to these recommendations.
Peacekeeping An Agenda for Peace made a number of specific recommendations designed to improve the conduct of peacekeeping operations. These included a renewed effort to persuade Member States to identify stand-by forces for UN peacekeeping, improved training for peacekeeping personnel, the strengthening of the military staff at the United Nations, and plans for the rapid expansion of management capabilities as peacekeeping operations required. The report also made a number of recommendations to improve the financing of peacekeeping operations, including the establishment of a UN Peace Endowment Fund with an initial target of $1 billion, a revolving peacekeeping reserve fund of $50 million, and authorization for the Secretary-General to borrow commercially if necessary. These proposals were accompanied by the stricture that "there is one inescapable necessity: Member States must pay their assessed contributions in full and on time."
Responses at the United Nations Many of the proposals on peacekeeping resulted from the continued work of the Committee of 34, and were broadly supported by the Member States. During 1993 important and long-sought changes took place in the conduct of peacekeeping operations, all of which had been recommended by the Secretary-General. These included the creation of the Standby Task Force, a group which was charged to identify specific peacekeeping commitments from Member States and to assess the ways in which such commitments could be integrated so as to expedite the deployment of peacekeeping forces. Although the Standby Task Force appeared to be near the end of its work by the end of 1993, details of the commitments made by Member States had not been released and the Task Force seems not yet to have submitted its final report. Boutros-Ghali also reported that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations had been strengthened through secondments from Member States and the redeployment of personnel from other departments, an approach which helped strengthen peacekeeping operations in the short run, but which posed longer-term questions about the cost of a permanent structure, and need for a staff more representative of the Member States. The temporary measures strengthened the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, but left it still strained to the limit in the management of peacekeeping operations involving around 100,000 personnel serving under the UN flag. In April 1993, in modest quarters opposite the Secretariat Building, the Office of the Military Advisor began operating a Situation Centre. Equipped with a fax machine and telephones operating on commercial lines, the Centre began continuous monitoring, first of UN operations in the former Yugoslavia, and then of the operation in Somalia. If elementary by military standards, the establishment of the Situation Centre was nevertheless another landmark in attempts to improve the control of peacekeeping operations. The Secretary-General, moreover, held out the hope that it would become a focal point for all peacekeeping operations. He commented: "I am studying the setting up of an integrated situation room which will cover the United Nations peacekeeping operations world wide in all their aspects." The implication was that a more sophisticated Situation Centre would tie together the peacekeeping activities of the Department of Peacekeeping, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, and the Department of Political Affairs. This could lead to a combined operations centre responsible for both operational planning and supervision of peacekeeping operations. In a further step, an operations centre might be linked to an early warning system as discussed above. The Secretary-General also secured broad support for his recommendations on financing peacekeeping, but, over the course of the year, his major success proved to be a pyrrhic victory. On 22 December 1992, the General Assembly passed Resolution 47/217 which, responding to the Secretary-General's request in An Agenda for Peace, authorized the establishment of a Peacekeeping Reserve Fund of $150 million. Six months later, however, the Fund had received only $64 million, most of which had been spent not, as was intended, to allow a prompt response to crisis situations, but to pay ongoing bills because of the failure of the Member States to pay their peacekeeping assessments.
