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|  | Liaison Newsletter > LIAISON Vol. 3, No. 3, May 1999 - Articles
TUNA-Canada's Position on the Situation in Kosovo The following is a copy of a letter approved by the National Board of Directors explaining UNA-Canada's position on the Kosovo crisis that was sent to the Prime Minister. It was distributed as a press release the following day. April 16, 1999 Rt. Hon. Jean Chrétien Dear Prime Minister, We have taken note with interest of the Statement by the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the NATO Council held on April 12th, 1999 Concerning the Situation in and around Kosovo. The decision by NATO to bomb Yugoslavia/Serbia so as to force the Milosevic government to accept the Rambouillet agreement was supported by the Canadian government and the Canadian Parliament. This Canadian commitment, including the dispatch of war planes, was in contrast to the policies followed by every Canadian government since the founding of the United Nations, namely,that Canadian forces would be used abroad only at the behest of the United Nations. Canadian military involvement in the Congo, Korea, the Persian Gulf, Somalia and in a long list of peacekeeping operations provides striking evidence of this policy. The UN Charter does recognize the legitimacy of action by regional bodies but to date has not set guidelines. Nor has it developed the will, the policies or the means to intervene in the internal affairs of a member state where human rights abuses are taking place. In Kosovo, NATO has displaced the UN after diplomatic talks failed. Its justification for doing so was that a Russian/Chinese veto would make it impossible to intervene militarily under UN Security Council (UNSC) auspices to halt the major abuses of human and community rights by Serbian forces against the Kosovars. To most members of the UNA/C, Canada’s decision to breach the Charter of the UN by making war on a sovereign state without either the justification of self-defence or a UN Security Council decision was deeply disturbing. Our members were revolted by the actions of the Milosevic regime, including its Bosnian Serb dependents in carrying out "ethnic cleansing" and other human rights violations and atrocities. Some reluctantly accepted, or at least hesitated to speak out against, the NATO decision to use force against Serbia/Yugoslavia; some spoke out against the use of bombing raids, others have spoken out against any military intervention. In the weeks that have followed NATO’s first attacks, it has become increasingly evident that humanitarian ends are not being served. The NATO strategy of using bombs has not stopped the massive expulsion of Kosovar-Albanians by the Serbs and huge refugee flows across the Macedonian and Albanian borders. Rather than ending human rights abuses, NATO bombs appear to have provoked a larger-scale onslaught and greater misery in Kosovo. The introduction of ground troops into the area, without Yugoslav agreement, has the potential to result in a wider war, and has already increased tensions tensions with Russia to dangerous levels Given these circumstances, the UNA/C calls on the Canadian government to: 1) Urge NATO to consider a temporary halt in the bombing. 2) After urgent consultations with like-minded states and strongly interested states such as Russia, recommend a UN-centered process of negotiation, led by the UN Secretary-General that will, in order of priority, a) seek to assure UN-sponsored protection for refugees returning to Kosovo, b) seek to protect individual, community, and religious rights in Kosovo, and c) seek a permanent end to the bombing and a peace agreement among the Serbs, Kosovo, neighbouring states, and NATO under UN auspices and d) seek to end the military involvement in the Kosovo region. 3) If no agreement can be reached, work within the UN to extend sanctions against Yugoslavia/Serbia, specifically on oil and arms and freezes on foreign travel and foreign bank accounts, but excluding humanitarian aid (medicine, food and human services). 4) Continue to support multilateral solutions through the UN by intensifying efforts to persuade the U.S. Congress to pay U.S. arrears to the UN so as to maintain its respect and credibility in the international community. We recognize that this return to respect for International Law may not be easy to attain and that all problems will not be solved overnight. The UN Security Council, hobbled by the vetoes of the Permanent 5, falls well short of an ideal instrument for achieving common security. We should remember, however, that our only formal obligation as a NATO member is to assist one or more of the parties that may be subject to armed attack (Article 5 of the Treaty). This is not the case. Indeed, the Treaty asserts the "primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 7). We believe that to do what we can to support this responsibility, despite the obstacles, will better serve the objective of protecting "human security" in the long run. |
