Liaison Newsletter > LIAISON Vol. 3, No. 4, July 1999 - Articles

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The Kosovo Peace Agreement and the Future of the U.N.
Geneviève Talbot, Peace and Security Project Officer, UNA Canada

On 24 March 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched its military operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). For humanitarian reasons, NATO decided to deal harshly with a sovereign nation. The United Nations stayed out of the conflict until 11 June of this year. The Security Council only became actively involved in resolving the conflict as a result of international pressure. Therefore, on 10 June 1999, the Council adopted resolution 1244. This resolution marks the end of the war, launched by NATO incidentally, and establishes peace-restoring measures.

However, this peace agreement, unlike any peace agreement so far, raises some interesting questions about the future role of regional organizations and of the United Nations in international crisis management. Indeed, in the name of humanitarian interference, two crucial international relations principles have been violated, namely the sovereignty of States, and U.N. statutes. Furthermore, the future of the United Nations hinges on this turning point. The peace agreement signed under the auspices of the Security Council may provide some clues to determine what the U.N.’s role will be in the years to come.

Resolution 1244 marks the beginning of a new era for the United Nations since the civilian duties are shared between U.N. agencies and independent international organizations and because, for the first time, the military contingency has its own hierarchical vote. Thus, the conflict between NATO and the FRY marks a turning point in international relations.

According to the peace agreement, the Council’s intention is to ensure that the international community is responsible for rebuilding the FRY. However, although the civilian forces are clearly under U.N. control, the same cannot be said for the military ones. The Secretary General has delegated certain operations to regional European agencies. In fact, the U.N. is only directly responsible for the interim civilian administration and, through the UNHRC, for humanitarian issues. However, the U.N. coordinates all activities related to the overall civilian presence.

Security is not a U.N. concern even though it is under its auspices. The special Representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo should work closely with the military force command. On the field, the United States, through NATO International Security Forces (KFOR), head the military forces.

Who benefits from the peace agreement: NATO or the U.N.?

Some believe that the peace agreement drafted as part of the United Nations Organization strengthens the U.N.’s role in resolving this conflict. In fact, if NATO was able to take military action without the U.N.’s consent, it was politically impossible. For this reason, the peace agreement was signed before the Security Council and not NATO. In fact, the case of Kosovo proves not only that the U.N. remains the only international agency capable of managing conflict resolutions and of helping the rebuilding of the countries concerned, but also that Council members are able to overcome their own personal interests in the name of international security.

However, we should not forget that this peace agreement was formerly drafted by the G-8 member countries. Does this mean that the G-8 will replace the Security Council in international crisis management? Or will U.N. actions be submitted to the G-8, NATO, or other regional agencies? Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the U.N. is responsible only for the civilian facet of this agreement. Does this mean that the future role of the Council will limit itself to humanitarian aid management and that international security issues will be handled by regional military organizations? What’s more: the heads of state of the seven most highly industrialized nations and Russia agreed on humanitarian aid as part of the G-8 meeting, and not the Security Council, nor a U.N. General Assembly.

In conclusion, the U.N. seems to be at a crossroads and the Balkan crisis may be the catalyzer for changes to come. Either the U.N. will come out a winner and profit from this crisis to improve its effectiveness, or this crisis will shed light on an even greater marginalization of the U.N. as an international force.