Canadian Responses Canadian policy has long emphasized improvements in the conduct of peacekeeping operations. In 1972, for example, Canada proposed that peacekeeping operations should be supported by an "International Headquarters Staff". The International Headquarters Staff would operate under the auspices of the Secretary-General and include military and civilian experts appointed by the Secretary-General. The headquarters staff would have been responsible for communications to and from the field, incidentally anticipating current demands for an effective Situation Centre at the United Nations to permit day-to-day monitoring of field operations, and provide prompt support to field commanders facing unforeseen situations. Canadian policy at the present time is remarkably similar. Building on recent developments at the United Nations which have led to the establishment of the Situation Centre and the strengthening of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Canadian officials now seek a much more capable UN structure able to provide the strategic headquarters for several large, multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. This headquarters would be organized so that it could deploy rapidly to the field and command a multi-dimensional peacekeeping force of up to 10,000 personnel. It would be responsible as well for establishing standards of readiness, inter-operability, and equipment requirements. The headquarters would be staffed by civilian and military personnel seconded to the United Nations by member states. Obviously, the establishment of such a headquarters would require a radical reorganization of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, with a part of the Department organized in accordance with traditional military lines. It also suggests a medium approach to the future of peacekeeping, one in which the United Nations would be organized to deal with complex peacekeeping operations, perhaps of the size of Cambodia, but not to conduct full-scale enforcement actions, thereby certainly excluding Gulf-style operations, and possibly leaving a question as to whether medium scale operations (say, 50-100,000 personnel) of the kind earlier envisaged in the former Yugoslavia would need a different command arrangement. Canadian diplomats should be encouraged in every possible way to promote this idea at the United Nations. To begin, Canada could offer to lead a multinational feasibility study, it should second military and civilian personnel to the headquarters, and it could offer standby units to the headquarters for training and operation. Far from being good but impractical ideas, these proposals, as the 1972 Canadian proposals indicate, meet longstanding needs at the United Nations. The current expansion of UN peacekeeping operations provides a not-to-be-missed opportunity to try once again to have them implemented. Both the current conduct of peacekeeping operations and the prospect of a strengthened Department of Peacekeeping inescapably raise the issue or representation. In presenting Canada's views on Security Council reform, Ambassador Louise Frechette has made Canada's position very clear. She commented that "broad support for Security Council action is a sine qua non condition of its legitimacy ... In this regard, there should be greater consultation between Council members and interested non-members before and during consideration of issues by the Council. As well, there should be increased opportunities for interested non-Council members to take part in Council debates. "Furthermore, consultations between troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations and the Council are also essential to ensure that the mandates envisaged enjoy broad support and to encourage the continued participation of troop contributors in such operations." These comments reflect the current reality that, increasingly, the Security Council meets in private, with only minimal statements about the direction and progress of its discussions. The troop contributing states, the majority of whom at any one time are not members of the Council, must glean what they can from informal briefings. While there are a number of possible solutions to this problem, Canada could propose the use of Article 29 of the Charter, which allows the Security Council to establish "such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions." A consultative committee constituted under Article 29 would allow the troop contributors to make their views known on the mandate, composition and rules of engagement of a peacekeeping operation or peace enforcement operation. It would satisfy the need of the troop contributors for consultation and information, and it would accord to the Security Council greater legitimacy than it is likely to enjoy if it continues to operate in private and with less and less claim to represent the larger membership of the United Nations. The composition of an Article 29 committee might vary according to the mission under discussion, or separate committees might be created for each mission. In any event, the committee would provide opinions and advice both to the Secretary-General and the Security Council. Incidentally, this proposal is also an old one -- both the Soviet Union and the United States recommended the use of Article 29 in 1970, and, at that time, Canada proposed that the Military Staff Committee be expanded to achieve exactly the same purpose. Current Canadian policy also places considerably greater emphasis than previously on the importance of training and education to ensure the maximum compatibility of different national contingents serving in UN forces. The current Canadian approach is that national training should be directed towards clearly defined UN common goals and good lines of communication between the personnel of countries involved. "Training the trainers" is seen as a niche for Canada, which, given its experience in UN operations, has much to contribute. The present government has made a modest start in this regard with the announcement, in February 1994, that it will provide funds for the establishment of a privately operated Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Centre using the facilities of the former Canadian Forces base at Cornwallis, Nova Scotia. The Centre is intended to help improve the training of UN peacekeeping personnel, and to integrate and improve the preparation, particularly of non-military personnel, for peacekeeping operations. The Department of National Defence has made it clear, however, that the training of military personnel would continue to rest with the existing military institutions, so that additional peacekeeping training for the military will continue to be the responsibility of the military schools and staff colleges. This means that every effort should now be made to expand the curricula of the military educational institutions in order to focus more sharply on peacekeeping. It is likely that, despite the Canadian commitment to peacekeeping, we lag behind countries such as Australia in this regard. In addition, the military educational institutions must address more directly the complexities involved in the new multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations, which will require calling to a much greater extent than previously on civilian peacekeeping experience as an element in the training of military personnel. At the international level, then Prime Minister Kim Campbell proposed to the General Assembly in September 1993 that a UN staff college should be established. This proposal offers the prospect of bringing together in a single educational programme all of the professional skills -- soldiering, policing, human rights and election monitoring, humanitarian relief -- which now characterize multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. Since a number of states appear willing to make national facilities available for this purpose, it will be important to elaborate as quickly as possible the Canadian concept of such a staff college, including the educational and training components, and the mix of professions which will be required in order to reflect the multi-dimensional character of UN peacekeeping. It should be emphasized that, following the Campbell proposal, UN officials and member states are expecting a follow-up. Conversely, many of the observations above about national training apply to the idea of a UN Staff College: the Canadian government should move expeditiously to develop the proposal and to offer Canadian experience and resources for its implementation. Somewhat anomalously in the light of current Canadian involvement in peacekeeping operations, formal Canadian policy on the commitment of standby forces to the United Nations appears to be that identified in the 1987 White Paper: "Canadian peacekeeping commitments flow from an established policy whereby up to 2,000 Canadian forces members can be called on for peacekeeping duties at any one time." The formal redefinition of the Canadian commitment - de facto, of course, the declared commitment has doubled -- may depend in part on the elaboration of a Canadian response to the longer term development of a true UN Standby Force. On the other hand, the problem of selectivity -- when, and in what circumstances, should the United Nations choose to intervene in a dispute, and by what criteria should Canada decide to participate -- are pressing problems both at the United Nations and for the Canadian government. The danger in identifying in advance criteria for participation is that peacekeeping situations tend to be very different from one to the next. Strict criteria, therefore, are difficult to define and likely to be pushed aside by events and situations. Moreover, the Canadian case is complicated by the reality that supreme national interests are seldom if ever at stake, and there is no case where Canada has been compelled by the force of events and the dangers to Canada to participate in a peacekeeping operation. It might be better, therefore, to identify certain general guidelines rather than strict criteria. These might include:
Of course, these guidelines are broad, but perhaps it is important that they be so. Before seeking narrower and stricter criteria, it might be well to recall the words of Lester Pearson responding to the apparent disparagement of Canada's peacekeeping policies in the early years of the Trudeau government: "... in few countries is there less likely to be a conflict between national interest and international policy, since in few are the requirements of interdependence so closely related to the maintenance of independence. I believe that this role, played not to spread ourselves or to gain prestige, but to discharge our proper international responsibilities, strengthened our national pride. This, in turn, contributed to national unity and a deeper sense of national identity."
Peace Enforcement An Agenda for Peace argued that the traditional methods of peacekeeping were inappropriate where an agreed ceasefire broke down or was otherwise not complied with. Since Member States might be reluctant to send their peacekeepers into high-risk situations, the report proposed that special forces -- peace enforcement units -- be constituted: "Such units from Member States would be available on call and would consist of troops that have volunteered for such service. They would have to be more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces." Peace enforcement units, therefore, would be a mid-point between traditional UN peacekeeping and Chapter VII style enforcement actions. Their use would be authorized by the Security Council, but they would be under the command of the Secretary-General.
Responses at the United Nations Neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council directly addressed the question of peace enforcement units. In subsequent clarifications, the Secretary-General indicated that he had in mind not a UN legion, but a standby quick reaction force composed of national elements, which in turn would be based on volunteers from the regular units of national military forces. In May 1993, however, the Security Council issued a statement on peacekeeping in which it set out a specific set of operational principles:
This statement might be compared with the official UN publication The Blue Helmets, where it is clearly stated that "peacekeepers have no rights of enforcement and their use of force is limited to self-defence, as a last resort. This means that if a party chooses not to co-operate, it can effectively defy a peacekeeping operation." The Council statement clearly indicated that force could be used against a party defying the UN mandate. It also allowed a slight opening to the Secretary-General's definition of peacekeeping ("hitherto with the consent of the parties") by allowing that there might be "exceptional circumstances" in which the consent of the parties was not a pre-requisite for a peacekeeping operation. Further deliberation on the feasibility of a standby force with a mandate beyond that of traditional peacekeeping, however, has been overtaken by the UN experience in Somalia and Bosnia. At least in the near term, both the concept and practicality of `peace enforcement' are in doubt, while the Security Council itself is most unlikely to generate the consensus necessary for further elaboration of the concept.
Canadian Responses Understandably, the initial Canadian response to the idea of peace enforcement was skeptical, reflecting the view that, since so many basic and practical reforms in peacekeeping had yet to be agreed, there was little point in diverting attention to such an ambitious proposal. In subsequent statements, however, the Canadian response was flexible. In her September speech to the General Assembly, then Prime Minister Campbell endorsed the general concept of a UN quick reaction force, but did not elaborate. During his speech to the General Assembly's 49th Session, Foreign Minister Ouellet went beyond this initial response and announced that Canada, drawing on international experts, would conduct "an in-depth review of the short-, medium- and long-term options" available for strengthening the UN's "rapid response capability" in times of crisis. The proposal for a UN standby force able to deploy quickly is closely linked to both early warning and preventive deployments -- proposals which have received broad support in Canada and elsewhere. The essence of preventive deployment is to contain a potential conflict through an early UN presence in the field: this cannot be accomplished with present peacekeeping arrangements, even if the standby task force results in improved procedures. Peacekeeping operations frequently take several months to deploy, especially since each one is basically ab initio. Since official Canadian statements have invariably emphasized the need for international action prior to the point where bloodshed hardens the attitudes of the parties, the exploration of the requirements for a UN quick reaction force is a logical extension of the Canadian approach.
Post-Conflict Peace-building In An Agenda for Peace, peace-building seemed to have two dimensions. First, it referred to actions in the immediate aftermath of conflict -- de-mining, the restoration of government, the supervision of elections -- to aid countries damaged by war. Second, and more profoundly, it drew attention to the need for long-term development as a solution to the renewal of conflict. The report went even further in asserting the linkage between peace and democracy: "There is an obvious connection between democratic practices - such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making -- and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order."
Responses at the United Nations In April 1993 the Security Council issued a statement on peace-building which was broadly supportive of the recommendations in An Agenda for Peace. The Council endorsement of peace-building, however, was long on encouragement but short on specific measures which might produce a coordinated response to post-conflict re-construction. Since the mandate of the Security Council does not, at first sight, extend to social and economic matters, its members were undoubtedly sensitive to the jurisdiction question, and anxious not to appear to be trespassing on the mandates of other UN agencies operating in the economic and social fields. As with humanitarian assistance and the collateral effects of sanctions, therefore, the onus was placed on the Secretary-General to contrive arrangements which would give substance to recommendations which had received broad support but required considerable organizational change if they were to be implemented. As suggested earlier, the Secretary-General's efforts in this area have not been well received. One year later, Boutros-Ghali remained optimistic that the various UN organs and specialized agencies would coordinate their efforts in post-conflict peace-building, but he could point to few tangible steps. The Secretary-General initiated consultations with the Bretton Woods international financial institutions associated with the United Nations on how they might coordinate assistance and action for states under and affected by sanctions. However, while the desirability of developing greater cooperation is clear the consultations have not yet resulted in any concrete action. Boutros-Ghali declared his determination "to address the root of conflict in an integrated manner", and, as the chief administrative officer of the United Nations and chairman of the Administrative Committee on Coordination, he promised "to do all that I can to merge many elements into a coherent and purposeful whole". The failure of his attempt to create a unified UN programme at the country level, however, suggests that the Secretary-General lacks the political power to overcome the opposition within the UN system. In sum, the idea that the UN system as a whole should be directed to assist in the reconstitution of societies devastated by conflict is one which has enjoyed broad support in principle, but which seems likely to be exceedingly difficult to implement.
Canadian Responses Together with the parallel emphasis under the rubric of peacemaking, post-conflict peace-building focuses attention on the non-military elements in peacekeeping and peacemaking. Peace-building requires the coordination of the military aspects of peacekeeping with aid policy, election monitoring, human rights policies, police training, and the range of development and humanitarian relief programmes provided by NGOs. Although some progress may have been made in assimilating the experience of these various groups in past peacekeeping operations, there is not yet a coordinated Canadian policy, or a process for bringing together the various agencies who would be involved in post-conflict peace-building.
Conclusion This preliminary assessment of the Canadian response to An Agenda for Peace suggests that, once the report is treated as a lengthy list of proposals which can be disaggregated and revisited on a selective basis, there are many policy options to be explored. Amongst these there are a number where Canadian initiatives would be valuable and helpful to the broader attempt to strengthen UN peacekeeping. Of these, perhaps the most important and timely is the development of an appropriate follow-up to the Canadian proposal for a UN Staff College. As a practical measure, this should not in the first instance take the form of a blueprint for a Staff College run by the United Nations itself. Instead, Canada should take advantage of its excellent facilities and human resources, as well the proximity of existing military educational facilities to the United Nations itself, to create a military centre of excellence and training in UN peacekeeping. Well designed courses at such a centre would be made available to a wide range of countries already anxious to improve the skills of their military personnel, as well as to Canadians. While the centre would be primarily operated by the Canadian military, it would be essential to incorporate the experience and insights of civilians into the curriculum. Such a centre should be envisaged from the outset as having international standing, and as providing an important educational and training dimension to the existing modest programs at the United Nations itself. In addition to this key initiative, Canada could take other immediate steps, viz:
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